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Abstract
Charles Peirce, the founder of Pragmatism, is not known for having developed a norma-
tive and ethical theory. His remarks on ethics and normativity are scattered and sparse.
There is nonetheless increasing interest in developing these aspects of Peirce’s thought.
Peirce takes logic to fall under the normative sciences and the open question, as I take
it here, is whether the normativity Peirce takes to be present in logic and inquiry can be
generalized to form an ethical theory. Most broadly Peirce takes an ethical theory to be
a general guide for conduct — it is a guide for conduct in thought, action or behavior
more generally, and in feeling. The question becomes whether Peirce’s theory of logic and
inquiry can offer a more general guide for conduct. Peirce’s writings on the classification of
the normative sciences, as well as his ‘Philosophy and the Conduct of Life,’ have led many
scholars to answer in the negative. I think that an ethical theory nonetheless arises from
within Peirce’s writings on logic and inquiry. In this dissertation, I lay the foundation for
this alternative approach by showing how Peirce’s theory of logic and inquiry serves as a
guide for behavior.
The basis for the argument can be briefly summarized. Peirce’s logic and theory of
inquiry provide normative standards that apply to changes in belief. Peirce takes the for-
mation of a belief to be an inference, and Peirce’s logic and theory of inquiry give us the
tools (at least the thought goes) to evaluate these inferences. Peirce also supposes a con-
nection between belief and action. According to Peirce the meaning of a belief is the mode
of action the belief establishes. The conjunction of these two claims suggests how a more
general guide for conduct can be motivated from within Peirce’s writings. It suggests that
for the Peircean pragmatist the normative standards that apply to belief formation apply
directly to established modes of action. This dissertation offers a systematic development
of this connection. I show how Peirce takes normative standards to apply to belief, and
then show how these standards correspond directly to changes in an individual’s behavior.
I begin with a characterization of Peircean pragmatism based on what I call the Con-
tinuity of Explanation. The Continuity of Explanation is the commitment that every
judgment entails consequences for action that are accountable to scientific investigation.
The Continuity of Explanation captures what I take to be the core aspects of Peirce’s
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theory of judgment and inquiry. It follows from situating the role the pragmatic maxim
serves in regulating scientific inquiry and distilling this maxim through Peirce’s theory of
judgment. I go on to demonstrate how the Continuity of Explanation serves as a guide
for developing more reasonable behavior. The characterization of Peircean pragmatism in
terms of the Continuity of Explanation yields further advantages. It provides a unified
framework to view Peirce’s metaphysics, offers a straightforward account of Peirce’s theory
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Charles Peirce, the founder of pragmatism, increasingly came to emphasize the connection
between pragmatism (or his pragmaticism, as he would later come to call it) and the more
general development of reasonableness. The reasonable, according to Peirce, is an ideal
suggested to us by logic:
But the saving truth is that there is. . . an element of Reasonableness to which
we can train our own reason to conform more and more. If this were not the
case, there could be no such thing as logical goodness or badness; and therefore
we need not wait until it is proved that there is a reason operative in experience
to which our own can approximate. [CP 5:160]1
As we develop a method of reasoning, and so train ourselves to reason better, we begin to
act more and more reasonably. Peirce referred to the development of reasonable behav-
ior as the development of concrete reasonableness. Linking the development of concrete
reasonableness to pragmatism, Peirce writes:
1Peirce, C. S. (1958-1966). Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press. Here and throughout referenced by [CP: Volume, paragraph number].
1
Accordingly, the pragmaticist does not make the summum bonum to consist in
action, but makes it to consist in that process of evolution whereby the existent
comes more and more to embody those generals which were just now said to
be destined, which is what we strive to express in calling them reasonable. [CP
5:433]
The development of good reasoning leads to the embodiment of reasonableness. This is the
ideal and result to which Peircean pragmatism aims.2 The thesis presented here offers what
I take to be systematic account of this development. It shows that Peircean pragmatism
suggests a method of reasoning and shows how this method of reasoning subsequently
suggests the development of more reasonable beliefs and correspondingly more reasonable
behaviors. In short Peircean pragmatism offers, I argue, a theory for developing reasonable
behavior.
As a logician most of Peirce’s work is rooted in his theory of logic. His development of
pragmatism is no exception, and so it should perhaps not be surprising that Peircean prag-
matism be seen as offering a method of reasoning. Two further preliminary considerations
support the position. First, it is generally recognized that Peircean pragmatism offers both
a theory of meaning and a theory of inquiry.3 The theory of meaning, emphasized notably
in “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” [EP1: 124-141,1878], suggests a means of clarifying our
thoughts by tracing out their practical consequences. The theory of inquiry, emphasized
notably in “The Fixation of Belief” [EP1:109-123, 1877], suggests the scientific method
as a means of testing a conception against experience. The two papers and theories were
intended to go together4, and they form the first two papers in a six-part series written by
Peirce titled “Illustrations of the Logic of Science.” What I want to suggest is that both
be read in terms of an underlying appeal to scientific reasoning. Faced with an unclear
thought, a scientific inquirer would reason through its experiential consequences, develop-
2See discussions of concrete reasonableness in Peirce in [1, most notably from p. 41-56], [3, p. 142-145],
and throughout [19].
3See a discussion (and colligation) of the two in [9]. A comparison and initial taxonomy is given in [32].
4See a discussion in [26, p. 7-9, also Chapter 7 & 8]. The proposed title for the combined work was
“Essays Toward the Interpretation of Our Thoughts” [CP 7:313, note 1].
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ing at the same time both the content of the thought as a hypothesis and its conditions for
testing. Peircean pragmatism — and I go on to substantially defend this view in the thesis
— is intended as a method for developing scientific reasoning. A second preliminary con-
sideration suggests that Peircean pragmatism provides method for developing reasoning. If
it is the case that pragmatism leads, as the passages above suggest, to the development of
reasonableness, then Peircean pragmatism in its earliest stages must contain the rudiments
of a method of reasoning — a rudiment, we may say, of reasonableness. Both suggest that
Peircean pragmatism at its core is intended as a method for developing reasonableness and,
in particular, reasoning in accord with scientific investigation.
While I do not take the broad point to be controversial to Peirce scholars, developing the
characterization produces surprising results. For one, it shows that a substantial amount
of Peirce’s philosophy can be recovered from a few simple assumptions about developing
reason. As we’ll see, Peirce’s conception of belief and inquiry, realism, and the like can all be
recovered and situated within this account. At the same time, the characterization suggests
a unified framework to understand Peirce’s underlying metaphysical assumptions.5 In each
case seeing Peircean pragmatism as a method for developing reasoning proves positive and
fruitful.
The focus of the dissertation is to take this one step further. It shows how the method
of reasoning on offer recommends certain behaviors as well. Far from a mere method of
reasoning in thought, the method offers a theory of reasonable behavior. Certain behaviors
are appropriate to inquiry. Developing this account of reasonable behavior in Peircean
pragmatism is the focus of the thesis. The discussion includes a Peircean theory of action
that shows how Peircean pragmatism distinguishes types of behavior. Types of behavior
that I discuss include self-controlled, deliberate, and intentional behavior. Each arise in
Peirce’s writings and are taken to be significant to inquiry. The discussion also details
behaviors that are characteristic of the practice of inquiry. These behaviors include the
will to learn, fallibilism, and what Peirce calls synechism, which is the tendency to view
the world as continuous. Further behaviors are shown to correspond with the methods
5For an overview of potentially conflicting metaphysical commitments within Peirce’s thought, see [10],
[7], and [23, p. 65]. [14, Ch. 7] offers another description of the problem and offers a potential resolution.
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of developing and testing different types of inference. The result shows how Peircean
pragmatism offers a guide for developing more reasonable behavior — behavior that is,
at least according to the Peircean pragmatist, in accord with Peirce’s characterization of
scientific inquiry.
Peircean pragmatism offers a theory for developing reasonable behavior. Let me offer
what I take to be the core assumptions upon which the discussion is based. Peirce takes
the result of inquiry to be a belief. I argue here that Peircean pragmatism follows from two
further assumptions. The first is that belief corresponds with a mode of action. According
to Peirce the meaning of a belief is the set of possible behavior that the belief establishes.
This first assumption provides the Peircean pragmatist with a direct connection between
belief and the ensuing behavior. The second is that the belief that is the result of inquiry is
a judgment. What Peirce has in mind here, it that a belief that is the result of inquiry can
be represented as a series of inferences. This second assumption allows Peirce to appeal
to logical considerations within inquiry. Belief, action, and inference (and the subsequent
judgment) are inseparably connected in Peircean pragmatism.
With these conceptual connections in place, it is relatively straightforward to see how
Peircean pragmatism offers a theory for developing reasonable behavior. Peirce offers a
method of reasoning for engaging in inquiry. The method allows us to evaluate inferences
and so allows us at the same time to determine whether a judgment, belief, and the corre-
sponding set of established behavior are reasonable. The method of reasoning Peirce offers
goes further. In offering a method of inquiry, the method also results in the development of
reasonable beliefs. As a method it recommends certain behaviors and judgments. Peircean
pragmatism offers a theory for developing reasonable behavior.
1.1 Situating the Contribution
There has been growing interest in Peirce’s thoughts on ethics and normativity. An an-
thology by the name has even emerged (see [8]). The question, I take it, is whether the
normativity Pierce thought present in logic and inquiry can be applied to behavior more
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generally. This literature is motivated mostly by an interest in Peirce first and an interest
in normativity and ethics second. It is clear from the anthology, however, that no clear
consensus on Peirce’s thoughts on normativity or ethics has arisen. My interest here is
ultimately in Peirce’s thoughts on normativity and ethics as well. The long range goal is to
develop these aspects of Peirce’s thought. This dissertation provides the groundwork for
such a further project. The dissertation does not present a Peircean ethical or normative
theory, but develops what I take to be the first step towards offering such a theory. The
groundwork on offer is positioned, as I argue below, to provide a number of advantages
over its predecessors in the literature. Each of the key aspects of the present work — the
motivation for developing an alternative account of Peirce’s ethics, the resulting contribu-
tions to scholarship, and my adopted methodology — are each best seen in terms of this
further goal of developing Peirce’s normative and ethical theory. In this section I discuss
two strands within Peirce’s writings that have been predominately emphasized in the liter-
ature on a Peircean ethics. I go on to situate a third strand that will be my interest here,
and which I go on to defend in the next section.
Peirce recognizes that logic falls under the normative sciences. Logic, according to
Peirce, is broadly concerned with correct inference. As a practice logic then relies on a
more general sense of correctness.6 This sense of correctness rests on the conformity of
some action — at least action in thought or inference — to an ideal. Logic falls under the
normative sciences according to Peirce because it is concerned with the conformity of an
action to an ideal. Peirce also discusses a second, more general normative science. While
logic restricts itself to conduct and ideals in thought, Peirce called the more general study
of conduct and ideals in action in general practics [CP 1:573]. Practics is concerned with a
general theory of conformity of action to ideals. The recognition that logic is a normative
science, and that practics is a more general study of the conformity of an action to an
ideal, is the starting point upon which most of the discussion on Peirce’s normative and
ethical thought is based.
6According to Peirce this sense of correctness relies on a more general sense of appreciation, which falls
under the esthetic. Peirce defends making a sense of appreciation the most general form of deliberate
conduct in [EP 2:377-8].
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Peirce was interested in the normativity in logic and inquiry but wrote little about its
relation to ethics. The question is whether one can generalize Peirce’s thoughts on logic
and inquiry in the hope of describing what a Peircean ethics might look like. While I
ultimately disagree with some of the generalizations and conclusions of these attempts (a
point I will elaborate on below), my work here is still very much in this same spirit. I take
Peirce’s writings on inquiry, scientific practice, and the normativity he thought present in
those practices as my starting point, and take them to offer the groundwork for a Peircean
ethical theory.
Research on Peirce’s ethics has been dominated by discussion of two strands within
Peirce’s thought. The first strand emphasizes some of Peirce’s comments on the relation
between ethics and his classification of the normative sciences. His comments in these
passages are mostly negative, and he suggests at the start that ethics cannot be a normative
science. The second strand emphasizes a lecture given by Peirce in Cambridge in 1898 title
‘Philosophy and the Conduct of Life’. During the lecture Peirce suggests at times that
ethics and ethical sentiments have no place in science as a theoretical discipline.
Let me first focus on Peirce’s remarks on the relation between ethics and the normative
sciences. Peirce suggests, at least on one occasion, that the study of ethics goes beyond the
study of logic and practics [CP 1:573].7 Ethics, he writes, requires making an additional
judgment about which ideal is the best to pursue — a pronouncement, he thinks, the study
of practics cannot provide. The motivation here seems to be that practics is limited to
the descriptive study of how an ideal can be pursued if it were to be endorsed, but says
nothing about which ideal should be pursued. In other passages Peirce also goes on to
question the objectivity found and sought in ethics. He suggests the study of ethics in the
end simply reflects a “a sort of composite photograph of the conscience of the members
of the community” [ibid.].8 Without objectivity in ethics, it is difficult to see how ethics
7Summaries of the difficulty of classifying ethics in relation to logic and the other normative sciences in
Peirce can be found in [19, Chapter 2] and [3, Chapter 4, especially p. 141-5]. Most discussions on Peirce’s
ethics, however, relate or include a discussion of these passages.
8Peirce writes: “Ethics is not practics; first, because ethics involves more than the theory of such
conformity; namely, it involves the theory of the ideal itself, the nature of the summum bonum; and
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can be a science at all. These considerations lead Peirce to doubt whether ethics can be
reduced to practics and to a study of the normativity in logic. The result, at least if we
take these remarks seriously, is that Peirce takes the study of ethics to go beyond the study
of practics and the normativity in logic.
In addition to these remarks, much of the discussion on Peirce’s ethics focuses on a
lecture given by Peirce in 1898 titled ‘Philosophy and the Conduct of Life.’9 During the
lecture Peirce seems to defend a strict division between theory and practice. He writes:
I would not allow sentiment or instinct any weight whatsoever in theoretical
matters, not the slightest. . . . science, has nothing directly to say concerning
practical matters, and nothing even applicable at all to vital crises. Theory is
applicable to minor practical affairs; but matters of vital importance must be
left to sentiment, that is, to instinct. [EP 2: 32-33]
Science and practice, it would seem, do not mix. These considerations again motivate a
separation in Peirce’s philosophy between ethics on the one hand and the study of practics
and logic on the other.
I take the emphasis on these two strands in Peirce’s writings, and in particular the
division that it supposes between ethics and the study of the normative sciences, to be
misguided. The problem, as I see it and as the dissertation starts to remedy, is the
separation it suggests between the norms that apply to logic and the norms that apply to
behavior. This dissertation defends a reading of Peirce where these norms are indeed one
and the same.
secondly, because, in so far as ethics studies the conformity of conduct to an ideal, it is limited to a
particular ideal” [CP 1:573].
9Again most discussions on Peirce’s ethics mention ‘Philosophy and the Conduct of Life.’ Most of the
essays in the anthology on the normative thought in Peirce begin with material from this lecture. See
Lizka’s ‘Charles Peirce on Ethics’, De Waal’s ‘Who’s Afraid of Charles Sanders Peirce?’, and Mayorga’s
‘Peirce’s Moral Realicism’ for examples. Misak’s ‘C.S. Peirce on Vital Matters’ found in [20] is another
example. More recent work by [19], [3] and [12, p. 19-24] each address the lecture as well.
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To begin to motivate a continuity between these seemingly disparate domains in Peirce’s
philosophy, I suggest that we can and should look elsewhere in his writings. First, I think we
have good reason to take the writings on the normative sciences to be merely preliminary
in terms of the development of Peirce’s normative thought. Both ‘Philosophy and the
Conduct of Life’ and his initial remarks on the classification of the normative sciences
should be seen with this in mind. Several writers, including Misak and Hookway, have
suggested that we accept Peirce’s comments in ‘Philosophy and the Conduct of Life’ with
qualification. Misak suggests Peirce was being sensational in his delivery and Hookway
suggests that the essay, uncharacteristically for Peirce, lacks “philosophical good sense.”
I have no desire to weight in on these debates here,10 but what I think needs to be kept
in mind is that at this time in Peirce’s philosophical development he is just beginning
to explore the relationship between normativity and behavior and of his pragmatism to
ethics. While this is beginning to be recognized in the literature in regards to interpreting
Peirce’s comments ‘Philosophy and the Conduct of Life,’ it is a point that has not been
appreciated in discussions on Peirce’s classification of the normative sciences, which still
serves as the source material from which most discussions on Peirce’s normative thought is
based. I suggest here that Peirce’s writings on the classification of the normative sciences
should also be taken as importantly preliminary. Peirce has at this point only just begun
to try to apply the categories towards understanding an individual’s behavior, and he goes
through a number of significant revisions. I do not wish here to dismiss the current work
in the literature that is based on these writings. I do, however, want to recognize this
important qualification that limits the scope and the conclusions that we draw from these
writings.
10I am in no position to weigh in on Misak’s historical claim that Peirce was responding to a dispute with
James. Unlike what is suggested by Misak and Hookway, I find the argument presented in ‘Philosophy and
the Conduct of Life’ to be subtle, rich, and more or less continuous with the rest of Peirce’s thought. The
supposed difficulties disappear when we recognize that Peirce is using a subtle distinction — and what
could very well be an idiosyncratic distinction — between theory and practice. Given these considerations
I think it is still appropriate to say, as Misak does and as Hookway’s comments suggest, that Peirce is
being sensational in his delivery.
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The emphasis on Peirce’s writings on the classification of the normative sciences and
on ‘Philosophy and the Conduct of Life’ can in some way be excused for practical reasons.
The fact is that Peirce only has several scattered passages on ethics and normativity, and
the literature has focused on the passages where Peirce’s remarks on ethics are most easily
identified. It is therefore somewhat understandable that emphasis has been placed on these
two strands of Peirce’s thought. What I take to be problematic, however, is that these two
sets of writings have been emphasized to the neglect of Peirce’s larger philosophical project
— a project that, once understood and made apparent, already possesses ethical import.
This is the second reason I think the emphasis on the previous two strands of Peirce’s
thought is misguided. I think the emphasis on these two strands is disproportionate to
other more significant features of Peirce’s philosophy. It is this alternative that I opt for
here. The dissertation shows how one can develop Peirce’s normative thought and its
application to behavior from more general features of his philosophy and theory of inquiry.
Peirce’s theory of inquiry, properly understood, offers a direct connection between the
norms of logic and the norms of behavior.
By focusing on the two strands discussed above the literature has tended to take Peirce’s
ethics to be separate from the study of practics and logic. I think an ethics, however, can be
motivated from within Peirce’s writings on the normativity in logic and practics alone. The
dissertation develops what I take to be a key first step in defending such a position. Peirce
takes ethics most broadly to be a general guide for conduct — it is a guide for conduct
not simply in thought, as in the case of the study of logic above, but also serves as a guide
for conduct in behavior and sentiment more generally. The question, as I see it here, is
whether Peirce’s writings on logic and inquiry alone can motivate a more general guide for
conduct. This dissertation begins to answer this question in the affirmative by showing
how Peirce’s writings on logic and inquiry can serve as a more general guide for behavior.11
A proper understanding of the relation between inquiry and behavior in Peirce’s writings
11In doing so I set aside for the time being a Peircean account of the development of sentiments. I do
take the position developed in the dissertation, however, to be particularly well suited for being extended
along these lines. I would appeal to recent suggestions by [19, p. 8-10 & 97-8] and [3, p. 156-60]. For a
general discussion of sentiments in Peirce, see [16], [14, Ch. 9], and [30].
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shows that — and this is the step that the dissertation begins to develop — Peircean
pragmatism has the resources for offering a guide for behavior within logic and inquiry
alone. The key is to focus first on the intersection of the two domains — the practice
of logic and inquiry, and of behavior more generally – and to look at the development of
reasonable behavior. This dissertation shows that a direct connection between the norms
of logic and the norms of behavior is found in Peirce’s theory of reasonable behavior.
Peirce’s theory of inquiry and logic, and the normativity Peirce thought present in those
practices, provides a more general guide for conduct. Whether and to what extent this
constitutes (or would constitute) an ethical theory is a further question, but a systematic
account of the development of reasonable behavior in Peirce is a necessary first step towards
understanding how a more general guide for conduct can be motivated from within logic
and inquiry alone.
As I mentioned above and the start of this section, I do not develop and present a
Peircean ethical theory. Neither is my interest here in ethics (or, as we’ll see below, action
theory) broadly conceived. My interest is primarily in Peirce and in developing and better
grounding Peirce’s normative thought within his own writings. In doing so I present and
develop important aspects of Peirce’s normative thought that remain under-examined in
the secondary literature. I take Peirce’s writings on logic and inquiry to offer a means of
evaluating, not simply judgment and inferences, but an individual’s more general behavior
as well. The aim of the present work is to provide this account. The dissertation shows
how Peirce’s theory of judgment provides a means for evaluation and developing more
reasonable behavior. This move towards defending a Peircean ethics by appealing to more
general features of his thought, as we’ll see in the next section, has received increasing
interest in the literature. Misak [21] and Heney ([12]) show how Peirce’s theory of inquiry
can apply to ethical doubts and their resolution. More in line with the position presented
here, is the work of Massecar ([19]) and Herdy ([13]). The relation between these works
and this dissertation, as well as the particular benefits this dissertation has to offer, will
be elaborated and defended in the next section.
The work presented here focuses primarily on Peirce’s texts. The contribution is to
show that a guide for developing reasonable behavior already lies latent within Peirce’s
writings on logic and inquiry. This connection between Peirce’s theory of inquiry and
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behavior more generally has been under-examined in the literature, and especially in the
literature on Peirce’s normative thought. I cite the overemphasis that has been placed on
the apparent division between ethics and the other normative sciences above to be a case
in point. I further elaborate on the contributions this dissertation offers to the literature in
the next section. This dissertation offers a characterization of Peircean pragmatism that
suggests no such division between logic and inquiry on the one hand and behavior and a
more general guide for conduct on the other. The emphasis that the secondary literature
on Peirce’s normative thought has placed on this supposed division has neglected this
continuity within Peirce’s thought. Developing this theory — a theory that is implicit in
the rest of Peirce’s writings, but that has been under-examined in the secondary literature
— is the subject of the dissertation.
The dissertation begins by developing a characterization of Peircean pragmatism and
then proceeds to show how this characterization offers a guide for behavior more generally.
This dissertation begins with more general, and what I take to be more commonly recog-
nized and accepted, features of Peirce’s thought. These general features include Peirce’s
theory of inquiry and the connection Peirce recognizes between belief and action. The ben-
efit of starting with these general features is that the conclusions reached are continuous
with Peirce’s writings on practics and logic. This alternative has been largely unrepre-
sented in the literature, and the conclusions reached in the dissertation show that this
feature of Peirce’s thought can and should be taken seriously. In taking these aspects of
Peirce’s writings as a starting point, the results begin to demonstrate how an ethics can
be motivated from within Peirce’s writings on the normativity in logic and practics alone.
While the argument presented does not place emphasis on Peirce’s writings on the
classification of the normative sciences and on ‘Philosophy and the Conduct of Life,’ it
does find direct support in another strand of Peirce’s writings. Let me briefly outline the
strand within Peirce’s writings that I emphasize here. Though Peirce is not known for
having developed an ethical theory, he increasingly came to see that his writings on logic
and science have ethical import. Logic and science are for Peirce both normative disciplines.
Here is Peirce discussing the connection in a lecture given at the Lowell Institute in 1903:
[Ethics] is the theory of self-controlled, or deliberate, conduct. Logic is the
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theory of self-controlled, or deliberate, thought; and as such, must appeal to
ethics for its principles. [CP 1:191]
Whereas ethics for Peirce is a general guide for conduct, logic is a guide for a particular
type of conduct — conduct in thought. Logic is a particular instance of ethical conduct.
Summarizing the argument he gave in 1903, Peirce suggests that the connection is even
more substantive:
Considering how it stood in the mid-channel of pragmatistic thought to join
ethics to logic, it seems to me strange that we had to wait until 1903 for
any pragmatist to assert that logic ought to be based upon ethics. Perhaps
some one of us had said it before; but I only know that it was then said in a
course of lectures before the Lowell Institute in Boston, and was maintained
on the ground that reasoning is thought subjected to self-control, and that the
whole operation of logical self-control takes precisely the same quite complicated
course which everybody ought to acknowledge is that of effective ethical self-
control. [CP 5:533, 1905]
If indeed the development of the two types of self-control are precisely the same, then
developing an understanding of logical self-control — what amounts for Peirce to the
development of reasoning — is to begin to develop an understanding of the type of control
necessary for ethical conduct. Understanding the normativity in logic, if we follow this
strand in Peirce’s writings, can serve as a means for developing an understanding of the
normative in ethics. This is the strand of Peirce’s thought that I emphasize here. I show
how the same normativity Peirce takes to be present in logic and inquiry applies directly
to behavior more generally. This is also the strand, as I elaborate in the next section, that
has begun to be developed by Massecar ([19]) and Herdy ([13]).
If such an approach is appropriate, then it has one significant advantage. What is
often sought in an ethical theory is that it be compatible with scientific inquiry.12 Peircean
pragmatism suggests how an ethical theory can be developed from within the normativity
12As suggested, for example, in David Brink’s Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics [5].
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it already finds present in logic and inquiry. If the analogy is not perfect, then the account
developed in the dissertation still has ethical import. Defending an ethical theory that is
compatible with scientific inquiry requires an understanding of what behavior is appropriate
to scientific inquiry. It is indeed this last point the dissertation serves and defends. Peircean
pragmatism, as I argue in this thesis, recommends certain behaviors as appropriate for
scientific investigation. Any ethical theory that claims to be compatible with scientific
investigation would benefit from such a discussion. In the end, and I hope to go some
way towards making this clear in this thesis, few philosophies are as ripe for developing a
connection between scientific and ethical conduct as Peircean pragmatism.
1.2 Contributions to Peirce Scholarship
As discussed in the last section, most of the work on Peirce’s normative thought has
focused narrowly on Peirce’s comments on the classification of the normative sciences
and his remarks in ‘Philosophy and the Conduct of Life’. An alternative approach, also
suggested above, is to focus on more general features of Peirce’s philosophy. In this section
I elaborate on these points and defend the need and benefits of this alternative. Recent
work by Misak, Heney, Herdy, Massecar, and Atkins move in this direction. In this section
I situate this work with respect to these recent accounts and go on to defend contributions
that this dissertation offers.
There has been an increasing interest in developing an alternative approach for a
Peircean ethics. I mention these approaches below to emphasize continuity in the literature
with the current project and to highlight the further contributions this dissertation has to
offer. Alternative approaches have been motivated by an increasing dissatisfaction with
the two initial strands in Peirce’s writings discussed above. This has been motivated in
part by Misak and Hookway who have suggested that we place less emphasis on Peirce’s
comments in ‘Philosophy and the Conduct of Life’.13 Discussions and alternatives have
also been offered for Peirce’s classification of ethics in relation to the normative sciences
13See Misak’s ‘C.S. Peirce on Vital Matters’ in [20, p.164], and [14, p.23]. Also, [3, p.2].
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([19, p. 36-41] or [3, p. 148-55]). Peirce went through several classification systems, and
the passages that are often cited to motivate a distinction between ethics and the other
normative sciences occur when Peirce is still working through alternatives. More devel-
oped classifications, ones that are still amenable to Peirce’s categories such as given by [19,
Ch. 2], Atkins [3, Ch. 4], and [13] move towards alleviating such concerns. The account
presented here is in line with these recent developments. The work in dissertation sug-
gests, however, that many of these approaches have not gone far enough in recognizing the
continuity in Peirce’s view between, on the one hand, the normativity in logic and inquiry
and, on the other hand, the normativity in behavior more generally.
Let me begin with a discussion of an alternative espoused by Misak and Heney. In
‘C.S. Peirce on Vital Matters’ [21], Cheryl Misak suggests how Peirce’s method of inquiry
can apply to ethical questions. The structure of the argument is relatively straightforward.
Peirce takes inquiry to be the activity that begins with a doubt and that ends with the
doubts cessation in a newly formed belief. Misak suggests that Peirce’s doubt-belief model
of inquiry applies just as well in the ethical domain and to ethical doubts. When we have
ethical doubts, and she takes it to be relatively uncontroversial that we do, the resulting
activity where we try to resolve them counts as inquiry. Insofar as our resolution satisfies
the previous doubt and results in a more stable belief then we can have a robust sense
of inquiry and progress towards ethical questions.14 Misak defends this conclusion by
appealing to three factors: i) that ethical experience can give rise to ethical doubts and
can thus satisfy the initial condition for inquiry to begin, ii) that ethical beliefs gives
rise to differences in behavior and so are (at least in theory) accountable to experiential
consequences and testing and can thus satisfy the condition for inquiry to continue, and
iii) that Peirce’s theory of regulative assumptions, which allows us to hope inquiry to be
successful in order to keep the practice going, also applies to ethical inquiry and thus can
motivate ethical inquiry in practice. Misak concludes that Peirce’s ethics is ultimately
friendly to cognitivism [21, p. 171]. Heney appeals to a similar considerations in [12].
I find this broad approach suggesting that Peirce’s theory of inquiry also applies to
ethical doubts unsatisfactory. First, it is at best only a preliminary argument in favor of
a Peircean ethics. While I agree that conditions (i)-(iii) are sufficient for us to consider
14See Misak’s discussion on p. 152-154.
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ethics as a potential domain of inquiry within Peirce’s doubt-belief model, the argument
does not go far enough. Until the details of a method are provided for how beliefs can be
evaluated to meet condition (ii), and until an argument is given (perhaps, again, by offering
a method for how it can be done) to motivate a hope in (iii), then the theory is importantly
incomplete. While Misak and Heney give us preliminary reasons to take Peirce’s theory of
inquiry to be amenable to ethical inquiry and so for suggesting that Peirce is an ethical
cognitivist, what is still needed is a detailed account of how inquiry into an individual’s
behavior can be conducted and achieved.
Second, and relatedly, this broad approach suggests a false (or at least misguided)
distinction between ethical inquiry and inquiry as a practice more generally. Though the
argument on offer suggests that a broad conception of inquiry applies to ethical doubts
as well, Misak and Heney do little to discuss the distinguishing features of the ethical
domain and ethical experience.15 In setting up in the terms of the debate a distinction
between ethical inquiry and what I will just call ordinary inquiry, an opening is created that
effects the demonstrative force of the argument. The opening leaves two further questions
unaddressed: What is characteristic of the ethical domain and ethical experience? And on
what grounds do we have to take the same type of inquiry to apply in this case? Insofar
as Misak and Heney leave these further questions unaddressed the broad account is again
importantly incomplete. This is, in part, why I find the approach unsatisfying — it is
explanatorily limited.
The point is driven home when we recognize that a better argument is available and
can be given in its place. The argumentative strategy used by Misak and Heney is at
best unneeded and at worse reflects poor reasoning. Peirce, as we’ll see, has no need for a
distinction between ethical inquiry and ordinary inquiry. An account that reaches the same
conclusions and does so within ordinary inquiry closes the opening upon which the two
further questions above arise. A proper reading of Peirce’s argument adopts this strategy.
15To be fair, both Misak and Heney go on to discuss Peirce’s classification of the normative sciences and
cite the standard passages on his distinction between aesthetics, ethics, and logic. Given the considerations
in the previous section, however, I do not think these appeals are helpful. We have good reason to move
beyond these preliminary classifications.
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The same normativity Peirce takes to be present in logic and inquiry applies directly to
behavior more generally. The demonstrative force of the argument is in this case left
intact — insofar as one accepts Peirce’s theory of inquiry and the normativity present in
the practice, then one accepts the same standards apply to an individual’s behavior. The
normativity that Peirce takes to hold within inquiry and for determining and evaluating
belief is the same normativity that applies to an individual’s behavior.
The two worries given above relate to the same problem. Misak and Heney, in short,
leave open the further question of showing how ethical beliefs can be reasonable. What we
need in its place, and the path I’ve already suggested that we take, is an account of the
development of reasonable behavior in Peirce. Misak mentions concrete reasonableness in
the third to last paragraph of ‘C.S. Peirce on Vital Matters’ but dismisses it as a “rather
unhelpful answer” [21, p. 170]. This dissertation shows, on the contrary, that Peirce’s
theory of the development of concrete reasonableness offers a general guide for conduct.
In providing an account of the development of reasonable behavior, I offer a response to
the first of the worries above and in-so-doing sidestep the second. In regards to the first
worry, I offer a method in Chapter 3 for determining and evaluating an individual’s belief.
Due to the connection Peirce draws between belief and action, the method allows us at one
and the same time to determine and evaluate a corresponding action. This is the method
that Misak and Heney need to continue to defend their project. The method gives the
details for how Peircean pragmatism determines and evaluates an individual’s behavior.
The method discussed in Chapter 3 also sidesteps the second worry. The method makes
no distinction between a supposedly ‘ethical’ belief and other types of belief. If the aim
is to explain and understand an individual’s behavior, then the distinction is not needed.
As the dissertation goes on to argue, however, this does not spell the end for a theory of
normativity that applies to behavior. On the contrary, and due again to the connection
Peirce draws between belief and action, it shows that the normative standards that apply
to belief formation and inquiry apply directly to behavior as well. This connection is what
the dissertation goes on to develop. An account of the development of reasonable behavior
in Peirce provides an important contribution to Misak and Heney’s account.
There are two additional approaches towards a Peircean ethics in the literature. Both
alternatives emphasis, as I suggest above and go on to do here, the importance of Peirce’s
16
development of concrete reasonableness. Atkins is concerned in Peirce and the Conduct of
Life primarily with defending Peirce’s appeal to instinct and conservatism in moral matters
[3, p. 148-55]. Atkins approach can be distinguished by his concern to ground concrete
reasonableness pre-inquiry. By pre-inquiry, I mean he is concerned with grounding concrete
reasonableness at the earliest stage of inquiry where an appeal cannot yet be made to
metaphysics or logic [3, p. 144]. Atkins correspondingly places his emphasis on abduction
and Peirce’s account of esthetics. Atkins writes:
. . . no one has succeeded in showing how the doctrine that the summum bonum
is the growth of concrete reasonableness is established independently of Peirce’s
logic and metaphysics. . . . Nonetheless, the present claim is that Peircean es-
thetics must be established on its own grounds. [3, p. 144]
I am not here concerned with Peirce’s remarks on conservatism in ethics. While it is
important to develop these aspects of Peirce’s thought, I do not share Atkins’ need to
ground instinct and common sense beliefs pre-inquiry.
I think Atkins approach to defend instinct and commons sense on its own grounds to
be misguided. For one, it stills rests on the distinction between theory and practice that
I’ve suggested does not hold up to scrutiny. Atkins writes:
We can then extend what Peirce states about reason and the summum bonum
to sentiment and instinct and, in turn, shed light on Peirce’s rather mystical
claims. Those claims, though, are not licensed in theoretical science; they rather
concern the conduct of our lives. . . . we can get some traction on Peirce’s rather
enigmatic, and occasionally inconsistent, claims about the summum bonum and
the outcome of evolutionary process if we keep what he has to tell us about
theoretical philosophy separate from what he was to tell us about the conduct
of life. Peirce’s views on each are not inconsistent, but they are separately
licensed. [3, p. 140-1]
I suggested in the last subsection why we need to move beyond this reading of Peirce.
The method of understanding an individual’s behavior presented in Chapter 3 shows why
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this distinction is mistaken. Because of the connection between belief and action, Peirce’s
method for determining and evaluating a belief is the same as evaluating behavior. In this
regard, while Atkins does well to emphasize the importance of the development of concrete
reasonableness in his account of Peircean ethics, I do not think he goes far enough.
There is a second consideration. Atkins approach falls short on explanatory grounds.
It leaves aspects of instinct and common sense unexplained. Instinct and common sense
— both what they are and why we have the particular instincts and commons sense that
we do — stills needs to be explained. This explanation will take place within inquiry.
Atkins does not give sufficient weight to this possibility because his view rests on the old
distinction between theory and practice found back in a reading of Peirce’s ‘Philosophy
and the Conduct of Life.’ The method presented in Chapter 3 nonetheless allows an
explanation. Peirce recognizes that beliefs, once they are sufficiently habituated, become
instinctive and can be reflected in sentiments and common sense.16 The account presented
in the dissertation suggests the underlying framework for how these beliefs — and so the
corresponding instincts and common sense beliefs that Atkins takes as his starting point
— can develop in accord with reason over time. Without doing so, Atkins still owes some
explanatory story for how instincts and common sense beliefs arise and develop. Again, as
in the case with Misak and Heney, a more complete explanatory story becomes apparent
when we recognize how the same normativity Peirce takes to be present in logic and inquiry
also applies directly to behavior more generally.
The contributions the present dissertation adds to Misak’s, Heney’s and Atkins’ ac-
counts come from the inclusion of the development of reasonableness within Peirce’s larger
project of understanding an individual’s behavior. Massecar’s approach in Ethical Habits
is similar in scope and aim as this dissertation ([19]). Unlike the accounts above, Masse-
car gives prime importance to the development of reasonable behavior within the practice
of inquiry. His account, I believe, is better for it. Massecar focuses on the development
of intelligent habits in Peirce and focuses, as I do here, on aspects of Peirce’s theory of
judgment. I am largely in agreement with Massecar’s approach and take it as a good sign
that there are similar recent developments in the work of a Peirce scholar. We cite much
of the same material and present a similar conclusion that the development of concrete
16See [14, Ch. 8].
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reasonableness is continuous with Peirce’s ethical project. The account presented here
nonetheless also offers an important contribution to Massecar’s project. While Massecar
shows how Peircean pragmatism can serve as a guide for our behavior, he does not discuss,
as I make a point to do here, how to determine whether an individual has a particular
belief or habit. I show how Peircean pragmatism offers a theory of action that allows us
to identify the beliefs, habits, and practice that an individual is engaged in. The result is
not simply a discussion of belief and habit in the abstract, but is a method for identifying
and applying these conceptions in our everyday lives. While Massecar offers a discussion
of the theory of Peirce’s development of concrete reasonableness, I go some way towards
extending the theory in a way that we can apply in practice.
This dissertation shows that a direct connection between the norms of logic and the
norms of behavior is found in Peirce’s theory of reasonable behavior. It offers a character-
ization of Peircean pragmatism that suggests no such division between logic and inquiry
on the one hand and behavior and a more general guide for conduct on the other. I’ve
situated the contributions above in terms of acknowledge this connection. I discuss two
further contributions below. The first further contribution is a resolution to a debate in the
literature over what are called regulative assumptions. The second further contribution is
a development of Pierce’s theory of action.
There is an ongoing debate in the literature over Peirce’s appeal to what are called
regulative assumptions (see [14], [22], [23], [15], & [2]). Regulative assumptions are as-
sumptions that are necessary to continue to engage in a practice and for the practice to
have a chance at success. If we take Peirce’s doubt-belief model of inquiry, for example,
then in engaging in the practice we assume that there are such states of mind as doubt and
belief, that there is some way to move from one to another, and that as inquirer’s it is pos-
sible for us to do so. The question is how to ground these assumptions and what attitude
to take towards them. Pierce is adamant that we cannot take these types of assumptions
to be true. He writes:
When I have asked thinking men what reason they had to believe that every fact
in the universe is precisely determined by law, the first answer has usually been
that the proposition is a “presupposition” or postulate of scientific reasoning.
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Well, if that is the best that can be said for it, the belief is doomed. Suppose it
be “postulated”: that does not make it true, nor so much as afford the slightest
rational motive for yielding it any credence. It is as if a man should come to
borrow money and, when asked for his security, should reply he “postulated”
the loan. To “postulate” a proposition is no more than to hope it is true.
The consensus in the literature is that Peirce thinks we can merely hope that regulative
assumptions are true. Misak writes:
Peirce seems to be suggesting that there is a propositional attitude, alternative
to belief, which is appropriate in certain circumstances. . . The attitude that
Peirce thinks is warranted towards such beliefs is that we should hope that
they are true. And in so hoping we should act on them. He is very clear that
this is a different matter from believing or asserting. [23, p. 64]
Howat, comparing Peirce’s appeal to regulative assumptions to Wittgenstein’s hinge propo-
sitions, states a similar point:
The inspiration for this paper is that we can explain these parallel objections
by appeal to a single, shared view about the structure of reasons: that some
propositions are immune from both rational support (and thus genuine claims
to knowledge) and rational criticism (and thus genuine claims to doubt), by
virtue of the epistemological role they play in our lives and practices. [15, p.
453]
And finally, Atkin writes:
However, it is important to note that by claiming some principle to be a reg-
ulative assumption on inquiry we are not appealing to its status as a law or
claiming it to be a conceptual truth. Indeed, we are not making claims about
the truth of such assumptions at all. Instead, we are simply noting that un-
less we make such an assumption we cannot possibly motivate any attempt to
answer a question, and we have thereby ‘blocked the road of inquiry’ from the
outset. [2, p. 451-2]
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In each passage the same point is emphasized: in general we cannot take regulative as-
sumptions in Peirce’s account to be true.
On the account presented in this dissertation this conclusion is misguided. The mistake
is again due to a failing to see the extent to which Peirce’s method for evaluating belief
applies to evaluating an individual’s behavior. While at the start of inquiry we can at best
merely hope that such assumptions are true, as inquiry continues these assumptions can
be affirmed. Furthermore, they are affirmed using the same method for determining and
evaluating beliefs.
Several authors have noted that pragmatism offers a theory of action.17 In regards to
the significance of action to pragmatism, Kilpinen writes:
One finds in the literature comments about how pragmatists often talk about
action. . . To see this is not yet, however, to see the essential pragmatist point. . . Their
usage of this term and the underlying idea differ from what is customary in
other philosophical approaches. Pragmatism namely approaches all theoretical
and philosophical problems as problems that in the final analysis are related to
action. [18, emphasis in original]
In a recent interview, Robert Tallisse makes a similar point:
[Pragmatism is] concerned with giving an empiricist and naturalist account of
action. It wants to try and understand all of the philosophical concepts that
we think are important for explaining action — like belief, truth, meaning
— in naturalistic terms rather than through an appeal to something either
transcendental or mental in some non-naturalistic sense, or a Cartesian sense.
It tries to naturalize all these concepts by explaining them in terms of human
activity and action. ([31])
In this dissertation these further details for a Peircean philosophy of action are presented.
I show how belief, reasons, the practice of inquiry, as well as deliberate and intentional
17See [18, 4, 17].
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behavior, can each be explained in terms of corresponding modes of action. Importantly,
I also show how to identify these types of action when they are present. The result again
is not simply a discussion of these types of actions in the abstract, but is a method for
identifying and applying these conceptions in our everyday lives.
1.3 Outline
The dissertation presents the method of reasoning Peirce takes to characterize scientific
inquiry, a method for determining whether a belief or behavior is reasonable given this
standard, and a method for developing more reasonable behavior (again, at least given this
standard of reasoning). The thesis is defended in these three parts. I introduce and present
a characterization Peircean pragmatism in Chapter 2. The result suggests that Peircean
pragmatism is intended as a method of reasoning in accord with his characterization of
scientific inquiry. I begin with a discussion of the pragmatic maxim and emphasize the
regulative role the maxim serves. The pragmatic maxim most broadly suggests that we
treat our opinions as potential hypotheses that could potentially be accountable to scientific
inquiry. We may not know how and in what ways an opinion can be treated as a hypothesis
accountable to scientific inquiry, but this vague indefinite commitment is, I argue, how
Peircean pragmatism gets off the ground. Situating Peircean pragmatism as an indefinite
regulative commitment has two advantages. It properly situates the position with respect
to the underlying metaphysical commitments upon which it is based, and it gives the right
context to see the further assumptions that refine the position into a more substantive
method of scientific reasoning and inquiry.
The second half of Chapter 2 begins to discuss some of these refinements. More than
just a vague regulative commitment to scientific inquiry, Peirce goes on to suggest maxims
that offer progressively finer-grained ways to regulate our thoughts in accord with scientific
inquiry. First, Peirce suggests restricting our attention to the possible differences in action
that a thought would produce:
Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we con-
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ceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects
is the whole of our conception of the object. [EP 1:132]
The maxim encourages clarity of thought by reducing an opinion to its practical effects.
The focus on practical effects is simply a way to capture possible differences in action.
These differences in action include differences in how we may conceivably behave, but
also differences in how we conceive the object of our thought to behave. Both — and
this leads to the significant second step — begin to direct our attention to behaviors
that would be accountable to scientific inquiry. The focus on practical effects is a step
towards directing our thoughts towards those that are scientifically appropriate. Peircean
pragmatism suggests a method of reasoning, where the pragmatic maxim is the first step for
regulating our thoughts. The pragmatic maxim serves to regulate our thoughts in accord
with scientific inquiry. I go on to offer a resulting characterization of Peircean pragmatism
based on what I call the Continuity of Explanation. The Continuity of Explanation is
the commitment that every judgment entails consequences for action that are accountable
to scientific inquiry. The Continuity of Explanation is suggested as a distillation of the
pragmatic maxim taken as a regulative commitment to scientific inquiry and combined
with Peirce’s theory of judgment.
The Continuity of Explanation serves as the characterization of Peircean pragmatism
upon which the rest of the thesis is based. It shows that Peircean pragmatism is based on
an underlying commitment to a method of reasoning that Peirce takes to be in accord with
scientific inquiry. I take the Continuity of Explanation to capture the initial commitment
to the development of reasonableness. It is the regulative commitment to what Peirce takes
to be scientific reasoning. With the Continuity of Explanation serving as an embryonic
commitment to a method of reasoning I then turn to how it serves as a guide for developing
more reasonable beliefs and behavior.
Chapter 3 begins with a more complete account of Peirce’s theory of judgment. Peirce
takes every judgment to be represented as a series of inferences, where inferences are three
types: abductive (or hypothetic) inference, deductive inferences, and inductive inferences.
I show how the Continuity of Explanation captures the commitments and methods of each
of these types of inference. The result is a significant refinement of the Continuity of
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Explanation and a significant defense of Peircean pragmatism as a method of reasoning in
accord with scientific inquiry. While one may disagree with Pierce’s account of scientific
practice, that the logic of science includes these three types of inference I take to be
relatively uncontroversial.
In the second half of Chapter 3 I apply the Continuity of Explanation towards un-
derstanding an individual’s behavior. I show how the Continuity of Explanation allows
us to form hypotheses about an individual’s behavior and to affirm whether and to what
extent the hypothesis holds. The result allows us to determine whether and to what extent
an individual’s behavior is reasonable. The Continuity of Explanation also allows us to
distinguish different types of behaviors. I show how it allows us to distinguish different
practices, deliberate and intentional behavior, and, as I demonstrate in Chapter 4, the
practice of inquiry itself.
Chapter 4 shows how the Continuity of Explanation offers a guide for developing more
reasonable behavior. I begin by applying the Continuity of Explanation to the practice
of inquiry in particular. The result is a characterization of the practice and familiarity
with the behavior of an individual engaged in it. I go on to show how the Continuity
of Explanation recommends certain behaviors. The behaviors recommended in inquiry
include a general will to learn, a fallibilism and synechism, and certain behaviors associated
with the different types of inference. These resulting behaviors are, according to Peircean
pragmatism, reasonable and recommended by inquiry. The result is the final demonstration
that Peircean pragmatism offers a theory for developing reasonable behavior — behavior
that is more and more accord with Peirce’s characterization of scientific inquiry.
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Chapter 2
The Continuity of Explanation
Making sense of an individual’s behavior is challenging. It is difficult to distinguish in-
dividuals who perform similar actions and yet do so for different reasons, desires, or who
have different abilities. If we observe an archer hit a bullseye, we may still be uncertain
whether the archer is a skilled expert or whether the archer is a novice benefiting from luck
and coincidence. If we observe a diner repeatedly order the same dish at a restaurant, we
may still be uncertain whether the diner continues to order the meal out of enjoyment, or
because the diner has a fear of trying other options. If we observe that an individual has a
certain belief, we may still be uncertain about the reasons upon which the belief is based,
e.g. whether the belief is based on testimony, experience, or the like. In each case a limited
observation makes it difficult to distinguish the meaning of an individual’s behavior.
Peirce claims, at least I argue here, that through continued observation and testing
we can nonetheless make sense of an individual’s behavior. In this chapter I lay the
groundwork for this Peircean position. I argue here that Peircean pragmatism follows
from two assumptions about inquiry. The first assumption is that making sense of an
individual’s behavior involves making a judgment. The second assumption is that every
judgment is accountable to scientific inquiry. By accountable to scientific inquiry I mean
that every judgment has a meaning that can be scientifically determined, evaluated, and
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potentially — assuming inquiry is not yet complete — admits of improvement. If both
these assumptions hold, then a judgment about an individual’s behavior can, like every
judgment, be refined and improved through scientific inquiry. In the long run we have
reason to think that we can reach a correct judgment about an individual’s behavior.
I begin with a short example that highlights these key features of Peirce’s position. I
then go on to give a general account of Peirce’s pragmatism that includes several clarifica-
tions and refinements. The result is a characterization of Peircean pragmatism upon which
the rest of the thesis is based.
My goal is to show that Peircean pragmatism follows from several basic assumptions
about judgment and inquiry. The pragmatic maxim is not motivated by a bold claim about
practical consequences, meaning, or truth. It is rather motivated by a much more straight-
forward demand that our actions be accountable to scientific inquiry. Each subsequent
chapter is a consequence or further refinement of the characterization discussed here. The
position leads, as I argue in the second half of the thesis, to a worldview with significant
implications for developing a guide for reasonable behavior.
An Example
Let me motivate Peirce’s position with an example. Imagine observing an individual heat-
ing a sample of metal and quenching the sample in oil. At the beginning it may not
be clear what the individual is doing and what the individual has in mind. Perhaps the
individual simply likes the red glow of hot metal and the hiss and smoke of quenching.
Someone more experienced with metal working may recognize steps of the hardening and
tempering process. For all we know the individual may be acting in an undisciplined or
aimless manner. With only a short observation who can really say what the individual is
doing and what the individual has in mind? Peirce takes each alternative to be possible
judgment about the individual’s behavior.
A judgment about an individual’s behavior, like every judgment for Peirce, is accountable
to scientific inquiry. Peirce motivates this claim by recognizing that a judgment about an
individual’s actions presumes further consequences for the individual’s behavior. Scientific
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inquiry in turn allows us to affirm whether these consequences hold. If they hold, then the
judgment is a good one. If not, then the judgment is mistaken.
To see what Peirce has in mind, let’s return to our individual — let’s call the person
Smith — heating and quenching a sample of metal. We had three possible judgments of
Smith’s behavior: Smith simply finds the actions enjoyable, Smith is acting with the goal in
mind of heat treating the metal sample, and Smith is merely acting aimlessly. Notice, first,
that in each case we can continue to ask further questions about the judgment on offer.
What is meant, for example, by enjoyable, aimless, or purposeful behavior? Enjoyable
behavior is presumably accompanied by signs of pleasure or other behavior associated with
enjoyment. We can similarly ask further questions about why the particular judgment is
made. Does Smith have a history of blacksmithing, acting aimlessly, or for enjoyment? In
each case a response, Peirce recognizes, rests on assumptions about more general aspects
of the individual’s behavior. A response suggests instances in the past when Smith would
have exhibited such behavior or likewise suggests instances in the future when Smith would
do so. In each case clarifying the content of the judgment involves citing potential related
activity.
Through scientific inquiry we can affirm whether this related activity is found in experi-
ence. If Smith does not demonstrate such related activity, and so we can find no answers to
these further questions, we may rightfully be suspicious that the individual acted accord-
ingly at all. In this case we can question whether the judgment is a good one. If Smith on
the other hand demonstrates related activity, and so we can find answers to these further
questions, then this is a sign that the judgment is a good one. The judgment, once we have
a clear idea of what it involves, includes further consequences for the individual’s behavior
that are accountable to scientific inquiry. Every judgment about an individual’s behavior
is accountable to scientific inquiry.
This example presents a rough account of Peircean pragmatism. Trying to make sense of
an individual’s behavior involves making a judgment about the individual. The judgment
in turn entails further consequences for the individual’s behavior that are accountable to
scientific inquiry. The above considerations rely on what I refer to as the Continuity of
Explanation. The Continuity of Explanation (CE) is the commitment that every judgment
entails consequences for action that are accountable to scientific inquiry. The more mediate
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notion of explanation and its relation to the CE will be discussed in Section 4.
Having used the Smith example to introduce Peirce’s position, I set the example aside
for now. I return to it in Chapter 3 when I apply the Continuity of Explanation towards
making sense of an individual’s behavior. In the following sections I show how the CE
captures Peirce’s position. The CE offers a characterization of Peircean pragmatism upon
which the rest of the argument in the thesis is based.
2.1 Peircean Pragmatism: Introducing the Pragmatic
Maxim
“Philosophy,” Peirce writes in 1868, “ought to imitate the successful sciences in its meth-
ods” [EP 1:29]. The challenge is making the meaning of this claim more precise. Peirce
initially introduces the scientific method as an alternative to methods that appeal to direct
apprehension of the world through intuition or to a power (what Peirce takes to be a vague
power) of introspection. “Modern science and modern logic”, Peirce writes, “requires us
to stand on a very different platform from this” [EP 1:29]. “We must,” he continues, “put
aside all prejudices derived from a philosophy which bases our knowledge of the external
world on our self-consciousness” [EP 1:30].
The attractive alternative is that found in science. Describing the method in 1877,
Peirce writes:
It is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be
caused by nothing human, but by some external permanency — by something
upon which our thinking has no effect. . . It must be something which affects, or
might affect, every man. And though these affections are necessarily as various
as are individual conditions, yet the method must be such that the ultimate
conclusion of every man shall be the same. Such is the method of science. [EP
1:120]
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Peirce spent a great deal of time studying the method of science and characterizing its prac-
tice. As the opening quote suggests, Peirce similarly spent a great deal of time developing
a philosophical position that he took to imitate it.
Many characterizations of Peirce’s philosophy begin with a discussion of the pragmatic
maxim. The pragmatic maxim is meant to capture the conduct Peirce takes to be (at
least in part) characteristic of scientific inquiry. By showing that the maxim applies to
philosophical investigation more generally, Peirce demonstrates how a philosophical method
can be in agreement with scientific inquiry as he sees it.
I take the pragmatic maxim as my starting point here as well. One of the original
formulations of the pragmatic maxim,1 and one that is still oft-cited, is given in ‘How to
Make Our Ideas Clear’ (1878):
Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we con-
ceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects
is the whole of our conception of the object. [EP 1:132]
This version of the maxim encourages clarity of thought by reducing mental conceptions to
their practical effects. While these practical effects are often highlighted in discussions of
the pragmatic maxim and Peirce’s position, my focus here begins elsewhere. In this section
I emphasize the role Peirce takes the pragmatic maxim to serve in regulating scientific
inquiry. Substantial aspects of Peirce’s philosophy can be recovered by properly situating
the pragmatic maxim as a regulative principle. The rest of this chapter will focus on
refining and defending the regulative role the pragmatic maxim serves. We’ll see that the
Continuity of Explanation falls out of this account.
Subsequent sections and chapters also clarify several other terms that I use freely below,
including judgment, hypothesis, explanation, and what I mean by being accountable to
1This version is often taken (even by Peirce himself) to be a significant initial formulation of the maxim.
I will often refer back to it as the original version in reference to this early formulation. It is not, however,
Peirce’s first appeal to the maxim. We find him making similar claims before this. I cite one such passage
below. Another is the following: “The meaning of a term is the conception which it conveys” (1868) [EP
1:24].
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scientific inquiry. Given these future refinements of relevant scientific terms, along with
discussions of the more general notion of a practice and the particular practice of inquiry in
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, the notion of scientific inquiry will see considerable clarification
throughout the dissertation. We’ll see that each of these terms has a specific meaning for
Peirce. In the meantime I take this general outline to be sufficient. My aim in this chapter
is more or less introductory and my goal is mostly to situate the role Peirce takes the
maxim to serve in regulating scientific inquiry.
What is worth noting for now is that Peirce’s use of scientific inquiry is broader than
scientific practice conceived as the performing of experiments in a laboratory. Peirce recog-
nizes that there is little difference between an experiment performed in the laboratory and
an experiment performed outside of it. Scientific inquiry for Peirce includes the stage prior
to an experiment where an inquirer makes the preparations needed so that observations of
a certain sort, if they were to happen, would count as an experiment.2 Scientific inquiry,
for Peirce, occurs whenever an individual reasons about experimental — or rather, poten-
tially experimental — phenomenon.3 Inquiry, for Peirce, is most broadly a means of fixing
belief. While there are many means of fixing belief, and so perhaps many means of inquiry,
what is characteristic of scientific inquiry for Peirce is that it aims to fix belief in accord
with recalcitrant experience 4 These preliminary remarks will see refinement in Section 2.4
and Chapter 3. Peirce goes on to give a method for making and evaluating inferences that
he takes to characterize scientific practice. For now I leave the qualification scientific in
Peirce’s conception of inquiry to emphasize the importance Peirce places on experimental
phenomenon. The discussion in this chapter is to show how the pragmatic maxim arises
from Peirce’s attempt to preserve the connection between our thoughts and experimental
phenomenon. It is a further question whether and to what extend Peirce’s characterization
of inquiry and investigation captures scientific practice as we understand it today. In later
chapters, I go on to drop the prefix and simply refer to inquiry or Peircean inquiry in
order to emphasize that the argument is based on Peirce’s particular characterization and
2Peirce takes there to be little difference between an experiment and an attentive observation more
generally [CP 2:605-6].
3See [CP 5:425-429] and [CP 6:526].
4See Peirce’s “Fixation of Belief” [EP 1:109,123], as well as discussion throughout [24].
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to leave open the question of the accuracy of Peirce’s particular characterization.
An early version of the pragmatic maxim, and one that I take as my starting point
here, is captured in the following passage from ‘Questions Concerning Certain Faculties
Claimed for Man’ (1868):
Admit no statement concerning what passes within us except as a hypothesis
necessary to explain what takes place in what we commonly call the external
world. [EP 1:30]5
This maxim suggests that every opinion be entertained as a potential hypothesis account-
able to scientific inquiry. This version of the maxim helps make clear i) that the pragmatic
maxim is motivated by a more general demand for scientific accountability and ii) that the
maxim serves a regulative function.
Summarizing this point elsewhere, Peirce writes:
All pragmatists will. . . agree that their method of ascertaining the meanings of
words and concepts is no other than that experimental method by which all the
successful sciences . . . have reached the degrees of certainty that are severally
proper to them today. [CP 5:465]
Burch agrees with the characterization of the maxim as a more general demand for
holding opinions accountable to scientific inquiry. He writes that when Peirce gave his
original formulation of the pragmatic maxim in ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’, “[Peirce]
had in mind that a meaningful conception must have some sort of experiential ‘cash value,’
must somehow be capable of being related to some sort of collection of possible empirical
observations under specifiable conditions” [6]. Houser supports this characterization as
well. “The pragmatic maxim,” Houser writes, “may thus be taken as a test for whether
5Peirce intends the statement to apply to our understanding of mental phenomena as well. He writes:
“The only way of investigating a psychological question is by inference from external facts” [EP 1:23] and
“All knowledge of the internal world is derived from hypothetical reasoning from our knowledge of external
facts” [EP 1:30].
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our conceptions, our theories, are indexed to experience” [EP 1:xxxiv]. On both accounts
the pragmatic maxim is motivated by a general demand for scientific accountability.
We find this characterization with an emphasis on the regulative function explicit in
Peirce’s later writings on pragmatism. At this point Peirce has offered what he takes to
be a synthesis of logic and scientific practice and so refers to the admissibility of certain
hypotheses rather than the entertaining of certain opinions. The pragmatic maxim, he
writes, places a restriction on the type of opinions (here hypotheses) that can be entertained
during inquiry. Here is Peirce in 1903 on the subject:
Pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, if sound, must render needless
any further rule as to the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as hypotheses, that
is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as hopeful suggestions; and, fur-
thermore, this is all that the maxim of pragmatism really pretends to do. . . [CP
5:196]
The maxim is meant to restrict our opinions to those that serve as hypotheses and so can
be accountable to scientific inquiry.
How does pragmatism differentiate those opinions that count as hypotheses? They
must, Peirce claims, have empirical content so that they can be accountable to scientific
inquiry. Here, again, is Peirce on the subject:
What should an explanatory hypothesis be to be worthy to rank as a hypothe-
sis? Of course, it must explain the facts. But what other conditions ought it to
fulfill to be good?... Any hypothesis may be admissible, in the absence of any
special reasons to the contrary, provided it be capable of experimental verifica-
tion, and only insofar as it is capable of such verification. This is approximately
the doctrine of pragmatism.6 [CP 5:197]
6A similar remark about abduction is found in [CP 7:220]: “It is plain that three considerations
should determine our choice of a hypothesis. In the first place, it must be capable of being subjected to
experimental testing. It must consist of experiential consequences with only so much logical cement as is
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The pragmatic maxim restricts the admissibility of opinions to those that have empirical
content and so can be accountable to scientific inquiry.
The use of the term ‘verification’ should not deter one’s reading of this passage. Peirce
explicitly rejects the nominalistic version of verificationism espoused by positivism, which
includes the version that would become popular in the middle of the 20th century.7 Peirce’s
method for how opinions are affirmed through scientific investigation is subtle and I think
it overcomes the problems that have been attributed to verificationism and to his position,
such as by Quine (in [28] and [29]).
Peirce himself is aware of the potential difficulty. He continues the passage above: “But
just here a broad question opens out before us. What are we to understand by experimental
verification? The answer to that involves the whole logic of induction” [CP 5:197]. I set
Peirce’s theory of induction and his response aside until Chapter 3. In the meantime I refer
simply to what is accountable to scientific inquiry, where accountable means — and at this
stage in the discussion this is admittedly indefinite — what is capable of being evaluated
and affirmed in scientific inquiry. The pragmatic maxim suggests that the opinions we
entertain be restricted to those that can be accountable to scientific inquiry.
Recognizing the underlying demand for scientific accountability that motivates the
pragmatic maxim, along with the regulative function that it serves, is significant to un-
derstanding Peirce’s position. We will see that much of Peirce’s philosophy follows from
it. Emphasizing the regulative function of the maxim also helps make clear the underlying
assumptions upon which Peirce’s position relies. Peircean pragmatism, at least at its most
general, is motivated by a demand for scientific accountability. In the next section I turn
towards the regulative demand and Peirce’s defense of regulation. I turn in the second half
of the chapter to what it means for an opinion, on Peirce’s account, to be accountable to
scientific practice. Peirce defends this claim by offering a method for how he thinks it can
be done.
needed to render them rational. In the second place, the hypothesis must be such that it will explain the
surprising facts we have before us which it is the whole motive of our inquiry to rationalize.”
7See Peirce’s criticism in “Critique of Positivism” [CE 2:122-130]. Also the discussion in [CP 5:198-205]
.
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2.2 Grounding Regulation: Regulative Commitments
I’ve suggested above that the pragmatic maxim is intended as a general regulative demand
for scientific inquiry. It places a restriction on the type of opinions to be entertained during
inquiry by demanding that the opinions we entertain be potential hypotheses. How does
Peirce justify this move to regulate our opinions to potential hypotheses? Peirce uses the
term abduction to refer to the form of inference that generates hypotheses. The question
is how Peirce justifies regulating abduction. His response is telling. I take it to be a fine
example of his larger metaphysical commitments.
Peirce defends abduction at the start of inquiry in that it is needed for scientific inquiry
to continue and for it to have a chance at being successful. Here is Peirce at three points
discussing his justification of Abduction:
All the ideas of science come to it by the way of Abduction. Abduction consists
in studying facts and devising a theory to explain them. Its only justification
is that if we are ever to understand things at all, it must be in that way. [CP
5:145]
And,
Concerning the validity of Abductive inference, there is little to be said. . . Abduction
merely suggests that something may be. Its only justification is that from its
suggestion deduction can draw a prediction which can be tested by induction,
and that, if we are ever to learn anything or to understand phenomena at all, it
must be by abduction that this is to be brought about. No reason whatsoever
can be given for it, as far as I can discover; and it needs no reason, since it
merely offers suggestions. [CP 5:171]
And finally,
An Abduction is a method of forming a general prediction without any positive
assurance that it will succeed either in the special case or usually, its justifi-
cation being that it is the only possible hope of regulating our future conduct
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rationally, and that Induction from past experience gives us strong encourage-
ment to hope that it will be successful in the future. [CP 2:270]
Peirce defends abduction on regulative grounds. Peirce justifies abduction on the grounds
that we need to make abductive (i.e. hypothetic) inferences for inquiry to continue and to
have a chance at success.
Peirce scholars have come to see Peirce’s defense of regulation as an appeal to regula-
tive assumptions. The expression comes, at least most notably in the context of Peirce’s
writings, from Hookway and Misak.8 Regulative assumptions, it is said, are assumptions
that are made to continue to engage in a practice and for the practice to have a chance
at being successful.9 The pragmatic maxim, which restricts the opinions we entertain to
potential hypotheses, is supposed to be appropriate on these grounds.
I agree in part with the broad account of regulative assumptions above. While most of
the discussions in the literature on regulative assumptions in Peirce focus on the regulative
assumptions of inquiry, the broad account above captures what I take to be an important
generality of regulative assumptions. It recognizes the role regulative assumptions play
within any practice. The breadth of the account of regulative assumptions above, however,
leaves it prone to ambiguity and misinterpretation. I suggest an alternative. Regulative
commitments, as I prefer to call them, are the commitments that characterize a practice
and an individual engaged in it. They are not so much assumptions that an individual
makes, or has to be cognizant of, but are commitments that an individual acts in accord
with when engaged in a practice.
If regulative commitments characterize the behavior of an individual engaged in a prac-
tice, as I suggest, then they serve something like an explanation of the individual’s behavior
and of the practice. Like other explanations they can be evaluated: Do the regulative com-
mitments in fact serve to characterize the practitioner’s behavior? Furthermore, these
regulative commitments can in turn be affirmed in experience. An alchemist, for example,
8See extended discussion throughout [14]), along with [24] and [23]. Recent summaries and further
developments can be found in [15] and [2].
9See, for example, [23, p. 50-52].
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is committed to there being a way to turn base metals into gold. This commitment regu-
lates, and so helps characterize, the alchemist’s behavior, but the commitments that it rests
upon will not be confirmed in experience. There is no way to turn base metals into gold.
The regulative commitment is in fact mistaken. A metallurgist who on the other hand
acts on the hope that there is a way to extract a base metal from its ore would nonetheless
have their commitment affirmed by the smelting process. Regulative commitments can be
affirmed in experience.
Regulative commitments characterize a practice and an individual engaged in it. Though
an individual need not be aware of the commitments that regulate their behavior, an indi-
vidual can come to be aware of them and go on to hope that they are true. I argue here
that Peirce takes the pragmatic maxim to be a regulative commitment of scientific inquiry.
An individual engaged in the practice acts in its accord. An inquirer acts in accord with
the pragmatic maxim to continue to engage in the practice and for the practice to have a
chance at success.
I further defend this account below. First I suggest differences between this account
and discussions of regulative assumptions in the literature. The expression ‘regulative as-
sumptions’ comes from Kant, and some Peirce scholars have likened regulative assumptions
in Peirce to regulative assumptions in Kant. The connection is not inappropriate. Peirce
acknowledges a Kantian influence, and his early discussions of regarding regulative assump-
tions seem to share features of indispensability arguments. But Peirce would later, however,
explicitly reject appeals to transcendental claims. He takes transcendental explanations to
be poor and finds appeals to ‘necessary’ factors and ‘presuppositions’ or ‘preconditions’ of
a practice to be vague and unhelpful.10 In the end Peirce does not give regulative assump-
tions any transcendental status. A practioner cannot appeal to transcendental factors to
defend regulative assumptions.
If we move beyond the Kantian account, as I think we should, then the question becomes
what sort of epistemic status a practitioner should nonetheless give to these regulative
assumptions. Misak suggests that the propositional attitude a practitioner adopts toward
10Discussion of transcendental leanings in Peirce and the difficulties for interpretation that follow can
be found in [10] and [7], [14, Ch. 7], and [22].
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regulative assumptions always remains a mere hope. “[Peirce] is very clear,” she writes,
“that this a different matter from believing or asserting” [23, p. 65]. In this case an
individual engaged in a practice can at best hope that these assumptions are true. Hookway
recognizes a similar tension in Peirce’s views.11 Hookway resolves this tension by appealing
to a distinction between practical, or living beliefs, and the theoretical beliefs that are
the result of scientific inquiry. The practitioner on this account can defend regulative
assumptions on practical grounds but not theoretical grounds. The alternative that I
offer below suggests that these views are incorrect. The debate is overblown. Regulative
commitments, contra Misak, can go on to be confirmed, and regulative commitments can
be confirmed in the same manner, contra Hookway, as beliefs that are the result of scientific
inquiry. The solution lies in a proper understanding of Peirce’s position. We should, in
fact, expect such continuity of confirmation in Peirce.
Two more recent accounts of regulative assumption in Peirce deserve mention. Howat
suggests that regulative assumptions in Peirce are akin to Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions
[15]. I think this captures an important aspect of the relationship between a practitioner
and the regulative assumptions (and similarly regulative commitments) at the start of the
practice, but it again leaves out the type of confirmation that regulative commitments
can receive as the practice continues and develops. Another recent account offered by
Atkin suffers the same problem [2]. Atkin gives no further account for how Peircean
regulative assumptions can be affirmed in the course of experience. Of note, Atkin does
emphasize an important motivating or affective element in Peircean regulative assumptions.
He recognizes that regulative assumptions include motivating or affective states that may
be significant to characterizing an individual engaged in a practice. This is based in part
on Peirce’s remarks (emphasized by Misak above) that a practitioner may hope regulative
assumptions are true. I agree with this inclusion, and take this to warrant in part the move
towards discussing commitments rather than assumptions that regulate and characterize
a practice. They are not simply assumptions but include motivational or affective states
characteristic of a practice.
The move towards regulative commitments offers a worthwhile alternative to these
debates in the literature. Regulative commitments characterize a practice and an individual
11See [14, p. 38-40 and p. 188, Ch. 9].
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engaged in it. Peircean pragmatism goes further and suggests that regulation is the primary
means of characterizing a practice. I defend this position below.
2.2.1 Regulation as primary
For Peirce, regulation is the primary means of characterizing a practice. Defending the
importance of regulation when characterizing scientific practice, Peirce writes:
That which constitutes science, then, is not so much correct conclusions, as it
is a correct method. But the method of science is itself a scientific result. It
did not spring out of the brain of a beginner: it was a historic attainment and
a scientific achievement. So that not even this method ought to be regarded as
essential to the beginnings of science. That which is essential, however, is the
scientific spirit, which is determined not to rest satisfied with existing opinions,
but to press on to the real truth of nature. [CP 6:428]
Peirce takes the regulation of a practice to be the best means of characterizing a practice.
The reason, suggested in the passage above, is that both the results of science and its
methods are prone to change and revision. Because science as a practice is changing
and evolving, where its results and even its method are susceptible to revision, what
characterizes a scientist at work cannot be a particular interest in a result or method, but
must include an openness to what the (future) results and method will be. The scientist
must act on an openness to the future practice. This spirit — what Peirce refers to above
as the scientific spirit — is a willingness to engage in the practice whatever the result or
method may turn out to be. That which animates the scientist must then be more general
than any one result or method. This spirit accounts for historical developments as well.
What characterizes the historical attainments of the practice cannot be the results, which
were sometimes (and even often) mistaken, or the method, which was imperfect, but again
by the general spirit that motivated the scientist. The scientist must be animated by an
indefinite understanding — or, as I prefer to say, a general understanding — of the future
results and methods of the practice. In the above passage, a practice and its practitioners
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are best characterized by this regulative spirit. Regulation is primary for characterizing a
practice and an individual engaged in it.
This is a good first step, but a further clarification is in order. It may be tempting to
see regulation as a necessary first step towards engaging in a practice. Using the example of
hypotheses in scientific practice, it may be argued that an important first step in regulating
scientific practice is to restrict the opinions we entertain to those that are (or might be)
hypotheses. This is especially so when we consider, as I think tends to be the case, that
we often need to consider several hypotheses before we arrive at one that is taken to be
successful. Scientific practice seems to support the position that it be initially regulated by
restricting opinions to potential hypotheses. In terms of the scientific spirit, the argument
here would be that the scientific spirit is needed at the beginning of the practice.
Restricting the opinions we entertain to those that serve as hypothesis is appropriate,
on these grounds, because it is a necessary preliminary step to engage in scientific practice
and for our engagement in the practice to have a chance at success. This is in accord with
the appeal to regulative assumptions above. Restricting opinions to potential hypotheses
is appropriate for scientific practice to continue and for it to have a chance at success.
I take Peirce’s position, however, to be more subtle. The preliminary account above
suggests that regulation is significant because we need to fail in scientific practice before we
succeed. This can be the case (and as acknowledged above is perhaps even often the case),
but Peirce recognizes that it doesn’t necessarily have to be so. It is certainly not a logical
impossibility, as it may be that the first hypothesis was (or happened to be) a correct
hypothesis (and even correct in all the right ways).12 This action would be sufficient to
serve as a counter-example to the preliminary account above. But it does not serve, I take
it, as a counter-example for Peirce’s position properly understood. Offering hypotheses
and potential explanations may (or at least may often be) an important preliminary step
in scientific practice. But I take the Peircean pragmatist to possess a stronger argument for
the primacy of regulation when characterizing a practice. Regulation is more fundamental
than this.
12The point here is not that it has to happen, but that eventually a good guess will arise, and nothing
restricts the good guess from being this good.
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I take there to be an underlying regulative principle that grounds the primacy of reg-
ulation in Peirce’s writings. As suggested above, the inquirer does not yet know all of the
correct results that science will (or would bring). Similarly, the inquirer does not yet know
what method or methods will (or would) be appropriate to the practice. The inquirer
must then be (at least in part) motivated by an openness to what these further results
and further methods would be. In the interim the inquirer must be regulated by what the
correct results or appropriate method(s) might be. I take this general regulative principle
to be the Peircean pragmatist’s best initial defense of the pragmatic maxim.
The initial justification for the pragmatic maxim, on this account, comes from the
fact that any act in accord with a practice will likewise be in accord with this general
regulative principle. Every potential engagement in a practice is regulated by what is
possibly engagement in the practice. Every potential successful engagement in a practice
is regulated by what is possibly a successful engagement in a practice. Every act in accord
with a practice falls under the larger class of regulated actions. The general regulative
principle follows from an assumption about the classification of actions. A successful
action falls under the broader class of actions that might be successful.
The pragmatic maxim, on this account, supposes that a practice must generally be
regulated by the actions that might be needed to continue to engage in the practice and
that might be needed for the practice to be successful. We saw in the last section that the
pragmatic maxim restricts the opinions we entertain during inquiry to potential hypotheses,
where hypotheses are just those opinions that might be accountable to scientific practice.
It asks us to regulate our opinions to those that might be relevant to the practice and that
might be successful. On this account, the pragmatic maxim is most broadly a statement
about what regulation does. The pragmatic maxim, I suggest, is initially defended on these
grounds. It is a suggestion for regulating scientific inquiry by restricting our opinions to
those that serve as potential hypotheses and so that might be accountable to scientific
practice. The initial justification for this claim comes from the general regulative principle
above.
The examples above show nicely why the pragmatic maxim, at least at its most general,
does not conflict with scientific practice. If regulation asks us at first to restrict opinions
to those that are hypothesis, and to those that might be successful, every instance of
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scientific practice will be in its accord. Acting in accord with scientific practice involves
acting in accord with what might be scientific practice. Achieving success in scientific
practice involves acting in accord with what might be successful in scientific practice. In
each case former is simply a subset of the latter. At its most general the pragmatic maxim
as a regulative principle then does not — and perhaps even cannot — conflict with scientific
practice.
This is the significant reason why at this point in the argument we need not discuss
the finer points of scientific practice. The initial justification for the pragmatic maxim, a
least at its most general, is just a claim about regulation. No engagement in the practice
does not also count as what might be engagement in the practice. No success in a practice
does not also count as what might be success in the practice. The pragmatic maxim, at its
most general, is simply a claim about regulating scientific practice whatever it may turn
out to be. Of course, Peirce goes on to offer a more detailed account of scientific practice
and a more detailed account of the pragmatic maxim that regulates it. These refinements
will be discussed in the rest of this chapter and the next. The initial justification for the
maxim nonetheless follows, I argue, from this general regulative principle.
I turn in the final section towards what Peirce means for an opinion to be accountable
to scientific inquiry. Peirce defends this claim by offering a method for how it can be done.
I begin with a general motivation for the method in order to show the minimal assumptions
that are needed to get the method off the ground.
2.3 Refine and Defend the Pragmatic Maxim, pt. 1:
Belief and Action
The pragmatic maxim regulates scientific inquiry. I suggested in Section 1 that the reg-
ulative function is enforced by what I have referred to broadly as the scientific demand.
The scientific demand is a general demand for scientific accountability. The discussion of
the pragmatic maxim in the last section suggested that an inquirer restrict one’s actions
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to what might count as engaging in scientific practice and what might be successful to the
practice; namely, to restrict one’s opinions to those that serve as hypotheses and potential
explanations.
The generality of the discussion of the maxim above is helpful in situating the maxim
within scientific practice, but the resulting characterization is too broad to be helpful in
guiding inquiry. In the next two sections I show how Peirce adds to the above picture.
The additions show how the maxim is more than just the (vague) regulative point about
scientific practice that the above account suggests, but that the maxim offers a substantive
method for guiding inquiry. It offers, I suggest, a method of reasoning in accord with
scientific practice.
2.3.1 Belief and Action
“The feeling of believing,” Peirce writes in ‘The Fixation of Belief’ (1877), “is a more or less
sure indication of there being established in our nature some habit which will determine
our action” [EP 1:114]. We find this connection between belief and action even earlier in
Peirce. He writes in ‘Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man’ (1868):
. . . it is a mere question of words whether we define belief as that judgment
which is accompanied by [a peculiar feeling of conviction], or as that judgment
from which a man will act. [EP 1:22]
Peirce also makes use of this connection in his original derivation of the maxim given in
‘How to Make Ideas Clear’ (1878), where he supposes that belief consists in the establish-
ment of a rule of action [EP 1:129].
When Peirce mentions the connection between belief and action in the passages above
he takes the connection more or less as given and does not elaborate or defend it. He
nonetheless comes back to address the connection and its importance to pragmatism in
1903. Peirce at this point dismisses what he takes to be weaker psychological assumptions
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in his initial accounts of belief.13 His interest in the supposition, however, remains intact.
Referring back to the supposition appealed to in ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear,’ he writes
that he had supposed “belief [to consist] mainly in being deliberately prepared to adopt
the formula believed in as the guide to action” [CP 5:27]. His interest in defending the
pragmatic maxim now turns towards defending this claim [CP 5:25-29].
The supposition, as I take it here, is that belief establishes a mode of action. I do not, at
least not yet, attempt to defend this supposition outright. My aim here is, rather, to show
that Peirce takes the supposition to follow from holding the notion of belief accountable to
scientific inquiry. Peirce, as we’ll see in the next section, goes on to offer a more substantive
account of belief. For now, however, I focus on this connection between belief and action
to highlight the minimal assumptions that are needed to motivate the pragmatic maxim.
All that is needed is the supposition that belief establishes a set of actions or possible
behaviors. In the next section I expand on this account. But, again, for now this minimal
account suffices.
The argument is straightforward. For the notion of belief to be accountable to scientific
practice, then it must be based on some empirical content. For the notion of belief to be
based on empirical content then it must refer to a set of possible behaviors or actions.
Referring back to Houser’s expression from before, we may say that for the notion of belief
to be scientifically appropriate it must be “indexed to experience.” It must, now referring
back to Burch, “be capable of being related to some sort of collection of possible empirical
observations under specifiable conditions.” The result, and now I suggest Peirce’s position,
is that belief establishes a set of possible behaviors. This is the case, at least, if the notion
13We see signs of the weaker psychological assumptions in the passages above, where Peirce still associates
a ‘feeling of believing’ or a ‘feeling of conviction’ with belief and judgment. Compare this, for example,
with a later account of belief given in 1903: “Belief is not a momentary mode of consciousness; it is a
habit of mind essentially enduring for some time, and mostly (at least) unconscious” [CP 5:417]. The
account developed below is in accord with these later developments in Peirce’s position. Peirce continues
to recognize that feelings can accompany belief and judgment, but he no longer seeks to appeal to such
factors in his derivation of the pragmatic maxim. See the discussion in [CP 5:25-33].
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of belief rests on empirical content and so is accountable to scientific practice.
This is what we find in Peirce. Peirce writes: “different beliefs are distinguished by the
different modes of action to which they give rise” [EP 1:129-30]. Belief, here, consists in
the establishment of a mode of action. Without some possible difference in action then
scientific practice would attribute the same belief. Peirce writes: “If beliefs do not differ in
this respect, if they appease the same doubt by producing the same rule of action, then no
mere differences in the manner of consciousness of them can make them different beliefs”
[EP 1:130]. Different beliefs, if the attributed difference is to be scientifically appropriate,
must likewise consist in establishing a different mode of action.
There are three points worth emphasizing about Peirce’s position cited above. As I
have stressed from the start of the section, the first is that Peirce takes belief to refer
to a set of possible behaviors. This follows from trying to restrict the notion of belief to
one that is accountable to scientific inquiry. It follows, as I’ve put it, from applying the
scientific demand to the notion of belief. The second is Peirce’s claim that if no difference
is found in possible behavior then scientific practice would attribute the same belief. This
claim is significant to understanding Peirce’s position and I appeal to it in arguments later
in this chapter and the next. Of note for now is that this leads Peirce to suppose that the
attribution of different beliefs, if the attribution is to be scientifically appropriate, must
come down to a possible difference in behavior. This is an early version of the Continuity
of Explanation that I mentioned in Chapter 1 and the beginning of this chapter, and will
go on to elaborate below. The third is the move from talking about ‘a set of possible
behavior’ as I did at the start to what Peirce refers to in the above passages as a mode of
action. This difference is not insignificant but its helpfulness will not be addressed until
the next section. The important point is that Peirce takes a belief to establish a mode of
action, a mode of action that can in part be characterized by a set of possible behaviors.
Peirce takes each of these to follow if we restrict the notion to one that rests on empirical
content and so is accountable to scientific inquiry.
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2.3.2 Regulating Opinions: Reintroducing the Pragmatic Maxim
Once we take belief to establish a mode of action, there is only one further assumption
to yield the pragmatic maxim. Peirce calls the activity in thought that begins with the
starting of a question and ending with its resolution inquiry [EP 1:128]. Peirce takes the
result of inquiry to be a belief. Inquiry, for Peirce, is the activity in thought between doubt
and belief [EP 1:128].14 If we take belief to consist in establishing a mode of action, and the
result of inquiry to be a belief, then the result of inquiry likewise consists in establishing a
mode of action. Peirce assumes, in short, that the result of inquiry be connected to action
as well. This is the insight that would motivate the pragmatic maxim.
We may say that inquiry for Peirce is anchored by doubt on the one hand and belief
on the other. The doubt that begins inquiry is doubt over a prior belief and the result of
inquiry is also a belief. Both the preliminary and antecedent belief consist in establishing
a mode of action. Peirce takes inquiry, whatever it may be, to be the activity in thought
between these two modes of action.
We see this move in Peirce’s original derivation of the pragmatic maxim in ‘How to
Make Our Ideas Clear’. “The function of thought,” Peirce writes, “is to produce belief”
[EP 1:127].15 As belief consists mainly in the establishment of a mode of action, “the
whole function of thought,” Peirce concludes, “is to produce habits of action” [EP 1:131].
Peirce is supposing here that the result of inquiry likewise consists in establishing a mode
of action.
It is at this point where Peirce suggests the insight that would become the pragmatic
maxim. If the result of inquiry would ultimately be accountable to the mode of action for
which it gives rise, then inquiry should be regulated by these considerations. If inquiry
is anchored between two modes of action, then Peirce suggests — and here he posits the
pragmatic maxim — that the opinions that we entertain during inquiry be guided as well
by considerations that consist mainly in establishing a mode of action.
14See a discussion of the same point in [CP 7:313-325].
15Peirce is also explicit about the statements importance: “That the settlement of opinion is the sole
end of inquiry is a very important proposition.” [EP 1:115].
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Below is Peirce beginning to formulate the maxim that becomes the pragmatic maxim.
Referring here to confusions in thought that arise when we mistakenly take the same beliefs
to be different, Peirce writes:
From all these sophisms we shall be perfectly safe so long as we reflect that the
whole function of thought is to produce habits of action; and that whatever
there is connected to thought, but irrelevant to its purpose, is an accretion to
it, but no part of it. . . Thus, we come down to what is tangible and practical,
as the root of every real distinction of thought, no matter how subtle it may
be; and there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but
a possible difference in practice. [EP 1:131]
This maxim suggests that we entertain opinions by considering the resulting modes of
action for which they give rise. I take a tangible and practical difference here to be one
that consists in a possible difference in action and so is, at least potentially, accountable to
scientific practice. On this reading Peirce’s emphasis on practical effects is simply a means
to capture the part of the opinion that is potentially scientifically appropriate. The same
can also be said of the teleological wording. While we may be able to talk of the ‘goal’
or ‘function’ of thought as producing modes of action, Peirce’s motivation for these claims
comes from a demand for scientific accountability.16
16It is interesting to point out that Peirce latter acknowledged the teleological weakness in this initial
argument for Pragmatism presented in Ideas. He writes in 1908:
My original essay, having been written for a popular monthly, assumes, for no better reason
than that real inquiry cannot begin until a state of real doubt arises and ends as soon as
Belief is attained, that “a settlement of Belief,” or, in other words, a state of satisfaction, is
all that Truth, or the aim of inquiry, consists in. The reason I gave for this was so flimsy,
while the inference was so nearly the gist of Pragmaticism, that I must confess the argument
of that essay might with some justice be said to beg the question. [CP 6:485]
I take the teleological assumption — that the goal or end (or aim) of inquiry is the settlement of belief
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It is only shortly thereafter that Peirce derives the original version of the pragmatic
maxim given in ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’ (1878):
Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we con-
ceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects
is the whole of our conception of the object. [EP 1:132]
The maxim, as I wrote before, encourages clarity of thought by reducing an opinion to its
practical effects. The focus on the practical effects is again simply a way to capture possible
differences in action. It is intended to capture, as I’ve stressed here, differences in the
resulting belief that would potentially be accountable to scientific practice. The pragmatic
maxim suggests we regulate the opinions we entertain during inquiry by considering the
modes of action for which they would give rise.
Peirce would continue to put the maxim in terms of practical consequences. Here are
two other versions that emphasize practical effects:
pragmatism is the doctrine that every conception is a conception of conceivable
practical effects [CP 5:196] (1903)
For the maxim of pragmatism is that a conception can have no logical effect
or import differing from that of a second conception except so far as, taken in
— to be the weak part of the argument that Peirce is referring to here. I avoid this to an extent in the
derivation above by emphasizing, as I take to be appropriate to Peirce’s view, not the mere settlement of
opinion but the settlement that would be found if scientific inquiry were carried sufficiently far. Peirce in
fact makes the same point in the continuation of the above passage when he writes: “The first part of the
essay, however, is occupied with showing that, if Truth consists in satisfaction, it cannot be any actual
satisfaction, but must be the satisfaction which would ultimately be found if the inquiry were pushed to
its ultimate and indefeasible issue.” It is worth noting that Peirce continues to acknowledge so many years
later that “the inference was so nearly the gist of Pragmaticism.” I take Peirce’s theory of judgment, here
characterized by the CE Method discussed in Chapter 3, to be the better argument and defense (the “gist
of Pragmaticism”) that Peirce has in mind.
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connection with other conceptions and intentions, it might conceivably modify
our practical conduct differently from that second conception. [CP 5:196] (1903)
In addition to an understanding of practical effects and consequences, we can still now
see the maxim in its role for regulating inquiry. The pragmatic maxim, on this reading,
presumes that an individual look to the different practical effects the adoption of an opinion
would have in order to focus on those aspects of the opinion that might hold up to scientific
inquiry.
Recall that the pragmatic maxim at its most general is a statement about what reg-
ulation does. It supposes that if our aim is success in a practice, that the most general
regulative principle is to restrict our engagement in the practice to those actions that
might be successful. The pragmatic maxim is simply a claim that we regulate inquiry
by considering the possible differences in action that would be accountable to scientific
practice.
If the pragmatic maxim is going to be controversial it will be in how it enforces the
condition on what ‘might’ be successful — a condition on what, as I’ve put it, it takes to
be accountable to scientific practice. Insofar as the pragmatic maxim can be mistaken it
can only be on account of this regulative restriction it enforces. A refined version of the
pragmatic maxim may, for example, be too restrictive on what it takes for a possibility
to be accountable to scientific practice and so cut off possibilities that are scientifically
appropriate. Or a refined version of the maxim may not be restrictive enough and allow
the entertaining of some possibilities that are not scientifically appropriate.
As I’ve argued here, however, the only assumption so far that Peirce makes is that
what is accountable to scientific practice must come down to a potential difference in action.
Peirce’s use of ‘differences in practice’ and ‘potential practical consequences’ captures these
possible differences in behavior that are capable of being accountable to scientific practice.
Given such a minimal assumption about action and scientific practice, I take it that the
pragmatic maxim as discussed so far does not yet suffer from these potential problems.
The pragmatic maxim is not motivated by a bold claim about practical consequences,
meaning, or truth. It is rather motivated by a much more straightforward scientific demand.
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The pragmatic maxim follows from supposing that our actions, including the inquiry we
engage in, be accountable to scientific practice. The maxim suggest that the opinions we
entertain during inquiry be regulated by considerations of possible differences in action.
This reading is in accord with Peirce’s later writings where he is explicit that the prag-
matic maxim serves to restrict the opinions we entertain during inquiry to those that may
have scientific purport. Referring back to his use of ‘conception’ in his original derivation,
he writes that this use “was to show that [he] was speaking of meaning in no other sense
than that of intellectual purport”17 He continues:
I understand pragmatism to be a method of ascertaining the meanings, not of
all ideas, but only of what I call ‘intellectual concepts,’ that is to say, of those
upon the structure of which, arguments concerning objective fact may hinge.
[CP 5:467]
The passage reiterates that the pragmatic maxim for Peirce is restricted to what I have
called opinions, and that this restriction is motivated by what Peirce takes to be the part
of the belief that is accountable to scientific practice.
This serves as an initial characterization of the pragmatic maxim. The above con-
siderations situate the pragmatic maxim as a regulative commitment of scientific inquiry.
The pragmatic maxim suggests we regulate our opinions during inquiry by considering the
different modes of action to which they would give rise. On the account given here the
only assumptions upon which Peirce relies are i) that a belief establishes a mode of action
that is accountable to scientific practice, and ii) that the result of inquiry will likewise
ultimately be held accountable to the belief and mode of action that it establishes.
I turn now towards extending this characterization of the maxim. Reflecting again on
the original derivation of the maxim, Peirce writes in 1904:
The word pragmatism was invented to express a certain maxim of logic, which,
as was shown at its first enouncement, involves a whole system of philosophy.
17This is affirmed elsewhere, such as where Peirce writes: “I make pragmatism to be a mere maxim of
logic instead of a sublime principle of speculative philosophy” [CP 5:18].
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The maxim is intended to furnish a method for the analysis of concepts. [CP
8:191]
I now turn towards this version of the maxim intended to furnish a method for the analysis
of concepts and that involves a whole system of philosophy. The result, while it may not
serve as a characterization of the whole system of philosophy that Peirce refers, suffices as
a preliminary characterization of Peircean pragmatism.
2.4 Refine and Defend the Pragmatic Maxim, pt. 2:
Method of Inquiry
The pragmatic maxim is a regulative commitment of scientific inquiry. The pragmatic
maxim suggests we regulate our opinions by considering the different modes of action for
which they would give rise. The preliminary defense of this claim in the last section was
quite minimal. It suggested that because belief establishes a mode of action, and because
the result of inquiry is a belief, that inquiry also be guided by considerations of possible
differences in action. I refine this account here and begin by offering a more detailed
look at Peirce’s conception of belief and a more detailed look at Peirce’s conception of a
mode of action. The discussion in the last section offered little for how this regulation
can be accomplished. Peirce goes on to suggest a method of inquiry for how this can be
done. The method, at least as I describe it here in the second half of this sections, rests
on Peirce’s theory of judgment. I take this to be Peirce’s best option for defending the
pragmatic maxim. Peirce’s theory of judgment is substantial and I take it to be one of —
if not the — most significant aspects of Peirce’s philosophy. I do not defend this claim or
summarize Peirce’s whole theory of judgment here, however, but rather restrict discussion
to the aspects of judgment that are most directly connected to modes of action and an
individual’s behavior. The inclusion of Peirce’s theory of judgment demonstrates how the
pragmatic maxim offers both a theory of meaning and a theory of inquiry. As a result,
I suggest that the pragmatic maxim and Peircean pragmatism are best characterized as
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offering a method of reasoning.
2.4.1 Belief and Action (again)
Peirce takes the meaning of a belief to be the particular mode of action that it establishes.
Peirce takes this notion of belief to be held by the experimentalist. In regards to an
experimentalist’s conceptions, Peirce writes:
[The experimentalist’s] disposition is to think of everything just as everything is
thought of in the laboratory, that is, as a question of experimentation. . . . when
you have found, or ideally constructed upon a basis of observation, the typical
experimentalist, you will find that whatever assertion you may make to him, he
will either understand as meaning that if a given prescription for an experiment
ever can be and ever is carried out in act, an experience of a given description
will result, or else he will see no sense at all in what you say. [CP 5:411]
Peirce offers another example of the experimentalist’s attitude when he discusses the
chemist’s conception of a substance:18
We must dismiss the idea that the occult state of things (be it a relation among
atoms or something else), which constitutes the reality of a diamond’s hardness
can possibly consist in anything but in the truth of a general conditional propo-
sition. For to what else does the entire teaching of chemistry relate except to
the ‘behavior’ of different possible kinds of material substance? And in what
does that behavior consist except that if a substance of a certain kind should
be exposed to an agency of a certain kind, a certain kind of sensible result
would ensue, according to our experiences hitherto. As for the pragmaticist, it
is precisely his position that nothing else than this can be so much as meant
by saying that an object possesses a character. [CP 5:457]
18Another passage can be found in [CP 7:340].
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Peirce applies the experimentalist attitude to the notion of belief. Peirce writes:
As a pragmaticist I hold a belief to be a determination of a person such that
under certain conceivable experiential circumstances he would be led by it to
act in a certain way. . . [MS[R] 200:91]
Two other passages summarize the point:
[Belief] is a general law of action, such that on a certain general kind of occasion
a man will be more or less apt to act in a certain general way. [CP 2:148]
And,
Belief is an intelligent habit upon which we shall act when occasion presents
itself. [CP 2:435]
The result, as I put it, is that belief establishes a mode of action.19 Belief entails that the
believer would exhibit certain behavior under specified conditions.
Finally, the pragmatic maxim follows from applying the experimentalist’s attitude to
every conception of thought. Referring in the passage below to the experimentalist’s atti-
tude, Peirce is explicit about the point:
Endeavoring, as a man of that type naturally would, to formulate what he
so approved, he framed the theory that a conception, that is, the rational
purport of a word or other expression, lies exclusively in its conceivable bearing
upon the conduct of life; so that, since obviously nothing that might not result
from experiment can have any direct bearing upon conduct, if one can define
accurately all the conceivable experimental phenomena which the affirmation
or denial of a concept could imply, one will have therein a complete definition
of the concept, and there is absolutely nothing more in it. For this doctrine he
invented the name pragmatism. [CP 5:412]
19Following, for example, use in [EP1: 129-130].
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And elsewhere:
. . . experimental results are the only results that can affect human conduct.
. . . Whenever a man acts purposively, he acts under a belief in some experi-
mental phenomenon. Consequently, the sum of the experimental phenomena
that a proposition implies makes up its entire bearing upon human conduct.
[CP 5:427]
Now we have arrived back at the original version of the pragmatic maxim, given here
in its original context as the pragmatic grade of clarity:
Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we con-
ceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects
is the whole of our conception of the object. [EP 1:132]
The maxim asks us to look at all the ways a conception of an object may influence our
behavior. The pragmatic grade’s emphasis on practical effects asks us to restrict our
opinion’s about an object to those that would make a conceivable difference in our behavior
— it is to restrict our attention to all the ways we conceive that the object might behave.
This in turn allows us to begin to test our conception against experience.
In the original derivation in ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear,’ Peirce suggests in places
that the pragmatic grade of clarity just is the experimentalist’s conception. When dis-
cussing what we mean by calling an object ‘hard,’ Peirce writes:
Let us ask what we mean by calling an object hard. Evidently that it will not
be scratched by many other substances. The whole conception of this quality,
as of every other, lies in its conceived effects. There is absolutely no difference
between a hard and soft thing so long as they are not brought to the test. [EP
1:132]
In this passage Peirce passes back and forth between the pragmatic grade and the exper-
imentalist’s conception. In some of the passages above he does not yet distinguish the
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regulative function that the pragmatic grade serves. By restricting our attention to all
the ways that we conceive that an object might behave, we begin to make our conception
accountable to scientific practice. The properties we conceive an object to have are those
that can go on to be tested. The pragmatic maxim, now in its role as the third grade of
clarity, is used to regulate the opinions we entertain to those that may be scientifically
appropriate.
It is more accurate to say that the pragmatic grade is the preliminary grade that leads us
to the experimentalist’s conception. Because the experimentalist’s and resulting scientific
conception is not yet complete, it may be more accurate still to say that the pragmatic
grade directs us towards what the scientific conception would be. Again, the pragmatic
grade regulates inquiry into the part of conception that is scientifically appropriate. The
pragmatic grade regulates inquiry into what the scientific grade would be. The emphasis on
any conceivable practical effect captures this difference and the regulative role the maxim
serves. The conceivable effects we envision may or may not be those that are scientifically
appropriate, but conceiving them and their practical effects is the first step in regulating
our opinions towards those that might be scientifically appropriate. The pragmatic grade
of clarity is to begin to conceive of the object by how it might behave — it is to begin to
conceive of the behavior of the object in a way where it could be put to the test.
It is only after Peirce recognizes and emphasizes the regulative role the maxim serves
that he is explicit about the difference. The key to the pragmatic grade of clarity, as Peirce
would come to recognize and as supported by discussion throughout this chapter, is that
the pragmatic grade regulates our inquiry into the scientific grade. The pragmatic grade
regulates inquiry by restricting the opinions we entertain to those that Peirce thinks may
be accountable to scientific practice.
2.4.2 Regulating Opinions (again): Belief, Judgment, and a Method
of Inquiry
The above account helps us refine the notion of belief and situate the pragmatic maxim
as a regulative commitment of what Peirce takes to be scientific inquiry. The result, as
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I put it, is that belief establishes a mode of action. The pragmatic maxim directs an
inquirer towards testing a conception’s conceivable experiential effects. To fully carry out
this project we need to include a logical analysis of the conception. Belief entails that the
believer would exhibit certain behavior in specified conditions. The logical analysis allows
us to begin to determine what these certain behaviors and specified conditions are.
Recall that Peirce uses the term inquiry to designate the starting of a question in
thought and its resolution. Peirce supposes the result of inquiry to be a belief that es-
tablishes a mode of action. To see the rest of Peirce’s position we need to go one step
further. Peirce supposes that the result of inquiry is not simply a belief but is also a judg-
ment. This begins simply as an assumption. It is defended as a regulative commitment
in order for inquiry to continue and have a chance at success. While it begins simply as
a commitment, it can seek affirmation as it continues to be successful.20 This move is
what allows Peirce ultimately to help himself to logical considerations within inquiry and
to achieve his purported synthesis of logic with scientific practice.21 In taking the result
of inquiry to be a judgment, Peirce assume that the resulting belief can be represented by
a series of inferences. The quote at the beginning of Section 3.1 referenced the connection
to judgment:
. . . it is a mere question of words whether we define belief as that judgment
which is accompanied by [a peculiar feeling of conviction], or as that judgment
from which a man will act. [EP 1:22]
Peirce’s theory of judgment helps refine the example above. It suggests a means for de-
termining the content of a judgment and the mode of action the judgment in particular
establishes.
20How such an assumption can be affirmed as inquiry continues is addressed in the next chapter.
21This purported synthesis arises when Peirce develops the three types of inference — hypothetic (or
abductive) inference, deductive inference, and inductive inference — and situates each within scientific
practice. Science, according to Peirce, is the practice that develops and tests these types of inferences.
Whether this suffices for a characterization of scientific practice as it is understood in contemporary terms
is a further question. I go on to discuss these type of inferences in Chapter 3.
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Peirce supposes that when an individual forms a judgment the individual forms an ex-
pectation based upon certain further considerations. Take, for example, an individual who
judges an object to be a hard diamond. Peirce describes the content of the judgment as “a
sort of composite photograph [that] appears in [the individual’s] imagination” [CP 5:542].
Peirce recognizes that the individual does not simply intuit the object to be diamond, but
rather that the individual infers the object under consideration to be a diamond. The
individual may have judged, for example, based on the object appearing to be a mineral,
to have an octahedral structure, and to look more or less like what past experiences of di-
amonds suggest. These inferences are also part of the ‘composite photograph’ that Peirce
references above.
Peirce takes the conclusion of a judgment to be represented logically by an expectation
that attributes a character to an object.22 Take again the judgment that a diamond is hard.
The judgment in this case is to expect hard when one encounters the object diamond.23
The object in this case is ‘a diamond’ and the attributed character is ‘hard.’ The character
captures what to expect, while the object captures the conditions to expect it.
Let me extend this introduction to Peirce’s theory of judgment, and its relation to
action in particular, in terms of an example found in ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear.’
The example suggests a preliminary method for clarifying opinions and for connecting an
individual’s opinions to a mode of action. In regards to the clarity of an idea, Peirce writes:
A clear idea is defined as one which is so apprehended that it will be recognized
wherever it is met with, and so that no other will be mistaken for it. [EP 1:125]
Peirce goes on in ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’ to dismiss several logician’s attempts
22When discussing hypotheses and evaluating them in ‘Some Consequences Concerning Certain Faculties,
Peirce writes that “[the] question, like every other, is whether certain objects have certain characters” [EP
1:32]. The plurality here is important. I will discuss it more below. The point is similar to the logical
notion that a proposition attributes a predicate to a subject. See discussion in [EP 1:2 & 4], and differences
in [EP 2:20].
23As the formation of an expectation, a judgment involves both what to expect and when to expect it.
Peirce writes: “Every belief expresses both what is believed and of what it is believed” [CP 5:542].
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to elaborate on this notion clarity. I take it, however, that he does not disagree with the
notion of clarity above.24 The definition of a clear apprehension above suggests a means of
linking clear (and so also confused) opinions with behavior. It suggests that the clearness
of apprehension of an object can be tested by whether and to what extent an individual
recognizes an object when it is present.
By combining these suppositions about judgment with the definition of clear apprehen-
sion above, the Peircean pragmatist has the beginnings of a method for linking a judgment
with the mode of action it establishes. Let’s return to the diamond example, and restrict
our focus for now to the content of the object that is represented in the judgment. Does
the individual in this case act on the same expectation if the object under consideration
were slightly different? Does, for example, the individual still take the object under con-
sideration to be a diamond if the diamond were in its rough unpolished form? If it is the
case that the individual does so and expects the object to behave accordingly, then this
is a sign that the content of the original judgment included these considerations. If the
individual does not do so, and so fails to show signs of recognizing the object, then this as
a sign that the content of the original judgment did not include these considerations.
Let us now turn towards the content of the character that is represented in the judg-
ment. Does the individual recognize the object’s hardness when put through different
tests? Does the individual recognize, for example, how the diamond would respond when
scratched by various other materials? Again if the individual is unsurprised by the results
— and in fact shows signs of expecting them — then this is a sign that the content of the
judgment included these considerations. If the individual is surprised by the results, or
indeed shows no signs of expecting or recognizing them at all, then this is a sign that the
content of the judgment did not include these expectations.
This account of judgment suggests how the content of a judgment corresponds with a
mode of action. It suggests that the meaning of a judgment that an individual makes is
captured by how the individual would behave in differing conditions. By observing how
24Peirce does acknowledge that this notion of clarity would require perspicuity of thought rarely seen,
but I do not take that as a sign against it. He furthermore goes on to suggest that some ideas can be made
(or likely are) perfectly clear in this way. See [EP 1: 136 & 140].
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the individual would behave in different conditions we can begin to determine the object
and attributed character in a judgment. The addition of the logical analysis and the theory
of judgment allows us to begin to test the content of a belief against different behaviors.
Whether and to what extent an individual’s behavior and beliefs can be represented by a
judgment is ultimately a further empirical question. At the beginning of inquiry, Peirce
defends this as a commitment to keep inquiry going in order to come to understand an
individual’s behavior. In the next chapter I discuss how Peirce thinks such an commitment
can be affirmed as inquiry continues.
Let me summarize where we stand. In the last section I introduced a supposition
that belief establishes a mode of action. This was sufficient in the last section to give a
preliminary defense of the pragmatic maxim. I argued that the pragmatic maxim suggests
that inquiry too be guided by considerations regarding the establishment of a mode of
action.
Given Peirce’s theory of judgment we can now refine this account. Inquiry, according
to Peirce, consists in making judgments. Peirce suggests how judgments in turn establish
different modes of action. The content of a judgment can be represented as a set of possible
behaviors that Peirce takes to be accountable to scientific practice. I give a detailed account
of how this works in the next chapter. In the meantime, the important point is that Peirce’s
argument in favor of the pragmatic maxim is more than a suggestion that inquiry be guided
by differences in modes of action — he goes on to suggest a method for how it can be done.
2.5 The Continuity of Explanation
The pragmatic maxim suggests that the opinions an inquirer entertains be restricted to con-
siderations of possible differences in modes of action. These possible differences in modes
of action are differences that are at least potentially accountable to scientific practice. The
pragmatic maxim, Peirce suggests, regulates scientific inquiry.
In the last section I refined this account by appealing to aspects of Peirce’s theory of
judgment. Peirce no longer simply suggests that inquiry be guided by possible differences
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in modes of action but begins to suggest a method for how it can be done. With Peirce’s
theory of judgment we can see how the pragmatic maxim offers a method for determining
the content of a belief. A judgment consists in attributing a character to an object.
The object and attributed character in the judgment correspond with what to expect
in experience and when to expect it. Both, furthermore, can be tested in the course
of experience. By combining these suppositions about judgment with the definition of
clear apprehension above, the Peircean pragmatist has the beginnings of a method for
linking a judgment with the mode of action it establishes and for testing the judgment
against experience. On this account inquiry is accountable to scientific practice because
every judgment entails consequences for action that are in turn accountable to scientific
practice.
The method presented in the last section can be summarized by what I call the Con-
tinuity of Explanation. The Continuity of Explanation (CE) holds that every judgment
entails consequences for action that are accountable to scientific inquiry. According to
the Continuity of Explanation we cannot separate a judgment from related actions about
how an individual would behave. Judgment is accountable to scientific inquiry because it
establishes a mode of action which in turn is accountable to scientific inquiry.
On the one hand the Continuity of Explanation is simply a refinement of the pragmatic
maxim found in Section 3. There Peirce supposed that the result of inquiry is a belief,
which establishes a mode of action. The pragmatic maxim was offered as a suggestion that
we regulate the opinions we entertain during inquiry by considering the mode of action
that they would establish. The picture is simply refined by suggesting that inquiry now
consists in making judgments that establish a mode of action.
On the other hand, the addition of Peirce’s theory of judgment allows us to see the
pragmatic maxim as a theory or meaning and a theory of inquiry. The inclusion of a
theory of judgment allows us to characterize the content of a belief, and the content of the
object and attributed character, and to begin to test them in the course of experience. The
Continuity of Explanation still serves a regulative function. It is a regulative commitment
for engaging in scientific inquiry as Peirce sees it. It suggests that every judgment entails
consequences for action that are accountable to scientific practice.
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In offering both a theory of meaning and a theory of inquiry, I want to suggest that
Peircean pragmatism offers a method of reasoning. The Continuity of Explanation allows
us to reason about concepts while preserving our ability to recognize the concept when it
is present. The direct benefit is that we preserve the conditions for testing the judgment.
It allows us to trace the effects of a belief in such a way that we preserve the experiential
consequences that would follow from such behavior. The result is the pragmatic elucidation
of belief. It is method for refining the meaning of our thoughts and whether the content is
affirmed in experience. It suggests not simply that inquiry be regulated by considerations
of possible differences in modes of action, but suggests a method for how such inquiry can
proceed.
Let me give several examples of the Continuity of Explanation at work. I’ll start with
the diamond example, and then will show how the CE applies to other possibilities as well.
Take the scenario where I judge the object before me to be a diamond. According to the
CE this judgment entails consequences for action that are accountable to scientific inquiry.
If I judge the object present before me to be a diamond, then I can presumably begin
to question the content of that judgment: What is meant by diamond? And why did I
judge this object to be a diamond? Though posing these questions may seem innocuous
enough, they capture the key feature of Peirce’s theory of judgment elaborated in Section
2.4.2. The first question yields consequences for how I expect the diamond to behave
and so also how I behave towards the diamond, while the second yields consequences for
when I expect that behavior. In each case the response to these questions, following the
Continuity of Explanation, yields consequences for action. The content of the judgment
yields consequences for action that are accountable to scientific inquiry. The CE is the
underlying commitment upon which reasoning about these consequences relies.
The Continuity of Explanation can also be applied to other possibilities. Perhaps,
I judge that the object before me only seems to be a diamond and that it is deceptively
something else. The CE again suggests that I begin to question the content of the judgment:
What is meant by ‘something else’? And why did I judge the object in this case to be this
‘something else’? Perhaps I judge the object to be cubic zirconia, a synthesized material
with properties similar to diamond. How do I expect cubic zirconia to behave and, similarly,
how would I behave towards it? Responding to this question yields consequences for action
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that would likewise be accountable to scientific inquiry. Why in this case did I judge the
object to be a cubic zirconia? Responding to this question likewise yields consequences for
when to expect such behavior.
Perhaps the ‘something else’ is more extra-ordinary (— a deception from an evil-demon
perhaps?). In this case the CE still nonetheless suggests reasoning about the consequences
that such a conception would have in experience. In applying the CE to each possibility
and asking these questions about the content of the judgment we can begin to trace out
the differences in behavior that would be the result of each judgment. If a difference is
found, then we can presumably observe which behavior holds. If no difference is found,
then we can question whether the content of the judgment differs in some scientifically
meaningful way at all. The CE in each case captures a commitment towards reasoning
that yields consequences for action that are potentially accountable to scientific inquiry.
The CE regulates scientific inquiry.
The Continuity of Explanation serves as a characterization of Peircean pragmatism. It
is a distillation of the maxim when taken as a regulative commitment for scientific inquiry
and refined through Peirce’s theory of judgment. The Continuity of Explanation serves as
the characterization of Peircean pragmatism upon which the rest of the thesis is based. I
refine the Continuity of Explanation in the next chapter, where I also go on to apply it
towards understanding an individual’s behavior. The result is a direct connection between
the method of reasoning given by the Continuity of Explanation and certain reasonable
behavior that follows from it.
2.6 Conclusion
The pragmatic maxim, for Peirce, regulates scientific inquiry. It places a restriction on
the type of opinions that can be considered during inquiry to those opinions that Peirce
thinks may, at least potentially, be accountable to scientific practice. More than simply
being regulative principle, I showed in Section 3 how the pragmatic maxim also suggests
a method for engaging in scientific inquiry. The method supposes that inquiry consists in
61
making judgments, and suggests in turn that judgments can be accountable to scientific
practice. This method, I argued, is captured by what I call the Continuity of Explanation.
The Continuity of Explanation (CE) assumes that every judgment entails consequences for
action that are accountable to scientific practice. The Continuity of Explanation serves
as a characterization of the pragmatic maxim. I have argued that it is a distillation of
the pragmatic maxim taken as a regulative commitment for scientific inquiry and refined
through Peirce’s theory of judgment. Inquiry is accountable to scientific practice because
every judgment entails consequences for action that are, in turn, accountable to scientific
practice.
I show in the rest of the thesis that the Continuity of Explanation suffices as a char-
acterization of Peircean pragmatism. Most significant for the next chapter, however, is
that the CE has important implications for individual behavior. In the next chapter I offer
a more detailed example of the CE at work. I apply the CE towards understanding an
individual’s actions. I elaborate and defend, in short, a Peircean theory of action.
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Chapter 3
The Continuity of Explanation
Applied to an Individual’s Behavior
In the last chapter I introduced a characterization of Peircean pragmatism based on what I
called the Continuity of Explanation. The Continuity of Explanation (CE) is the commit-
ment that every judgment entails consequences for action that are accountable to scientific
inquiry. I offered the CE as a distillation of the pragmatic maxim taken as a regulative
commitment for scientific inquiry and refined through Peirce’s theory of judgment. The
CE is the regulative commitment of scientific inquiry. In this chapter, I show how the CE
can be applied towards making sense of an individual’s actions. The result is a method for
understanding an individual’s behavior.
I set aside for the time being discussions of behaviors that are radically foreign to us
such as the behaviors of individual’s from radically different cultures and social practices.
Some Peirce scholars, mostly in the context of potential limitations in Peirce’s notion
of a community of inquirers, have wondered whether Peirce’s account can address these
problems.1 The question is whether the community of inquirer’s can make sense of those
1See, for example, [11].
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outside the community. Some, such as Massecar [19, p. 12], seem to respond in the
negative. I think that Peirce’s account has more going for it than these views suggest, but
I will save that discussion for another day. Presently I leave it up to the reader to apply the
method discussed below for making and evaluating inferences and to decide for themselves
the extent that the method can be applied.
I begin by returning to the Smith example and showing how the Continuity of Expla-
nation can be applied towards understanding Smith’s actions. Peirce takes any judgment
about Smith’s actions to assume more general features about Smith and Smith’s behavior.
These general features and behaviors are, according to Peirce, accountable to scientific
inquiry. If the presumed features and behaviors are affirmed by scientific inquiry, then the
judgment is a good one. If not, then the judgment is mistaken.
In demonstrating how the Continuity of Explanation applies towards makings sense
of an individual’s actions I go some way towards clarifying and defending the CE. In
particular, I show how the CE i) follows from a few simple assumptions that we make when
trying to understand Smith’s behavior, and ii) captures the commitments and methods of
the three types of inference — abductive, deductive, and inductive inferences — that Peirce
takes to be employed in scientific reasoning. The three types correspond with coming up
with a hypothesis, deducing the consequences that would follow from the hypothesis, and
observing through induction whether the consequences (and so the hypothesis) are affirmed.
Of the three types, Peirce writes:
Abduction furnishes all our ideas concerning real things, beyond what are given
in perception, but is mere conjecture, without probative force. Deduction is
certain but relates only to ideal objects. Induction gives us the only approach
to certainty concerning the real that we can have. [CP 8:209]
The weight Peirce gives to the study of these three types of inference cannot be overem-
phasized. Peirce not only finds the three types of inference affirmed over and over in
scientific inquiry, but takes Peircean pragmatism (what Peirce refers to below as pragmati-
cism, a term he used to distinguish his version from other pragmatists) to consist in their
development and deployment. Peirce continues the above passage:
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In forty years of diligent study of arguments, I have never found one which
did not consist of those elements. The successes of modern science ought to
convince us that induction is the only capable imperator of truth-seeking. Now
pragmaticism is simply the doctrine that the inductive method is the only
essential to the ascertainment of the intellectual purport of any symbol.2
The CE captures the general commitments and methods of the three types of reasoning
that Peirce finds employed in scientific inquiry.
In the final two sections of this chapter I continue to develop the claim that the CE
offers a method for understanding an individual’s behavior. I show how the CE allows us
to differentiate deliberate behavior and intentional (i.e. purposive) behavior, as well as the
reasons upon which an individual acts. What I take to be most interesting about Peirce’s
view is that in each case differentiation rest on aspects of his theory of judgment. Each
type of behavior can be distinguished by the judgments upon which it is based.
My concern in the last two sections is to show that Peirce offers a response to the
questions of differentiating actions, agency, and the relation between actions and reasons.
I do not compare Peirce’s responses to contemporary theories. I leave that discussion
for another day. My aim is to show that the CE offers a method for understanding an
individual’s behavior — a method that, as I will show in the final chapter of the thesis,
has important implications for developing more reasonable behavior.
3.1 Abduction: Committing to a Practice
In my endeavour to meet the exigencies of verifiable thought in science, I have
long ago come to be guided by this maxim: that as long as it is practically
2He writes elsewhere: “I say that these three are the only elementary modes of reasoning there are.
I am convinced of it both a priori and a posteriori” [CP 8:209]. And: “Thus the validity of induction
depends upon the necessary relation between the general and the singular. It is precisely this which is the
support of Pragmatism” [CP 5:170].
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certain that we cannot directly, nor with much accuracy even indirectly, observe
what passes in the consciousness of any other person, while it is far from certain
that we can do so. . . even in the case of what shoots through our own minds, it
is much safer to define all mental characters as far as possible in terms of their
outward manifestations. . . That maxim is, roughly speaking, the equivalent to
the one that I used in 1871 to call the rule of “pragmatism.” [EP 2:469]
Consider again the individual, Smith, whom we observe heating a metal sample and
quenching the sample in oil. At the beginning it is not clear what Smith is doing. Smith
may be acting aimlessly, for mere enjoyment, or with the goal in mind of heat treating the
metal sample. With only a short observation we cannot be sure which of these alternatives
holds.
Peirce takes each of the possibilities offered above to be potential hypotheses for Smith’s
behavior.3 Peirce writes of hypothesis: “Any proposition added to observed facts, tending
to make them applicable in any way to other circumstances than those under which they
were observed, may be called a hypothesis” [CP 6:524].4 The beginnings of investigation
consists in the invention, entertainment, and eventual selection of a hypothesis. This step
is what Peirce refers to as abduction. Peirce takes the culmination of abductive inference
to be a potential explanation of Smith’s behavior. Peirce writes of this stage:
At length a conjecture arises that furnishes a possible Explanation, . . . On ac-
count of this Explanation, the inquirer is led to regard his conjecture, or hy-
pothesis, with favor. As I phrase it, he provisionally holds it to be “Plausible”;
this acceptance ranges in different cases — and reasonably so — from a mere
expression of it in the interrogative mood, as a question meriting attention and
3Peirce defends the significance of hypothetic reasoning to our practical life in [CP 6:522-525] and [CP
6:485]. Peirce defends the adoption of a hypothesis as an act of inference in [CP 2:776], [CP 7:202] & [CP
7:220]. Peirce suggests that hypotheses can be right or wrong, that the adoption of a hypothesis involves
a method, and that there are important considerations of economy when deciding which hypothesis to
adopt. Each suggests a hypothesis is an inference.
4See also [CP 7:202].
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reply, up through all appraisals of Plausibility, to uncontrollable inclination to
believe. [CP 6:469]
Abduction, as Peirce puts it, is the preparatory stage in investigation [CP 7:218]. Here is
Peirce writing on explanation:
Upon finding himself confronted with a phenomenon. . . he looks over its features
and notices some remarkable character or relation among them, which he at
once recognizes as being characteristic of some conception with which his mind
is already stored, so that a theory is suggested which would explain (that is,
render necessary) that which is surprising in the phenomena. [CP 2:776]
Abduction furnishes the inquirer with the initial conceptions and potential experiential
consequences that (as we’ll see in the next subsection) induction goes on to either affirm
or deny [CP 2:776].5
The above account gives a broad overview of the early stage of investigation. The
Peircean investigator invents, entertains, and eventually selects a hypothesis that serves
to explain the behavior in question. In this chapter I want to develop this account by
appealing to Peirce’s theory of judgment. According to Peirce, a hypothesis about Smith’s
behavior is a potential judgment about Smith’s behavior. It is based on further inferences.
Each potential judgment assumes features about Smith and about Smith’s behavior more
generally. Peirce recognizes that these general features can in turn go on to be tested in
scientific investigation. The account of judgment, I argue here, supports and extends the
broad account given above. Peirce’s theory of judgment allows us to see the connection
between a hypothesis, which begins merely as an assumption, and an explanation, which
can in turn begin to be evaluated.
I begin by looking at an initial indeterminacy in judgment. This initial indeterminacy
accounts for the guesswork at the start of inquiry.
5Peirce writes elsewhere: “[Abduction] is the first step of scientific reasoning, as induction is the con-
cluding step” [CP 7:218].
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Peirce offers an elaboration of this indeterminacy in ‘The Doctrine of Chances’ (1878).
Scientific investigation, Peirce argues, can conclude little from a limited sampling of an
event. Peirce offers the example of a scientist tossing a die. Peirce claims that from the
single toss very little can be concluded about the nature of the die. The argument is simple.
From a single observation of a die being tossed we cannot yet know whether the die is fair
or weighted. A die showing ‘3’ in one instance may continue to show ‘3’ more often than
not in the future, or it may continue to show ‘3’ as likely as any other number. With only
a single instance who can say whether the number showing on the face is a sign of the die’s
fairness, or whether it is a sign of the die’s being loaded? Observing one toss is insufficient
to determine whether the die is weighted or fair.
The problem is not resolved (at least without some further information) with repeated
tosses of the die. Imagine the die continues to show ‘3’ on nine subsequent tosses. Is the
series of ten tosses sufficient for the scientist to distinguish between the die as weighted
or fair? Peirce recognizes that the scientist would still refrain from drawing a definitive
conclusion. A fair die, after all, has a slight chance of showing a ‘3’ on ten sequential
tosses. Peirce’s scientist would take this possibility into account. A limited sampling is
insufficient to determine whether the die is weighted or fair.
Writing of the die example again in 1908, Peirce clarifies the point. The problem with
a limited sampling is that it is insufficient to determine the habit or tendency of the die.
A fair die may temporarily show a seemingly weighted series of results. Likewise an unfair
die may temporarily show a seemingly fair series of results. Peirce’s scientist would take
these possibilities into account. A limited sampling is insufficient to determine the habit
or tendency of the die.
The example has important implications for making sense of an individual’s behavior.
With a limited sampling we do not know what habit the individual’s actions reflect. We
cannot judge from a single observation of an individual whether the individual’s action is a
common occurrence or is extremely rare. We cannot tell whether the habit has developed
over a long period of time or is relatively new, or whether and to what extent the habit
is still developing. With only a short observation we cannot yet distinguish between these
possibilities.
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Peirce is explicit at one point about the connection between the die example and an
individual’s behavior. In clarifying the meaning of the statement that a die has a certain
probability (i.e. that a die has a certain habit or tendency) of yielding certain results,
Peirce writes:
The statement means that the die has a certain “would-be”; and to say that a
die has a “would-be” is to say that it has a property, quite analogous to any
habit that a man might have. Only the “would-be” of the die is presumably as
much simpler and more definite than the man’s habit as the die’s homogeneous
composition and cubical shape is simpler than the nature of the man’s nervous
system and soul. [CP 2:664]
In both instances we attribute a certain habit or tendency — a would-be, as Peirce writes
— to the object. In both cases the problem of determining the meaning of an action comes
down to an inference from a limited sample.
There are three points I want to make explicit about the implications of the die example
for making sense of an individual’s behavior. The first point is that a judgment about the
individual’s behavior rests on supposing some habit or tendency. Peirce writes:
Thus, if wishing to test a die to see whether it is loaded (whether intentionally
or not) I throw it say 900 times. If the different faces come up with as equal
frequency as they could be expected to do, what can I infer? Only that as long
as the habit or tendency of the die remains what it is, it will probably not bring
the different faces up so unequally as to show decisively in 900 throws. That
is, I base my inference on the assumption that there is some habit. [CP 8:361]
When making sense of an object’s behavior, we suppose that there is some habit or tendency
possessed by the object. A judgment about an individual is no different. A judgment about
an individual’s behavior supposes some more general habit or tendency.
The underlying regularity that our judgment assumes takes Smith to be acting in accord
with more general behavioral tendencies. Our judgment assumes that Smith is acting in
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accord with a more general practice. We take Smith to be engaged in the practice of aimless
behavior, or acting for enjoyment, or heat treating a metal sample.
The second point I wish to make is that at the beginning of inquiry each potential
judgment about an individual’s behavior begins simply as a hypothesis that we make. This
is a result, I argue here, of the initial indeterminacy that arises from a limited sampling.
From a short observation we cannot initially be sure what general behavior an action
reflects. We may initially take Smith to be acting with the goal in mind of heat treating
the metal sample, or we may simply take Smith to be acting aimlessly, or for pleasure.
Each potential judgment begins simply as a hypothesis.
Finally, the third point is that the assumed habit or tendency entails further conse-
quences for Smith’s behavior. If we take Smith to be heat treating the metal sample, for
example, then this hypothesis would lead to further behaviors. Perhaps Smith will go on to
use the hardened metal, or has a history of blacksmithing, and will otherwise demonstrate
an understanding of the activity. If we take Smith to be acting for pleasure, then Smith
would presumably show signs of enjoyment. Each assumption holds further consequences
for Smith’s behavior. An assumption about Smith’s behavior is not taken to be discon-
nected from related phenomena. It is, on the contrary, taken to include further effects for
the individual’s behavior.
As with the initial defense of abduction given in the last chapter, these assumptions can
initially be defended on regulative grounds. This should come as no surprise given that each
potential judgment is a hypothesis — each of which, according to Peirce, is represented
by an abductive inference — and so the more general features of abduction apply. We
assume that the individual is engaged in a larger practice in order to try to make sense
of the individual’s behavior. We do not know at the start of inquiry whether or to what
extent these assumptions will be affirmed as investigation continues. The assumptions are
nonetheless appropriate at the start of investigation because such commitments are needed
to continue investigation and for us to have a chance at being successful. Each of these
assumptions — that with a short observation we are simply making a hypothesis, that
Smith is engaged in a larger practice, and that this larger practice yields more general
consequences for Smith’s behavior — can initially be defended on regulative grounds.
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Supposing that an individual is engaged in a more general practice situates the individ-
ual’s actions in relation to other actions and possible practices. Peirce writes of explanation:
“This is what we call explaining it, which always consists in supposing that the surprising
facts that we have observed are only one part of a larger system of facts, of which the other
part has not come within the field of our experience, which larger system, taken in its
entirety, would present a certain character of reasonableness, that inclines us to accept the
surmise as true, or likely” [CP 7:36].6 A practice situates the individual’s actions amongst
a larger network of relations. Presuming that the individual is engaged in a larger practice,
for Peirce, is to begin to explain Smith’s actions.7
We have arrived at the continuity of explanation thesis in its most general form. The
continuity of explanation thesis is the commitment that every judgment entails conse-
quences for action that are accountable to scientific investigation. I argued that the con-
tinuity of explanation thesis is a regulative commitment of scientific investigation. Here
I show how it is present in an embryonic form in abduction. The three points above —
that forming a judgment about an individual’s behavior is to form a hypothesis, that the
hypothesis supposes that the individual is engaged in a larger practice, and that this larger
practice yields more general consequences for Smith’s behavior — capture the continuity
of explanation thesis at its most general. At the start of inquiry these assumptions are
defended on regulative grounds. They are regulative commitments of abductive reasoning.
They are appropriate at the start of inquiry insofar as they are necessary to continue to
engage in abductive reasoning and for abductive reasoning to have a chance at success.
While these assumptions are initially defended on regulative grounds, I’ve argued above
6Two other passages may be helpful in understanding what Peirce means by explanation. In [CP 6:606],
Peirce writes: “to explain a fact is to show that it is a necessary or, at least, a probable result from another
fact, known or supposed.” And, in [CP 6:469]: “At length a conjecture arises that furnishes a possible
Explanation, by which I mean a syllogism exhibiting the surprising fact as necessarily consequent upon
the circumstances of its occurrence together with the truth of the credible conjecture, as premisses.”
7 Peirce is also explicit at one point that abduction is defended on regulative grounds. He writes:
“[Abductions] only justification is that its method is the only way in which there can be any hope of
attaining a rational explanation” [CP 2:777].
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that they can nonetheless be motivated by several straightforward assumptions about in-
quiry. The first, that forming a judgment about an individual’s behavior is to form a
hypothesis, follows from the initial epistemic indeterminacy at the start of investigation.
That the hypothesis assumes a larger practice and that this larger practice involves more
general consequences for the individual’s behavior, both follow from assuming that we can
continue to ask further questions about any potential hypothesis on offer. As we’ll see be-
low, these can be further motivated by Peirce’s theory of judgment. While the continuity
of explanation thesis is at first defended on regulative grounds, as we will see in the next
section, we are well on our way towards refining this method and being able to determine
the practice an individual is engaged in.
3.2 Determining a Practice
The continuity of explanation thesis can continue to be applied towards making sense of
Smith’s actions. In this section I highlight three consequences of applying the continuity
of explanation thesis. Each leads to an important implication for making sense of an indi-
vidual’s behavior. The first is that a repeated application of the continuity of explanation
thesis allows us to refine the meaning of the practice an individual might be engaged in.
The second is that through continued refinement we can begin to distinguish the practice
an individual might be engaged in. Finally, being able to distinguish a practice that an
individual is engaged in leads us to be able to affirm whether and to what extent the
individual is engaged in the practice. The result — that we can refine, distinguish, and
affirm the practice that the individual is engaged in — is that the continuity of explanation
thesis gives us a method for determining the practice an individual is engaged in.
These steps parallel the grades of apprehension discussed in the last chapter. Refining
the meaning of a practice through the continuity of explanation thesis is to increase fa-
miliarity with the practice. Continuing to refine the meaning of a practice is to begin to
differentiate that practice from related practice. The result is to begin to have a distinct
apprehension of the practice. Continued differentiation leads to a clear apprehension where
we can apprehend a practice whenever it is present
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The steps also parallel the remaining types of inference that Peirce takes to be employed
in scientific inquiry. In the present discussion the three types of inference correspond
directly to i) postulating a practice (discussed in the previous section), ii) deducing the set
of behavior that the practice would entail, and iii) observing, through induction, whether
and to what extent an individual is engaged in the particular practice. The result of
deduction is akin to increasing familiarity with a practice. It increases familiarity with a
practice. Continued deduction give rise to a distinct understanding of a practice. Induction
allows us to affirm whether an individual is engaged in the practice.
3.2.1 Refining a Practice Through Deduction
In the last section, I discussed several potential judgments for Smith’s actions. We can
ask further questions about each potential judgment, now taken to be a hypothesis, on
offer. To see how this works let us return to the Smith example. What do we mean,
for example, by “aimless”, “purposive”, or “acting for pleasure”? Purposive behavior
presumably corresponds with signs of having some goal, aimless behavior with signs of
lacking a goal, and pleasure with signs of some enjoyment. This refinement can continue.
Let us focus, for instance, on the hypothesis that Smith is acting for enjoyment. If Smith
enjoys forging and heating the metal sample, then there would be other related signs of
such behavior. Signs of enjoyment would presumably be seen when Smith enjoys other
activities that involve a forge, or heating metal, or fire. If Smith’s actions are aimless then
Smith may have a history of changing activities on a whim. Likewise if Smith engages in
the practice with the goal of heat treating the metal sample, then Smith may show signs
associated with reaching a goal, such as satisfaction upon completion, putting the result
to use, or adopting a further goal.
In each case we can continue to trace out the consequences of the hypothesis and
what behavior would follow if it were the case. When we refine a hypothesis we employ
a second type of judgment: that of deduction. Deduction, for Peirce, involves tracing
out the consequences of a hypothesis. Once we adopt a hypothesis through abduction,
Peirce writes, the first thing that is to be done “will be to trace out its necessary and
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probable experiential consequences. This step is deduction” [CP 7:203]. We reflect on
what would follow if the hypothesis were true and the result is that certain phenomena,
at least under certain conditions, ought to appear [CP 2:775]. Deduction, for Peirce, is
idealized. “Deduction” Peirce writes, “does not lead to any positive knowledge at all, but
only traces out the ideal consequences of hypotheses” [CP 7:207]. Talk of idealization may
bring about unwanted associations. All that Peirce has in mind, however, is that deduction
traces out the consequences of what is already contained in the hypothesis. Peirce writes:
“This appears to be in harmony with Kant’s view of deduction, namely, that it merely
explicates what is implicitly asserted in the premises” [CP 7:204]. It is idealized only
insofar as the initial hypothesis is idealized.
The Continuity of Explanation captures commitments and methods of deduction. The
Continuity of Explanation is the commitment that every judgment entails consequences for
action that are accountable to scientific investigation. The CE assumes we can continue
to ask further questions about the explanation on offer, and that these refinements in turn
correspond with differences in action that would be accountable to scientific investigation.
In each case we are asking further questions about a hypothesis for Smith’s behavior and
trace out the consequences that would follow from it. This refinement involves deduction.
The continuity of explanation thesis captures deduction at work.
3.2.2 Distinguishing a Practice (deduction continued)
The method above places no limit on the extent of this refinement. It’s only limitation
is the extent that the method can be applied. Continued refinement — at least it would
seem, a point I discuss below — allows us to begin to distinguish the practice an individual
might be engaged in.
To see this, notice that the set of behaviors needed to support and demonstrate aimless
behavior above is different from the set of behaviors in which purposeful behavior consists.
In one instance Smith happens to heat treat the metal sample. In the other instance
Smith achieves a result that is both desired and expected. This difference entails further
consequences for behavior. If Smith simply happens to heat-treat the sample then Smith
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would presumably show signs of being unaware or surprised by the result. If Smith rather
expects the result, then Smith would presumably show signs of expectation, perhaps signs
of enjoyment for achieving a desired result, or would perhaps put the result to use and in
so doing demonstrates an understanding of the hardening process. This example suggests
that competing hypotheses would give rise to different sets of behavior. If this is the
case, then the continuity of explanation thesis provides a means to differentiate competing
practices.
There may seem to be a tension here. I suggested in the last section that at the
start of inquiry the hypothesis we adopt is merely an assumption about an individual’s
behavior. At the start of inquiry I claimed that we could generate a host of possible
explanations — and, I went so far to say, seemingly indistinguishable explanations— for
Smith’s behavior. Now I am suggesting, however, that through deduction and tracing out
the consequences of a particular hypothesis, we can nonetheless refine and distinguish any
one explanation for Smith’s behavior. The tension is between the claim that explanations
can be indistinguishable at the start of inquiry and yet distinguishable at the end of inquiry.
Using a Peircean phrase, we may say that while we may not be able to distinguish
in the short term the practice that an agent is engaged in, such differentiation becomes
possible in the long run. While a short observation (as argued in Section 3.1) is insufficient
to distinguish which practice an individual is engaged in, a longer observation allows us
to begin to differentiate these practices. Putting it another way, we may say that while
at first we may not locally be able to distinguish between the behaviors of two competing
practices, there will be a way in general to distinguish such behaviors. We have reason to
think that in general some behavior would allow us to distinguish between them.
Let me defend this view that we can in general distinguish between competing hypothe-
ses. Notice that in the course of experience some explanations of Smith’s behavior begin to
seem less plausible. It would certainly be remarkable if Smith stops engaging in the prac-
tice after hardening and tempering the sample, goes on to turn the sample into a kitchen
knife that continually demonstrates its strength in use, and does so all the while acting
without purpose. Similarly, how would we account for Smith’s seeming to test and refine
the method of heat treatment along the way? I take this to be part of Peirce’s answer.
Some competing hypotheses become less plausible over the course of experience.
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I take Peirce’s overall point, however, to be more subtle. As Peirce points out, measure-
ments of plausibility — and even of probability, given the limitations of sampling discussed
above — are not direct measures of verisimilitude.8 In the case above, where Smith goes
on to make and use a kitchen knife, someone may be adamant that Smith is (or could be)
nonetheless acting aimlessly. According to Peirce, however, such a possibility in the long
run would either be affirmed in experience or would lose all grounds for support. Let me
explain. Take again the hypothesis that Smith is engaged in aimless behavior. Recall our
presumption of related activity discussed in Section 3.1. If an individual’s activity were
aimless, we presumed that there would then be some further signs of such aimlessness.
The individual would perhaps demonstrate aimless activity in the past (or some relevantly
related activity) and if so we would be able to offer further support for why and under
what conditions the individual had done so. Perhaps the individual routinely begins and
ends activities on a whim, or is lackadaisical and fickle in their pursuits. Perhaps Smith has
over time become tired and careless. If the behavior seems unique to this particular case,
then there would presumably be further signs accounting for its uniqueness. Perhaps there
are signs of a mental lapse, or the abrupt change in behavior can be accounted for by some
new condition in experience. While the hypothesis of aimless behavior cannot be ruled
out, continued observation and testing can rule out these related or auxiliary activities.
In the case when the individual is not engaged in aimless behavior, continued observation
and testing will supply fewer and fewer grounds to defend these auxiliary activities. An
individual that continually demonstrates purposeful activity offers no such auxiliary sup-
port for the alternative hypothesis of aimless behavior. The auxiliary hypothesis is — like
8See an extended discussion of the difference between plausibility, probability, and verisimilitude as
Peirce uses the terms in [CP 8:222-237] or [CP 2:662-667]. Plausibility is the type of assent that we
attribute to abductive inference. Probability is a statistical or mathematical ratio employed in deduction.
Recall that induction is (citing here the same passage from the beginning of the chapter) “the only approach
to certainty concerning the real that we have” [CP 8:209]. Verisimilitude is the level of assent we attribute
to an inductive conclusion. Probability can be derived from induction inferences, such as in the case of
sampling (and so can be based on considerations of verisimilitude), but inferences based on probability are
either abductive (i.e. they are new hypotheses) or deductive (i.e. they are mathematical idealizations).
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a paper doubt — a paper hypothesis, a hypothesis lacking further support.9 We therefore
have reason to think that in the long run we can distinguish the practice that an individ-
ual engages in. We have good reason to suspect that when the set of behaviors are fully
spelled out for competing practices, the corresponding behaviors will eventually be found
to conflict or one of the competing practices will be found to be groundless.
As the set of behaviors that characterize a practice become more refined, the behavior of
individuals engaged in different practices begins to be distinguished. Competing hypotheses
that entail a different set of behaviors are pragmatically distinguishable. The continuity of
explanation thesis offers a method to distinguish between competing practices.
9Peirce writes elsewhere: “Do you call it doubting to write down on a piece of paper that you doubt? If
so, doubt has nothing to do with any serious business” [CP 5:416]. See also [CP 6:498], and especially [CP
2:265], where Peirce writes in regards to Descartes’ method of doubt: “The initial skepticism [may] be mere
self-deception, and not real doubt.” For a doubt to be considered real for Peirce it must be accompanied by
further effects on one’s behavior that are accountable to scientific practice. It may be useful here to recall
Peirce’s distinction between belief and doubt from Chapter 2. There, doubt is characterized by a pause
or hesitation in one’s actions. Doubt is, Peirce writes, the lack or privation of a habit and corresponding
mode of action [CP 5:417]. If a supposed doubt does not correspond with the erratic behavior associated
with the privation of a mode of action then the doubt is not a real doubt. In this case the doubt is mere
self-deception, or superficial, or merely imagined.
Also:
It thus appears that it is one thing to question a proposition and quite another to doubt it.
We can throw any proposition into the interrogative mood at will; but we can no more call
up doubt than we can call up the feeling of hunger at will. What one does not doubt one
cannot doubt, and it is only accidentally that attention can be drawn to it in a manner which
suggests the idea that there might be a doubt. Thence comes a critical attitude, and finally,
perhaps, a genuine doubt may arise.
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3.2.3 Affirming a Practice Through Induction
I’ve suggested above that the continuity of explanation thesis allows us to refine and dis-
tinguish a practice. The continuity of explanation thesis also offers a means to affirm the
practice an individual is engaged in. An individual who continues to act in accord with
the set of behaviors distinct to a practice affirms their engagement in the practice.
This affirmation arises through induction. Induction, for Peirce, arises when an already
formed hypothesis is tested against experience.10 Peirce sometimes refers to induction
more broadly as “the experimental testing of a theory” or as “experimental research”.11
Induction is the form of inference that induces assent to a theory [CP 5:590]. Through
induction we begin to accept a hypothesis as being approximately true.
“When we get to the inductive stage what we are about is finding out how much like
the truth our hypothesis is, that is, what proportion of its anticipations will be verified”
[CP 2:775]. While this proportion need not always be a quantitative measurement, in
the most straightforward cases it is.12 The result in this case is a statistical ratio that
approximates the proportion of the predictions that follow from a hypothesis that are
affirmed in the course of experience.13 “It measures,” as Peirce writes elsewhere, “the
degree of concordance of that theory with fact” [CP 5:145].
Given the limitations discussed in Section 3.1 above about the inferences that can be
drawn from a limited sampling, Peirce cautions against interpreting the ratio that is the
10See passages in [CP 7:206] & [CP 2:775].
11See [CP 5:145] & [CP 8:209], respectively.
12Peirce often writes that the result of induction is the value of a quantity. See, for example, [CP
1:67], [CP 5:145], & [CP 5:194]. Peirce eventually distinguishes three types of induction: crude induction,
qualitative induction, and quantitative induction [CP 2:755-760]. Crude induction is an induction from the
particular to the universal. It rests on the presumption that future experience will not be utterly invariant
from the past. Though important, it is the weakest form of induction, and it is unfortunate that it gets
so much discussion at the neglect of the others.
13See [CP 2:775] & [CP 5:21].
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result of induction as a direct measure of concordance between hypothesis and fact.14 The
die example illustrates the type of confidence that Peirce nonetheless takes induction to
secure:15
Suppose you go on throwing the die a great many times, and after each throw
you divide the number of aces that have turned up by the whole number of
throws so far. The quotient will be [the] result for the probability of throwing
an ace with this die. You will get a new and amended, though not always a
really improved, result after every throw. Now although the throws are purely
fortuitous, so that to most questions about them only probable answers can be
given, yet one thing will certainly happen. Namely, sooner or later, probably
very soon, but it may be only very late, yet certainly at length, a time will
come after which all your values for the probability of throwing an ace with
this die will be correct in the first figure after the decimal point. A later time
there will be after which all the successive determinations will be correct in the
first two figures, and so on. You will never be certain that that time has come,
but it certainly some time will have come. [CP 7:77]
The resulting ratio approximates how often a given sort of event would occur in the course of
experience. The result only indefinitely approximates such a ratio, because our limitations
in sampling — and think here of the fair coin having a chance of nonetheless showing a
series of one-sided flips — precludes certainty that the ratio at any one time is an accurate
representation of how the object would behave in general.
We have confidence, not necessarily in any one result of inductive inference (though
sometimes, perhaps even often, the result of a series of inductive inferences is accurate),
but in the inductive method. We have confidence that a persistent application of the
method would converge, albeit indefinitely, on the correct result.16 The result, we may say,
leads to a practical infallibility in the general habit or tendency of the hypothesis being in
accord with experience.17 Peirce summarizes the point elsewhere:
14See also similar passages in [CP 2:777], [CP 7:207], & [CP 8:236].
15Peirce makes the same point on several other occasions. See [CP 2:758], [CP 2:780], & [CP 7:210].
16See [CP 2:269-70], [CP 2:775], [CP 5:145], [CP 5:350], [CP 6:40], & [CP 6:100].
17Peirce continues the passage above:
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The validity of induction is entirely different; for it is by no means certain
that the conclusion actually drawn in any given case would turn out true in
the majority of cases where precisely such a method was followed; but what
is certain is that, in the majority of cases, the method would lead to some
conclusion that was true, and that in the individual case in hand, if there is
any error in the conclusion, that error will get corrected by simply persisting
in the employment of the same method. The validity of an inductive argument
consists, then, in the fact that it pursues a method which, if duly persisted in,
must, in the very nature of things, lead to a result indefinitely approximating
to the truth in the long run. [CP 2:781, emphasis in original]
We have confidence that the inductive method in the long run would continue to converge
indefinitely on some general truth about the way things are.
Peirce finds induction to be well grounded. The inductive method, according to Peirce,
depends on two assumptions. The first assumption is that parts make up and constitute
the whole.18 The second assumption is that induction rests on a means (even if it be a
mere conceived means) of sampling. This is seen in the above account that rests on the
assumption that enlarging the sample would change the resulting ratio so that it comes to
Now that which is necessarily inerrant may in a somewhat indefinite sense be fairly called
infallible. Thus, a skillful use of fortuitous events will bring infallibly correct replies to an
endless series of questions. This kind of infallibility, which may [be], for aught we know, not
to say quite probably is, the infallibility of the instinct of animals, is certainly the only kind
of infallibility that can be attributed to the results of science, inasmuch as we can so little
know when the very truth is reached that even the second law of motion is at this moment
under indictment. Moreover, when we come to subject the processes of science to criticism,
we shall find it impossible to deny that a conditional form of this kind of infallibility must
be attributed to science. [CP 7:77]
18See [CP 2:269], [CP 5:349], [CP 5:170], [CP 6:100], & [CP 6:526].
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converge, albeit indefinitely, on the way things are [CP 2:709]. It rests on the assumption
that sampling the parts in the long run would approximate the whole.19
Peirce’s defense of induction ultimately, however, rests on regulative grounds. The
considerations in the previous paragraph are simply assumptions until the intervening
inquiry has had its say and come to an end. In the meantime they are defended as
regulative commitments.
As one of the elements or kinds of judgment, induction is captured by the continuity of
explanation thesis. Where deduction is employed to determine the consequences for action
that follow (or would follow) from a judgment, induction is employed when determining
whether those consequences are affirmed in experience. The result is a commitment that
a habit or tendency is operative in the world [CP 5:171].
Summarizing the abductive, deductive, inductive inferences that Peirce takes to cap-
ture the different types of reasoning, and which Peirce takes to be employed in scientific
investigation, Peirce writes:
Abduction having suggested a theory, we employ deduction to deduce from
that ideal theory a promiscuous variety of consequences to the effect that if we
perform certain acts, we shall find ourselves confronted with certain experiences.
We then proceed to try these experiments, and if the predictions of the theory
are verified, we have a proportionate confidence that the experiments that
remain to be tried will confirm the theory. [CP 8:209]
The CE Method captures the commitments and methods of abductive, deductive, and
inductive reasoning. Peirce takes the the Continuity of Explanation, as I argued in the
last chapter, to be the general commitment to scientific investigation. In the last section I
showed how the Continuity of Explanation captures the commitments of abductive infer-
ence. In this section I complete the claim that the Continuity of Explanation is the general
commitment to scientific inquiry by showing that the Continuity of Explanation captures
19Peirce emphasizes the importance of the long run for the meaning of probability in [CP 2:758], [CP
5:21] and [CP 5:349].
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the commitments of deductive and inductive inference. The Continuity of Explanation is
the method of reasoning that Peirce takes to be compatible with scientific investigation.
I introduced the Continuity of Explanation in Chapter 2 as the regulative commitment
of scientific investigation. I went on to argue that the Continuity of Explanation also offers
a method, via Peirce’s theory of judgment, for determining the meaning of a conception.
Here, the method is most fully developed. The Continuity of Explanation does not simply
allow us to determine the meaning of a conception but allows to determine whether and
to what extent the conception is affirmed in the course of experience. The Continuity of
Explanation captures both the commitments and methods Peirce takes to be employed in
scientific reasoning. For the rest of the thesis, I will take the above discussion to suffice
as a defense of this claim. To acknowledge this development I will sometimes refer to the
Continuity of Explanation as a method — as the CE Method — rather than simply as a
commitment.
3.2.4 Realism
The Continuity of Explanation offers a method for refining, distinguishing, and affirming
the consequences that follow from a hypothesis. Continued refinement suggests that we
can distinguish a hypothesis by its potential consequences. Through induction we can then
test whether and to what extent these distinct consequences are affirmed in experience.
If the hypothesis continues to be affirmed in experience, then the hypothesis begins to be
seen as correct. Peirce writes:
When, however, we find that prediction after prediction, notwithstanding a
preference for putting the most unlikely ones to the test, is verified by experi-
ment, whether without modification or with a merely quantitative modification,
we begin to accord to the hypothesis a standing among scientific results.20 [CP
7:206]
20See a similar claim in [CP 2:775]: “Upon their appearance [an inquirer] accepts the theory with a
modality which recognizes it provisionally as approximately true.”
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Peirce continues: “for the truth of a theory consists very largely in this, that every per-
ceptual deduction from it is verified” [CP 2:775].21
The account of reasoning above offers an argument for Peircean realism. Peirce’s real-
ism, when put in these terms, is that judgments can continue to be refined and improved
so as to increasingly approximate the way the world is. Peirce describes the capability of
this theory of reasoning below:22
The true guarantee of the validity of induction is that it is a method of reaching
conclusions which, if it be persisted in long enough, will assuredly correct any
error concerning future experience into which it may temporarily lead us. This
it will do not by virtue of any deductive necessity (since it never uses all the
facts of experience, even of the past), but because it is manifestly adequate,
with the aid of retroduction and of deductions from retroductive suggestions,
21And elsewhere: “the entire meaning of a hypothesis lies in its conditional experiential predictions: if
all its predictions are true, the hypothesis is wholly true” [CP 7:203].
22Another relevant passage is discussed below:
[Inductions] validity does not depend upon the uniformity of nature, or anything of that kind.
The uniformity of nature may tend to give the probability evaluated an extremely great or
small value; but even if nature were not uniform, induction would be sure to find it out, so
long as inductive reasoning could be performed at all. [CP 2:775, emphasis added]
Peirce recognizes that this is at variance with the doctrines of other logicians of his time. The passage
continues:
[They] commonly teach that the inductive conclusion approximates to the truth because of
the uniformity of nature. They only contemplate as inductive reasoning cases in which, from
finding that certain individuals of a class have certain characters, the reasoner concludes that
every single individual of the class has the same character. According to the definition here
given, that inference is not inductive, but is a mixture of deduction and presumption.
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to discovering any regularity there may be among experiences, . . . and is thus
readily discovered by induction to exist where it does exist, and the amount
of departure therefrom to be mathematically determinable from observation
where it is imperfect. [CP 2:769]
Development of each type of inference — abductive (referred to in the previous quote as
retroductive), deductive, and inductive inference — allows us to increasingly approximate
how things are. Induction allows us to affirm any regularity if it exists in experience. The
CE provides a means to refine the meaning of judgment and to determine the conditions
for testing the judgment. Through induction an inquirer can then determine whether and
to what extent the judgment is affirmed in experience. In Peirce’s own words:
We have thus seen how, in a general way, the processes of inductive and hypo-
thetic inference are able to afford answers to our questions, though these may
relate to matters beyond our immediate ken. In short, a theory of the logic of
verification has been sketched out. [CP 2:744]
Peirce is explicit about the point in “The First Rule of Logic” (1898), where he suggests
that reasoning is capable of fixing its mistakes. He writes:
This calls to mind one of the most wonderful features of reasoning and one of
the most important philosophemes in the doctrine of science, of which, however,
you will search in vain for any mention in any book I can think of; namely, that
reasoning tends to correct itself, and the more so, the more wisely its plan is
laid. Nay, it not only corrects its conclusions, it even corrects its premisses.
[CP 5:575]23
The last point is significant. Peirce achieves his purported synthesis of logic and scientific
practice because his logic goes beyond deduction to include induction and abduction.24
23See similar lines in [CP 5:579 & 582].
24Peirce takes abduction to be the type of inference that had been least developed by logicians. See [CP
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The result is that logical truth for Peirce is not cut off from material truth.25
The real, for Peirce, is what would be reached at the result of such continued correction.
The cognitions which thus reach us by this infinite series of inductions and
hypotheses . . . are of two kinds, the true and the untrue, or cognitions whose
objects are real and those whose objects are unreal. And what do we mean
by the real? . . . The real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information
and reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of
the vagaries of me and you. . . And so those two series of cognition — the real
and the unreal — consist of those which, at a time sufficiently future, the
community will always continue to re-affirm; and of those which, under the
same conditions, will ever after be denied. [CP 5:311]
Given an enough time an inquirer — investigating indefinitely, as Peirce refers to it —
would be led to a correct judgment about how things are. Any hypothesis may be wrong
or in need revision, but the Continuity of Explanation accounts for forming, refining,
distinguishing, and affirming any hypothesis. We have reason to think that in the long run
we can form a correct judgment about Smith’s behavior. As I put it in the beginning of
the section, we have reason to think that we can determine the practice that an individual
is engaged in.
The Continuity of Explanation allows us to determine the meaning of a conception
and allows us to determine whether and to what extent the conception is affirmed in the
course of experience. Given the considerations of the real above, the CE Method allows
us to trace the real meaning of a conception. It is the meaning of a conception that is
affirmed in the course of experience and investigation. This is significant. I introduced
the pragmatic maxim as maxim for regulating inquiry. The maxim allows us to clarify
8:228] & [CP 5:144]. The six-lecture series “Illustrations of the Logic of Science” (1877-78) is a systematic
discussion of this point. The “Fixation of Belief” and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” are the first two
essays of the series. The connection, however, is pervasive in Peirce’s early and late work.
25See the discussion in [CP 5:142]. I will come back to this point in the next chapter when I discuss the
leading or guiding principles of inference.
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meaning by looking towards the conception’s practical consequences. The addition of
Peirce’s theory of judgment allows us to see the maxim, here characterized as the CE
Method, as a method of reasoning that allows us to determine and affirm the real meaning
of a conception, i.e. that part of the conception that Peirce thinks would hold up to
continued scientific investigation. The CE is a method for distinguishing and affirming
the part of the conception that is real. The CE is a method of reasoning in accord with
scientific investigation as Peirce see it.
For the rest of the dissertation, I will in general simply refer to inquiry or Peircean
inquiry to refer to Peirce’s method of evaluating inferences discussed in this chapter. It
is a further question whether this suffices as a characterization of inquiry in general or
as a characterization of scientific inquiry as it is actually practiced. While I think that
an important component of scientific practice involves developing and testing abductive,
deductive, and inductive inferences in this way, it is a further question whether this is
an accurate characterization of scientific practice. The argument and conclusions reached
presented in the rest of this chapter and the next take this method as its starting point.
3.3 Action Individuation and Agency
The last section applied the Continuity of Explanation to understanding an individual’s
behavior. The result shows how the Continuity of Explanation allows us to form, refine, and
affirm a hypothesis about an individual’s behavior. I show in this section how the method
allows us to differentiate deliberate and intentional behavior as well as the reasons upon
which such behavior is based. The discussion shows that Peirce employed the Continuity
of Explanation towards answering these questions and begins to suggest the conclusions
that would be reached by applying such a method. As will come as no surprise, Peirce
thinks we can distinguish different behaviors by looking at their effects.
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3.3.1 Deliberate and Intentional Behavior
For Peirce, deliberate and intentional behavior are types of more general self-controlled
behavior. I begin, then, with a discussion of self-controlled behavior, and go on to show
how deliberate and intentional behavior are distinguished as species of self-controlled be-
havior. The account of self-control given below is complicated by the fact that Peirce often
discusses self-control in the logical context, i.e. with respect to self-controlled reasoning.
I nonetheless try to pull apart these notions here and do so by appealing to Peirce’s cat-
egories. Self-controlled behavior is a species of more general resolved behavior. Tracing
back these relations is helpful because it allows us to clarify the respective concepts and
be able to apprehend them when they are present.
The meaning of self-controlled behavior, according to Peirce, lies in its effect on future
conduct [CP 5:427]. An action is self-controlled if it involves exercising some level of control
over one’s future behavior. We may say that a behavior shows signs of self-control if it
reflects the formation of a resolve. Here is an example given by Peirce:
I remember that one day at my father’s table, my mother spilled some burning
spirits on her skirt. Instantly, before the rest of us had had time to think what
to do, my brother, Herbert, who was a small boy, had snatched up the rug
and smothered the fire. We were astonished at his promptitude, which, as he
grew up, proved to be characteristic. I asked him how he came to think of
it so quickly. He said, “I had considered on a previous day what I would do
in case such an accident should occur.” This act of stamping with approval,
“endorsing” as one’s own, an imaginary line of conduct so that it shall give
a general shape to our actual future conduct is what we call a resolve. [CP
5:538]26
The action cited in the passage is an example of self-controlled, deliberate, and perhaps
even (as I will discuss below) intentional behavior. I want to begin by focusing on the last
part of the passage where Peirce refers to a resolve.
26Peirce also discusses the example in an endnote [CP 5:487].
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A resolve, Peirce writes in the passage above, involves endorsing a future line of conduct
as one’s own. The practical effect of a resolve, Peirce continues in the passage, is that “when
a similar occasion actually arises. . . it will be found that the habit of really reacting in that
way is already established” [CP 5:538]. The suggestion here is that the immediacy of a
response is a sign that the reaction has been pre-established. Rather than being an instance
where, upon encountering a novel situation, a course of action still needs to be determined,
this is a case where the resulting course of action has already been decided on. This is a
sign that the response has in some way already been habituated.
This effect shows that the individual’s action is a type of resolved behavior, but not
yet why the individual has acted on self-control. I wrote above that for the behavior to
be self-controlled, the action needs to demonstrate the formation of a resolve. Whether a
resolve has been formed can likewise be distinguished by certain practical effects. Perhaps
the most important feature are signs that a resolve has changed or been acquired. The
individual’s behavior in this case is such that in the past the individual did not have such
a resolve, i.e. that a habit for acting had not yet been established, and that a new resolve
has since been acquired. The previous paragraph discussed how to determine whether an
action is a type of resolved behavior. The same means of determination is appealed to
here. The only difference is that in this case we are looking for a change in resolve rather
than a resolve itself.
If a change is found in an individual’s resolved behavior, then this change needs to be
accounted for. In some cases the change will not be arbitrary. It will be subject to some
restraint — to some control — in which case it is a controlled change.27 The controlled
change in behavior also needs to be accounted for. In some cases the change can be
accounted for by something external. In some cases, however, we will not be able to trace
the external influence. In this case we posit a self to account for the change.28 The result
is that the action is said to be self-controlled. The sign that an action is self-controlled is
that the individual’s actions demonstrate the personal formation of a resolve. I will come
back below to fill in some of the details when I discuss agency in the next section.
27See [CP 5:418].
28See the discussion about individuality and error in [CP 5:225-237]. Peirce writes: “It is necessary to
suppose a self in which this ignorance can inhere” [CP 5:233]. Also, see a similar discussion in [CP 7:433-6].
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For Peirce, deliberate behavior is self-controlled behavior in thought. Deliberate be-
havior involves the formation of a resolve and is marked by the same signs and effects of
self-control. In deliberate behavior, however, the resolve is based on some further consid-
erations in thought. He writes:
In the formation of habits of deliberate action, we may imagine the occurrence
of the stimulus, and think out what the results of different actions will be.
One of these will appear particularly satisfactory; and then an action of the
soul takes place which is well described by saying that that mode of reaction
“receives a deliberate stamp of approval.” The result will be that when a similar
occasion actually arises for the first time it will be found that the habit of really
reacting in that way is already established. [CP 5:538]
Deliberate behavior is marked by these further considerations in thought — it is marked
by signs of reasoned, or we may say rational, self-control.
Recall that behavior is said to be controlled when the change in resolve that it demon-
strates is not arbitrary. In deliberate behavior the change in resolve is not only not-
arbitrary but is now based on some further rational considerations. Whether a change in
resolve is based on rational considerations can be distinguished by further practical effects.
Take again the above example of Herbert. Herbert noted that he acted quickly to put out
the fire because he had considered such an event before and had thought about what to do.
The resulting behavior is deliberate because it involved certain considerations in thought.
Importantly, Peirce does not take it to be deliberate merely because Herbert reported that
deliberation took place. It is deliberate because Herbert’s thinking upon certain possible
scenarios led to further aspects of Herbert’s behavior being affected. Recall a line in the
above passage above about deliberate action. Peirce writes that during deliberate action
“we may imagine the occurrence of the stimulus, and think out what the results of different
actions will be.” Even though Herbert resolves to act in accord with one of these alterna-
tives, his thoughts would nonetheless reveal themselves if one of those different actions were
to arise. This is what Peirce takes to be most distinctive of deliberate behavior. Reasoning
effects an individual’s general behavior — it effects how the individual would behave in
different situations. Reasoning is general for Peirce. Any conclusion reached by reasoning
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leads to more general changes to one’s behavior. Deliberate behavior, i.e. behavior that is
the subject of rational self-control, is demonstrated by the resulting general effect that it
has on an individual’s behavior.
The last section will continue to develop this account. Being attentive to this reasoned
change allows us to differentiate the specific reasons upon which an individual acts. For
now, I want to show how a similar move can distinguish deliberate and intentional behavior.
Some deliberate behavior will also be intentional. In the case of intentional thought,
the rational considerations reflect considerations of a further purpose. As a type of delib-
erate behavior, intentional thought involves the formation of a resolve based on rational
considerations. Whether a behavior is purposive can be distinguished by certain practi-
cal effects. These practical effects can be seen when comparing intentional behavior with
other species of deliberate behavior. Consider, for example, that Herbert entertained var-
ious possible scenarios, determined that one would lead to a quick distinguishing of the
fire, and resolved to act accordingly. If the deliberation were based on this determination
— and this determination alone — then in undertaking the act no further purpose would
be achieved. Carrying out the act would lead to no further (general) effect on Herbert’s
behavior. The action in this case would merely be acting in accord with some previously
determined resolve.
This is not always the case. If the resolve is based on a further purpose then the resolve
would continue to have a further general effect on the individual’s behavior. Take an alter-
native possibility of Herbert’s behavior. Perhaps Herbert is aware that the consideration
upon which he bases his resolve rests on a further assumption (i.e. a hypothesis) that the
rug would smother the fire. This in turn would have a further general effect on Herbert’s
behavior. When conditions for acting on the resolve arise Herbert would not simply act on
the previously determined resolve, but would see the action as affirming the assumption
that a rug can be used to smother a fire. Herbert may have increased confidence in rugs
smothering fire (such as through induction) or may take the opportunity to form a further
judgment about a rug’s ability to smother fire. What is characteristic of this behavior is
that effects of the resolve are carried forward in future behavior. The continued general
effect on an individual’s behavior is characteristic of intentional behavior.29
29I take Peirce to draw attention to the distinction between deliberate and intentional conduct in the
90
The initial resolve in the alternative scenario above was based on the further purpose
of making more determinate the assumptions upon which the resolve was based. This is
a particular type of intentional behavior — the purpose this action reflects is to further
inquiry. When the conditions for acting on the resolve arose, the action was seen by Herbert
to affirm or extend the inferences upon which the initial resolve were based. The next
chapter will focus on the practice of inquiry and how to determine whether an individual is
engaged in the practice. The discussion will be based on some of the considerations above.
What I take to be significant about the relationship above between deliberate and
intentional thought, is that it allows the formation of certain resolves to be the product
of thought and yet not be the product of inquiry. Behavior may demonstrate signs of
deliberation and yet not shows signs of more serious intentional thought. Deliberation
becomes inquiry, according to Peirce, only when it is intentionally carried out. I think
this makes sense. Inquiry, after all, is not simply running through the motions of how
one currently deliberates. This may appear to have the aspects of inquiry but it is only
nominally so. Inquiry is rather an opportunity to improve one’s ability to deliberate —
it is an opportunity to change one’s future deliberation. Peirce’s account shows how we
can differentiate between the behavior of an individual who “merely” deliberates and one
passage below:
Now the theory of Pragmaticism was originally based, as anybody will see who examines
the papers of November 1877 and January 1878, upon a study of that experience of the
phenomena of self-control which is common to all grown men and women; and it seems
evident that to some extent, at least, it must always be so based. For it is to conceptions of
deliberate conduct that Pragmaticism would trace the intellectual purport of symbols; and
deliberate conduct is self-controlled conduct. Now control may itself be controlled, criticism
itself subjected to criticism. . . [CP 5:442]
An instance of intentional behavior is when controlled behavior is subject to further control and criticism
subject to further criticism. The effect of such behavior is a continued general effect on the individual’s
behavior.
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who is engaged in “genuine” or “real” inquiry. We can differentiate these behaviors by
the potential effect such actions may have on an their future behavior — by whether
their future behavior would be effected if certain conditions arose. Mere deliberation only
nominally counts as an instance of inquiry. While mere deliberation has aspects of inquiry,
it fails to demonstrate any of its effects. Using terminology from the last section, we may
say that as a particular act mere deliberation has the features of inquiry (i.e. it may appear
to be inquiry), but that it fails to show any of the more general features of inquiry. Even
though locally (and think back here to the indeterminacy from a limited sampling) we may
not be able to distinguish them, we nonetheless in general can. We can give criteria for
doing so and would be able to if inquiry were to continue indefinitely in the long run. It is
more accurate to say that mere deliberation is a degenerate instance of inquiry.
I wrote that according to Peirce the meaning of self-controlled behavior lies in its effect
on future conduct. In the account above what is characteristic of intentional behavior is
that it continued to have (or, if the purpose has yet to be achieved, continues to have) an
effect on future conduct.30 Whereas the result of deliberate behavior leads to a general
effect on an individual’s behavior, the result of intentional behavior leads to some continued
general effect on an individual’s behavior. The difference between controlled behavior,
deliberate behavior, and intentional behavior can each be distinguished by their practical
effects.
This section serves as a demonstration of the Continuity of Explanation as a method of
conceptual analysis. The Continuity of Explanation is a method of reasoning that preserves
and improves our ability to distinguish a type of behavior when it is present. The result
is a pragmatic elucidation of the behavior. The primary benefit of this approach is that it
offers a means of conceptual analysis that preserves the relations between a concept and its
potential experiential consequences. It is a method of reasoning that seeks to preserve the
relations found in experience and that might go on to be affirmed in scientific investigation.
It is a further, empirical question whether we find behaviors that demonstrate these effects.
Peircean pragmatism nonetheless offers a means of distinguishing such behaviors, and does
30See the discussion in [CP 5:441-442], where Peirce is explicit about the difference. In intentional
behavior, the control exercised in deliberate behavior is itself the subject of further control.
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so based on reasoning about possible differences practice.
3.3.2 Agency
In the last subsection I distinguished deliberate and intentional actions by tracing out
differences in their practical effects. I only gestured at the time towards how a change in
behavior can be a controlled change and how a controlled change can be attributed to a
self. Here I suggest that we may speculatively say that resolved behavior is the product
of some agency. I begin with a discussion comparing resolved behavior and with other
types of habituated behavior. The result shows that for Peirce agency is closely tied to
intentional behavior.
While there is a close connection between resolved behavior and habituated behavior, I
want nonetheless to disambiguate them here. A habit, as I’ve been using the term, may be
a natural disposition. It is a further open question about whether the habit is the product
of thought and deliberation, or whether it arose from some other process. Here is Peirce
writing on the distinction in 1902:
Let us use the word “habit,” throughout this book, not in its narrower, and
more proper sense, in which it is opposed to a natural disposition (for the term
acquired habit will perfectly express that narrower sense), but in its wider and
perhaps still more usual sense, in which it denotes such a specialization, original
or acquired, of the nature of a man, or an animal, or a vine, or a crystallizable
chemical substance, or anything else, that he or it will behave, or always tend
to behave, in a way describable in general terms upon every occasion (or upon a
considerable proportion of the occasions) that may present itself of a generally
describable character. [CP 5:538]
I have been using “habit” in this wider, more usual sense, as a habit or tendency to behave
in a general way. A resolve is an acquired habit in the above sense.
Even though a resolve produces something very much like (or just is) a habit, it captures
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an important further point about the origin of the habit. Here is Peirce writing specifically
on acquired habits, now in 1906:
A man can be durably affected by his percepts and by his fancies. The way in
which they affect him will be apt to depend upon his personal inborn disposition
and upon his habits. Habits differ from dispositions in having been acquired as
consequences of the principle, virtually well-known even to those whose powers
of reflexion are insufficient to its formulation, that multiple reiterated behaviour
of the same kind, under similar combinations of percepts and fancies, produces
a tendency — the habit — actually to behave in a similar way under similar
circumstances in the future. [CP 5:487]
This use of habit here, and notice that Peirce is talking specifically about the formation
of a habit in the above passage, is that of a general tendency to behave that is acquired
through the iteration of behavior. An acquired habit can develop from the physiological
changes that accompany reiterated behavior.
Peirce continues the above passage by noting that the same principle applies to thoughts
in the inner world:
Moreover — here is the point — every man exercises more or less control over
himself by means of modifying his own habits; and the way in which he goes to
work to bring this effect about in those cases in which circumstances will not
permit him to practice reiterations of the desired kind of conduct in the outer
world shows that he is virtually well-acquainted with the important principle
that reiterations in the inner world fancied reiterations if well-intensified by
direct effort, produce habits, just as do reiterations in the outer world; and
these habits will have power to influence actual behaviour in the outer world;
especially, if each reiteration be accompanied by a peculiar strong effort that is
usually likened to issuing a command to one’s future self. [CP 5:487]
Habits of thought (and of the respective corresponding changes to habits of action) can like-
wise be developed through iterated behavior. Peirce takes the acquisition of physiological
habits and habits in thought to be developed through iterated behavior.
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In the physiological case this development did not necessarily require further control on
behalf of the agent. The same may be said of the development of some habits of thought.
Habits of thought may also be constitutional or acquired.31 Habits that are further de-
veloped through iterative thought where the individual cannot help but be affected are
uncontrolled. Like the physiological example above, the developments that follow iterative
inferences may serve again as a case in point. A reiterated inference develops efficiencies in
thought. The iteration adds no new content, but the habit is nonetheless being developed.
The acquisition of some habits, however, appear to be the product of some agency.
Here is Peirce acknowledging the distinction in habits of thought:32
All inferences are really performed under the influence of the law of associa-
tion. But all psychical actions divide into two great classes, those which are
performed under the uncontrolled governance of association and those in which
by the “agency” of consciousness, whatever that may mean, the actions come
under self-criticism and self-control. The latter class of actions may be pro-
nounced good or bad; the former could not be otherwise than they were. [CP
7:444]
Some acquired habits seem to be the product of self-control. The distinction here is between
habits that are developed in an uncontrolled way, and habits that are acquired through
the exercise of some control.
Peirce is speculative here. Following his method of reasoning, characterized here by
the Continuity of Explanation, is nonetheless interesting and worthwhile. In following the
method we clarify the meaning of each concept within experience. Peirce speculates at this
point that agency is concomitant with an act of voluntary attention. Below is the further
passage where Peirce, though still tentative, elaborates on the point:
Interest has been spoken of as either connected with voluntary action or as
emotional. We must not, however, lose sight of the fact that there is such a
31Peirce writes: “That which determines us, from given premisses, to draw one inference rather than
another, is some habit of mind, whether it be constitutional or acquired” [CP 5:367].
32See also, the rest of the section on uncontrolled inference from [CP 7:444-450].
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thing as theoretical interest, which has reference not to outward action but to
the voluntary agency we put forth in directing our own ideas. . . Let us rather
content ourselves with acknowledging that this sort of voluntary action is of
a nature not understood. It exists; there is a corresponding kind of interest
referring to it; and there is a kind of attention, or heightening of consciousness
in the initial stage of suggestions interesting in that way.
An immense number of associations are formed, and remain as long as they
endure, in the background of consciousness, that is, in subjective obscurity.
But as soon as a cerebro-motor suggestion is made, that is a suggestion of the
idea of voluntarily exercising thought, the whole set brightens up. At the same
time the action of forming and annulling sets, say the metabolism of thought,
becomes more active. So that our instinctive psychological explanation is that
the heightened consciousness is an agent that performs the action. If there is
nothing in this but a word, we need not quarrel about it; but it would seem
that as a matter of dynamics heightened consciousness, or attention, is nothing
but a concomitant of the idea of voluntary action. . . [CP 7:433 & 434]
Peirce recognizes that there may be nothing in the difference except for a word, but the
formation of the habit in the above passage begins to be seen as the product of an agent.
The acquisition of a habit through voluntary attention is a sign of agency.
I take Peirce’s reservations to arise from the emphasis on “voluntary” attention. This
meaning of voluntary can be cached out in the same way that the attribution of a self is
attributed to a controlled act. In some cases we will not be able to account for attentive
behavior by appealing to (or at least solely to) some external influence. What I want to
turn to, however, is the new emphasis that Peirce places on attention and its relation to
agency.
There is a close connection between attention and the discussion of intention in the
previous subsection. Recall that the characteristic of intentional behavior is that it con-
tinues to have a general effect on an individual’s behavior. The meaning of intentional
behavior, according to Peirce, lies in its potential continued effect on future conduct. The
meaning of attentive behavior on this account also lies in its effect on future conduct. The
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effect of attentive behavior is that certain aspects of current experience are carried forward
into subsequent experience. The effect of attention is iterative experience. Attention, at
least when it has no further aim, is intentional behavior lacking in definite purpose. We
may say, using a term introduced before, that attentive behavior is a degenerate form of
intentional behavior.
Here we see the uptake of the discussion. Attention, according to Peirce, is the com-
mon denominator between agency and intentional behavior. Attention is also for Peirce
the common denominator between intentional behavior and deliberation. Let us return
to the alteration on the Herbert example offered to demonstrate intentional thought. In
the example Herbert is aware of — and now we may just as well say Herbert is attentive
to — the further considerations in thought upon which the resolve is based. The differ-
ence between intentional behavior and deliberate behavior came down to a difference in
attention.
Peircean pragmatism, here characterized by the Continuity of Explanation, offers a
theory of action and agency. Again, it is a further empirical question whether we find
behaviors that demonstrate these effects. Testing for signs of agency is a notoriously
difficult problem. Peircean pragmatism nonetheless suggests a means of distinguishing
such behaviors, and does so based on reasoning about possible differences practice —
differences in behavior that would, at least potentially, be accountable to inquiry. The CE
Method allows us to distinguish between intentional and deliberate behavior. Peirce also
possesses a theory of agency that links agency with intentional behavior and intentional
behavior (at least intentional thought) with acting on a reason.
3.3.3 Reason and Action
The previous section demonstrated how the Continuity of Explanation can be employed to
individuate different types of action and agency. I set aside at the time the further question
of which specific considerations the individual has in mind. In this section I complete this
account and show how the Continuity of Explanation allows us to determine the specific
reasons upon which an individual acts.
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According to Peirce, considerations in thought are general and so lead to a correspond-
ing general effect on an individual’s behavior. A deliberate action involves the formation of
a resolve that is based on some rational considerations in thought. The result is a rational
effect on an individual’s behavior. At this point I set the details of this process to the side.
I did not discuss how the method allows us to determine the rational considerations upon
which deliberation, and the resulting resolve and rational effect, is based. Here I fill in
these details. Peirce’s theory of judgment allows us to determine the inference upon which
an individual’s behavior is based.
I begin with a review of Peirce’s theory of judgment introduced in Chapter 2. Recall
the diamond example as initially presented in Section 2.2. Peirce recognizes that the
individual does not simply intuit the object to be diamond, but rather that the individual
infers the object under consideration to be a diamond.33 The individual may have judged,
for example, based on the object appearing to be a mineral, to have an octahedral structure,
and to look more or less like what past experiences of diamonds suggest.
We can test which inference the resulting judgment is based by seeing how the individual
would behave if situations were different. While the behavior of two individual’s may
appear indistinguishable in a present instance — both may judge the present object under
consideration to be a diamond of certain hardness — the general behavior of the two
individuals can nonetheless still be distinguished. As an example, take two individuals:
one who infers from the relative translucency of the object that object is a diamond, and
another who bases the inference on the object’s mineral structure. These inferences would
correspond with different general effects on an individual’s behavior. One individual would
act accordingly on similarly translucent objects, the other would act accordingly on objects
with similar mineral structures. But the sets of objects in each of these classes are not
the same. There are situations where the two individuals would draw different conclusions
regarding a same object. The different conclusions and the resulting difference in behavior
allows us to distinguish which inference a judgment is based on. Which inference an
33Whether and in what way an individual infers is a further empiricial question. I point out for now that
Peirce’s argument so far only rests on an assumption that the individual’s behavior can be represented by
a judgment.
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individual makes can be tested by how the individual would behave in different situations.
This allows us to test which rational considerations the resulting habit is based.
This account allows us to evaluate judgments and the inferences upon which the judg-
ment is based. Not only can we now distinguish from an individual’s behavior the inference
upon which a judgment is based, but we can evaluate whether the inference is a good one.
Would the individual who infers a diamond based on translucency apprehend a diamond
whenever a diamond is present? The individual may in this case incorrectly attribute a
diamond’s hardness to a translucent, non-diamond mineral. Or, the individual may incor-
rectly fail to attribute hardness to an object that is a diamond, but is nonetheless in its
unpolished, non-translucent form.
This is in accord with the account given in Section 2.4.2. There I appealed to a clear
apprehension of an object as being able to apprehend the object whenever a sign of the
object is present. This included being familiar with an object, having a distinct appre-
hension of an object, being able to identify an object by its effects. A clear apprehension
demonstrates itself in an individual’s behavior in these ways.
The CE Method above allows us to add to this picture. The individual’s judgment
may be based on the object appearing to be a mineral, to have an octahedral structure,
and to look more or less like what past experiences of diamonds suggest. We can now
refine this account. The inference is based, according to Peirce, on a series of prior abduc-
tions, deductions, and inductions. The diamonds observed in the past offered a sampling,
abductive inferences offered hypothesis about a diamond’s hardness and how to identify
diamonds when they are present. When we determine the reason upon which an action is
based, we can now include and refine aspects of the judgment through previous abductive,
deductive, and inductive support.
By refining the general effect a judgment has on an individual’s behavior, we can
distinguish whether and to what extent an individual acts on a reason. The Continuity
of Explanation allows us furthermore to evaluate the inference upon which a judgment is
based. Peirce’s theory of judgment offers a direct connection between reasons and action.
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3.4 Conclusion
The Continuity of Explanation offers a method for understanding an individual’s behavior.
I began this chapter by demonstrating how the CE allows us to determine the practice that
an individual is engaged in. This includes positing a practice through hypothetic inference,
refining and distinguishing the practice from other related practices through deductive
inference, and affirming the practice through inductive inference. I went on in Section 3
to demonstrate how the method can be applied to particular types of behavior. I showed
how the CE allows us to differentiate deliberate behavior and intentional (i.e. purposive)
behavior, as well as the reasons upon which an individual acts.
More broadly, the CE provides a method of conceptual analysis that preserves the
relations between a concept and its potential experiential effects. It is a method of reasoning
that preserves the experiential consequences that might be affirmed in Peircean inquiry.
This supports the claim, introduced in Chapter 2 and refined and further defended in
Chapter 3, that the CE is the regulative commitment of inquiry. The CE incorporates
the methods and commitments of the three types of inference — abductive, deductive, and
inductive inference — that Peirce takes to be characteristic of scientific reasoning. Whether
and to what extent this is representative of scientific practice is a further empirical question.
As I stated before, I find it uncontroversial that scientific practice rests, at least in part,
on these types of inferences and so that some of the conclusions should extend to our
understanding of the practice. But I leave it open to the reader to determine to what
extent the model can be taken as representative of actual scientific practice.
While the CE incorporates the methods and commitments of abductive, deductive, and
inductive inference, it is not simply the combination or intersection of the three inference
types. The CE captures the aspects of abductive, deductive, and inductive inferences that
serve the larger goal of forming and testing judgments that would be affirmed in inquiry.
This in one of the advantages offered by the CE. As the general commitment to what
Peirce takes to be scientific reasoning, it is committed not just to the employment of the
three inference types, but is committed to how they relate and support each other and, in
particular, how they relate and support each other to further the goal of reaching a correct
judgment about the world. The CE also makes plain the metaphysical commitments upon
100
which such reasoning is based. The metaphysical commitments were introduced in Chapter
2 and will be further developed in the next chapter.
A result of applying the CE is worth emphasizing. The CE Method allows us to evalu-
ate an individual’s behavior. The meaning of an individual’s behavior can be characterized
by the reasons upon which the behavior is based. We can in turn evaluate an individual’s
action by evaluating the reasons upon which the act is based. The CE allows us to differ-
entiate different types of action, offers an account that connects actions and reasons, and
allows us to evaluate actions. The CE allows us, we may now say, to determine whether
and to what extent the practice that an individual is engaged in is reasonable. This point is
elaborated in the next chapter, where I argue that the CE does not simply offer a method
for determining whether an action is reasonable, but offers a guide for developing more
reasonable behavior.
There is one further result that is worth noting. According to Peircean pragmatism,
determining the meaning of an action leads to the means of evaluating the action. The
order is significant. The CE serves first as a means to clarifying the meaning of a concept.
It is only through clarifying the meaning of a concept that its means of evaluation become
clear. This leads to a corollary. It suggests that if one does not see how to evaluate an




The Continuity of Explanation
Applied to Inquiry
The Continuity of Explanation (CE) is the commitment that every judgment entails con-
sequences for action that are accountable to scientific inquiry. I introduced the CE in
Chapter 2 as a regulative commitment to Peircean inquiry. The CE was significantly re-
fined in the last chapter where I showed that it captures the commitments and methods of
the three types of inferences — abduction, deduction, and induction — that Peirce takes
to be characteristic of scientific inquiry. The CE offers, in short, a method of reasoning
that is in accord with Peircean inquiry.
The last chapter demonstrates how the Continuity of Explanation can be applied to-
wards understanding an individual’s behavior. The CE leads to three significant results
for understanding an individual’s behavior . The CE Method can determine the practice
an individual is engaged in, can determine the reasons upon which a practice is based,
and can determine whether the reasons are good reasons. The CE Method can determine,
in short, whether an individual’s behavior is reasonable. I went on to apply the CE to-
wards understanding deliberate and intentional behavior. The results show how Peircean
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pragmatism offers a theory of action.
The aim of the dissertation is to show not simply that Peircean pragmatism can de-
termine whether a practice is reasonable, but that it can serve as a guide for developing
more reasonable behavior. Up until now, I have done little to address this last question.
I remedy this omission here. By ‘more reasonable’ I mean more in accord with the CE
Method discussed in Chapter 3, which is gives a method for evaluating respective abduc-
tive, deductive, and inductive inferences. I do not compare this method of reasoning with
other alternatives.
I begin this chapter with a discussion of the practice of inquiry. I go on to give an
account of its development. To understand the practice of inquiry we can appeal back to
the CE. Inquiry, after all, is a practice that we can engage in and so the same method
for understanding the practice will apply. The result is an increased familiarity with the
practice and the behavior of an individual engaged in inquiry.
Next, I turns towards how the CE offers a guide for developing the practice. I begin
this development with a final (at least for our purposes here) refinement of Peirce’s theory
of judgment. According to Peirce’s theory of judgment every inference is based on more
general principles of reasoning. These general principles of reasoning correspond — as
should no longer comes as a surprise — with more general behaviors. What I go on to
argue, however, is that the CE shows how to develop an understanding of these general
principles. It is through developing these general principles that the CE offers a method
for developing more reasonable behavior.
In the penultimate section I discuss the general principles of reasoning in more detail.
I show that these general principles for Peirce include the will to learn, a fallibilism, and
a tendency to view the world as continuous, a view Pierce refers to as synechism. Each
type of inference also rests on more general principles characteristic of their evaluation.
The result is the final support for the claim that Peircean pragmatism offers a guide for
developing more reasonable behavior.
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4.1 Inquiry and Investigation
Inquiry is a practice we engage in. In this section I apply the CE towards understanding
the practice of inquiry. The result is a pragmatic elucidation of the practice that allows us
to identify whether and to what extent an individual is engaged in inquiry.
I introduced Peirce’s conception of inquiry in Chapter 2.2 as the activity that begins
with doubt and that ends with its cessation, i.e. in a state of belief. When I introduced the
notion of belief, I suggested that the meaning of a belief is the mode of action it establishes.
At the time I only gestured towards why Peirce takes this to be the case. I suggested that
if the concept of belief is to be scientifically appropriate then it must refer to a mode of
action that can be accountable to scientific investigation. I went on to argue in Chapter 2
that this is also the insight that motivates the pragmatic maxim. Peirce assumes that the
result of inquiry is a belief and so the result of inquiry likewise consists in establishing a
mode of action (see 2.3). The pragmatic maxim is the maxim for inquiry that follows, in
short, when we take inquiry to result in a mode of action. Peirce assumes that the result
of inquiry be regulated by its future connection to action.
The point of the discussion at the time was to emphasize the minimal assumptions
that went into motivating the pragmatic maxim and so at the time the gesturing was
appropriate. The discussion of the CE in the last chapter allows us to refine and defend
this account. Peirce’s initial characterization of inquiry follows from an application of the
CE Method. The CE allows us, as we’ll see below, to go further. But for now I begin with
applying the CE to the conceptions of doubt and belief. In ‘The Fixation of Belief,’ Peirce
introduces the concepts doubt and belief with an example on deciding how best to pay a
fare for a horse-car:
. . . looking at the matter minutely, it must be admitted that, if there is the least
hesitation as to whether I shall pay the five coppers or the nickel (as there will
be sure to be, unless I act from some previously contracted habit in the matter),
though irritation is too strong a word, yet I am excited to such small mental
activity as may be necessary to deciding how I shall act. . . . However the doubt
may originate, it stimulates the mind to an activity which may be slight or
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energetic, calm or turbulent. Images pass rapidly through consciousness, one
incessantly melting into another, until at last, when all is over — it may be in a
fraction of a second, in an hour, or after long years — we find ourselves decided
as to how we should act under such circumstances as those which occasioned
our hesitation. In other words, we have attained belief. [CP 5:394]
In this example Peirce links the conceptions of doubt and belief with certain actions. A
sign of doubt, on this account, is a pause or hesitation in one’s behavior. In the case of
inquiry, doubt is followed by some mental activity — by an activity in thought, no matter
how small or how slight, as Peirce emphasizes — that leads to a decision about how to
act.1 The resulting decision about how to act is the attained belief. Each action — the
pause or hesitation that is a sign of doubt, the resulting mental activity that corresponds
with inquiry, and the resulting behavior that the belief establishes — is according to Peirce
accountable to scientific inquiry.
This is a preliminary pragmatic elucidation of inquiry. It is in accord with Peirce’s initial
characterization in ‘The Fixation of Belief’ and the account given in Chapter 2.2. Now we
can see that Peirce is employing the same method of pragmatic elucidation elaborated in
Chapter 3 that involves tracing out the concept’s practical (or experiential) effects.
The CE Method discussed in the last chapter allows us to refine this account. For
starters it offers a method for determining changes in action. The CE, furthermore, allows
us to determine the mode of action that inquiry establishes. Here we can appeal to the
methods of determining behavior discussed in Chapter 3.1 & 3.2. Indeed the CE allows
us, by focusing on the difference between the mode of action before and after inquiry, to
determine the specific reasons upon which an individual’s inquiry is based (see Chapter
3.3). The CE Method allows us, in short, to look at the general effects the mental activity
in which inquiry consists has on an individual’s behavior.
On this account all that is needed to gain familiarity with the practice of inquiry, ac-
cording to Peirce, is familiarity with recognizing doubt, recognizing belief, and recognizing
the type of change in belief that is specific to the practice of inquiry. Each of these con-
cepts can in turn be reduced to differences in modes of action. This is significant as it rests
1Peirce offers a similar account in [CP 5:510].
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on no further metaphysical assumptions other than those that went into Peirce’s initial
conception of belief as establishing a mode of action. The assumption that belief estab-
lishes a mode of action is substantially developed in the last chapter in my discussion of
the CE Method, where through abduction, deduction, and induction we can determine the
mode of action that an individual is engaged in. Familiarity with the practice of inquiry
requires familiarity with a mode of action (i.e. belief), the privation of a mode of action
(i.e. doubt),2 and the resulting change in a mode of action that is characteristic of inquiry.3
Doubt followed by mental activity and a corresponding change in an individual’s mode
of action are signs of inquiry. The CE offers a further refinement on the pragmatic elucida-
tion of inquiry. Inquiry is not simply a change from doubt to belief, but is a specific change
— a deliberate, self-controlled change — that establishes a mode of action. Here I appeal
to the discussion of deliberate and intentional behavior in Chapter 3.3.1. In the case of
2Peirce writes in [CP 5:514]:
Doubt is of an altogether contrary genus. It is not a habit, but the privation of a habit. Now
a privation of a habit, in order to be anything at all, must be a condition of erratic activity
that in some way must get superseded by a habit.
Peirce writes of doubt being the privation of belief on one other occasion, where he offers the following
example: “The third kind of opposition is between a habit and its privation, as sight and blindness” [CP
2:608].
3The latter is familiarity with the derivative (∆) of a mode of action. I will not develop this insight
here, but it seems that this may be the simplest and most direct instance of the importance of continuity
in inquiry. It is an example of Peirce’s synechism, or to be more specific, of synechistic reasoning. It allows
us to engage in inquiry without additional metaphysical assumptions. It allows us to reason about belief
and its derivatives in a way that preserves our familiarity with the initial conception of belief. Compare
with the discussion of synechism in Sect 4.4 later in this chapter. Indeed the discussion in this dissertation
suggests how one could give an account of Peirce where every epistemic concept — including judgment,
inquiry, and even reality and truth — is derivative of a mode of action. Each can be characterized and
reduced to the mode of action that it would establish.
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deliberate behavior the change in the mode of action that belief establishes is controlled,
and has a further, more general effect on the individual’s behavior. Referring again to a
passage cited in the discussion of deliberate behavior in Chapter 3, Peirce writes:
In the formation of habits of deliberate action, we may imagine the occurrence
of the stimulus, and think out what the results of different actions will be.
One of these will appear particularly satisfactory; and then an action of the
soul takes place which is well described by saying that that mode of reaction
“receives a deliberate stamp of approval.” [CP 5:538]
Recall the example of Herbert deliberating in advance how to put out a fire. While Her-
bert’s acting immediately to put out the fire is a sign that he deliberated about what to
do in advance, the deliberation had a further general effect on Herbert’s behavior. During
deliberation Herbert considered various alternative scenarios and it is this entertaining of
other scenarios that leads to further effects on Herbert’s behavior. Herbert perhaps de-
cided that a rug would be the better choice than a table cloth or dish towel, or that, if
no rug is available to stop, drop, and roll. These deliberations reveal themselves in Her-
bert’s actions for smothering the fire (or would reveal themselves if other scenarios were to
arise). Inquiry is deliberate and so includes, according to Peirce, these more general effects
of deliberation on an individual’s behavior. This further pragmatic elucidation in turn
increases familiarity with the practice of inquiry. The CE method gives a straightforward
means of distinguishing inquiry that is deliberate and self-controlled from related practices
that, though they may share certain behaviors or demonstrate similar physiological signs,
merely coincide with the practice of inquiry.
Peirce increasingly came to emphasize this connection between deliberate behavior and
inquiry proper.4 Reflecting back on the pragmatic maxim circa 1905, Peirce emphasizes
the importance of deliberate, controlled conduct in applying the maxim. He writes:
The method prescribed in the maxim is to trace out in the imagination the
conceivable practical consequences, — that is, the consequences for deliberate,
4See examples in [CP 5:441-3] and [CP 8:191]. Peirce’s increasing interest in the normative sciences
can be seen as evidence of this as well.
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self-controlled conduct, — of the affirmation or denial of the concept; and the
assertion of the maxim is that herein lies the whole of the purport of the word,
the entire concept. [CP 8:191]
Peirce recognizes the difference between an individual engaged in inquiry proper and an
individual who merely appears to be. Peirce writes:
Reasoning is a process in which the reasoner is conscious that a judgment,
the conclusion, is determined by other judgment or judgments, the premisses,
according to a general habit of thought, which he may not be able precisely
to formulate. . . Without this logical approval, the process, although it may be
closely analogous to reasoning in other respects, lacks the essence of reasoning.5
[CP 2:773]
I take these passages to suggest that Peirce makes a distinction between genuine inquiry,
i.e. inquiry that is deliberate (and so also subject to self-control), and a contrasting, merely
nominal version of the practice. An individual who doubts, shows signs of mental activity,
and goes on to establish a mode of action, may appear to be engaged in inquiry. But if
the individual is not conscious of the rule of thought whereby the resulting mode of action
is established, then even though the individual is going through the motions they are not
engaged in genuine inquiry. The individual in this case is not engaged in reasoning. While
the individual in this case may appear to be engaged in inquiry, there are no signs of the
general effects that accompany the practice. We only confuse such individuals if we are
being particularly nearsighted. Inquiry is genuine only if it is deliberate and subject to
self-control.
Inquiry may also be intentionally engaged in. I again appeal to the discussion of
intentional behavior in Chapter 3.3.1. Whereas the result of deliberate behavior leads to a
general effect on an individual’s behavior, the result of intentional behavior is a continued
general effect on an individual’s behavior. I call inquiry that is intentionally engaged in
5Peirce makes a similar remark with regard to reasoning and inference in [CP 5:108].
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investigation.6 Intentional inquiry, i.e. investigation, leads to a further update and revision
of one’s beliefs, methods, or confidence in them.
The move to intentional inquiry, i.e. investigation, also corresponds with important
features of Peirce’s later thought. The CE accounts for these developments as well. Peirce
increasingly came to emphasize the intentional aspect of reasoning. Peirce writes:
In genuine reasoning, we are not wedded to our method. We deliberately ap-
prove it, but we stand ever ready and disposed to reexamine it and to improve
upon it, and to criticize our criticism of it, without cessation. Thus the util-
ity of the word “reasoning” lies in its helping us to discriminate between the
self-critical and uncritical formations of representations. [MS 831, 1900]
Notice Peirce’s use of ‘self-critical’ rather than ‘self-control.’ It is the continual readiness
to reexamine deliberate thought — i.e. being self-critical — that Peirce emphasizes is
characteristic of genuine reasoning in the passage above. This continued general effect on
an individual’s behavior is what, as I’ve argued above, is distinctive of intentional inquiry.
Peirce also increasingly came to equate the intellectual purport of a conception with
the part of the conception that is carried forward in inquiry. Peirce writes:
It appears then that the intellectual significance of all thought ultimately lies
in its effect upon our actions. Now in what does the intellectual character
of conduct consist?. . . it must be capable of rational interpretation to a future
thought. Thus thought is rational only so far as it recommends itself to a
possible future thought. Or in other words the rationality of thought lies in its
reference to a possible future.7 [CP 7: 361]
6As far as I can tell this distinction is nowhere made explicit in Peirce’s writings. Peirce seems at times
to use the terms interchangeably (such as in ‘The Fixation of Belief’). I nonetheless take the distinction
between deliberate and intentional inquiry to be significant, and I go on to argue below why the distinction
captures a significant and core aspect of Peirce’s latter writings.
7A further passage regarding Peirce’s semiotics helps describe the point:
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The pragmatic maxim is concerned with the intellectual purport (or as Peirce refers to it
below, the rational purport) of a conception. The intellectual or rational purport is the part
of the conception that is carried forward into the future thought as investigation continues.
In regards to rational purpose, Peirce is explicit about its importance to pragmatism:
I agree that of the two implications of pragmatism that concepts are purposive,
and that their meaning lies in their conceivable practical bearings, the former
is the more fundamental. I think, however, that the doctrine would be quite
estropiée without the latter point. [CP 8:322]
Reflecting on the pragmatic maxim in 1902, Peirce acknowledges that looking towards a
conception’s purpose leads to a still higher grade of clarity. Peirce writes:
. . . the spirit of the maxim itself, which is that we must look to the upshot
of our concepts in order rightly to apprehend them, would direct us towards
something different from practical facts, namely, to general ideas, as the true
interpreters of our thought. . . . the maxim has approved itself to the writer,
after many years of trial, as of great utility in leading to a relatively high grade
of clearness of thought. . . . when that has been done, and not before, a still
higher grade of clearness of thought can be attained by remembering that the
only ultimate good which the practical facts to which it directs attention can
subserve is to further the development of concrete reasonableness; so that the
meaning of the concept does not lie in any individual reactions at all, but in
Thought, however, is in itself essentially of the nature of a sign. But a sign is not a sign unless
it translates itself into another sign in which it is more fully developed. Thought requires
achievement for its own development, and without this development it is nothing. Thought
must live and grow in incessant new and higher translations, or it proves itself not to be genuine
thought. [CP 5: 594]
The point, as I take it here, is the same: genuine thought is proven in its continued relation to future
investigation.
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the manner in which those reactions contribute to that development. [CP 5:3,
emphasis added]
Peirce asks us not only to adopt the maxim attentively but asks us to look towards the
‘upshot’ or the results the intentional adoption of the conception would have. According to
the maxim, the intellectual purport of a conception lies in its relevance in continued future
investigation. The passage captures nicely Peirce’s emphasis on the effects of deliberate
behavior and general ideas, and the importance of the effects that would result from the
intentional adoption of a conception. The CE can account for the significance Peirce comes
to place on effects of the intentional effects of a conception.
The passage above also, though it is more subtle, suggests that the importance of both
deliberate and intentional behavior comes down to a difference in directing attention. This
is substantially in accord with the discussion of attention and its relation to deliberate and
intentional behavior found in Chapter 3.3.2. The CE method accounts for the importance
of attentive, deliberate, and intentional behavior within inquiry, along with the increasing
emphasis Peirce places on each. In the next section I offer a final development along these
lines. A further refinement of Peirce’s theory of judgment developed in the next section
allows us to say what the inquirer is attentive to.
Finally, the emphasis the CE places on deliberate and intentional inquiry allows us to
see how investigation can influence behavior more generally. Peirce increasingly came to
recognize that the pragmatic maxim offers not only a theory of meaning and inquiry but
offers a guide for developing more reasonable behavior. It is through investigation that one
develops more reasonable behavior.
The CE method yields a pragmatic elucidation of inquiry and investigation. The result
is that we can begin to determine whether and to what extent an individual is engaged
in inquiry, and when an individual does so deliberately and intentionally. It is a further
empirical question whether we find behaviors that demonstrate these effects. Peircean
pragmatism nonetheless suggests a means of distinguishing such behaviors, and does so
based on reasoning about possible differences practice. Such a distinction is nonetheless
significant, however, because we can begin to discuss what would result if an investigator
were to continue to intentionally engage in inquiry. The final section of the chapter begins to
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draw conclusions about such an investigator. The CE method offers of guide for reasonable
behavior. To see how the CE method serves as a guide for more reasonable behavior, we
need first to turn to one last feature of Peirce’s theory of judgment — that judgment,
according to Peirce, is in some sense continuous.
4.2 Continuity of Judgment
I turn now to emphasize one last feature of Peirce’s theory of judgment. The meaning of
a judgment, according to Peirce, can be represented by a series of inferences. The series
is potentially infinite — it has no clear end and no clear parts — and so we can say
that judgment is, in some sense, continuous. I explain the point below. The continuity of
judgment is significant for seeing how the CE method serves as a guide for more reasonable
behavior in Section 3. It also allows us to make a final refinement on the distinction
between inquiry and investigation discussed in the last section. The continuity of judgment
allows us to differentiate deliberate inquiry and inquiry that is intentionally engaged in,
i.e. investigation. The difference lies in the aspect of judgment an individual is paying
attention to.
I appealed earlier to the continuity in judgments. The first appeal to continuity in
judgment came in Chapter 2, where I suggested that every judgment is based on further
considerations. To see this, take again the diamond example discussed in Chapter 2.4.
Peirce recognizes that the individual does not intuit but rather infers the object to be a
diamond.8 The individual may have concluded that the object is a diamond, for example,
based on an inference from the object appearing to be a mineral, to have an octahedral
structure, and to look more or less like what past experiences of diamonds suggest. These
in turn lead to further questions that rest on further considerations. According to Peirce,
every judgment is based on such further considerations.
8This ultimately is an empirical claim. Peirce’s argument rests on supposing that we can make such an
assumption to keep inquiry going. It is what I have called a regulative commitment. The further question
(for both Peirce’s account and for the empiricial support) is whether such a claim finds support.
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In the diamond example above the judgment can be represented by the series of infer-
ences upon which the judgment is based. Given the three types of inference discussed in
Chapter 3, this series of inferences includes a combination of abductions, inductions, and
deductions. Judging an object to be a diamond is an abduction based in part on prior
abductions. To attribute a diamond’s hardness to an object is to offer a hypothesis. The
hypothesis suggests that the object would indeed behave like a hard diamond. Deduction
is present in tracing out the consequences that would follow from such a hypothesis, and
these in turn are tested in experience.9 The content of the attribution (what is meant by
‘hard’) is in turn the product of past hypotheses combined with inductive testing. Confi-
dence in the result is based on prior inductions and prior samplings of diamonds and how
they behave. In each case the meaning of the judgment can be represented by the further
inferences upon which the judgment is based.
According to Peirce, when an individual forms a judgment the individual employs a
logical method. The logical method supposes that the judgment, in this case the conclusion
of deliberation, indeed follows from the series of inferences upon which it is based. Peirce
writes:
Reasoning is a process in which the reasoner is conscious that a judgment,
the conclusion, is determined by other judgment or judgments, the premisses,
according to a general habit of thought, which he may not be able precisely
to formulate. . . Every reasoner, therefore, since he approves certain habits, and
consequently methods, of reasoning, accepts a logical doctrine. . . 10 [CP 2:773]
When an individual forms a judgment the individual employs and approves of this logi-
cal method. The employment and approval of this method, as Peirce suggests above, is
something an inquirer is attentive to even though the inquirer may not be able to precisely
formulate it.
9For the rest of this section I focus mostly on the abductive and inductive elements. This is to keep
the discussion brief, but also because the abductive and inductive elements are the most interesting for
my purpose here.
10Similar passages can be found in [CP 2:589] & [CP 4.476].
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A logical method is comprised of what Peirce calls leading or guiding principles :
That which determines us, from given premisses, to draw one inference rather
than another, is some habit of mind, whether it be constitutional or acquired. . . The
particular habit of mind which governs this or that inference may be formulated
in a proposition . . . and such a formula is called a guiding principle of inference.
The general method upon which an individual resolves doubt in terms of belief rests on
these further guiding principles.11 The series of inferences that represent a judgment in-
cludes these guiding principles.
Each type of inference includes guiding principles of its own. A judgment with ab-
ductive elements rests on prior and more general assumptions about abductive inference.
Likewise the inductive elements rests on prior and more general assumptions about in-
ductive inference. I discuss these more general assumptions of abductive and inductive
inference in the final section. For now, I wish simply to point out that some guiding prin-
ciples are based on more general features of reasoning and types of inference. These, like
in the instances of more general assumptions about abduction and induction above, are
guiding principles for logical reasoning — they are logical guiding principles.12
4.2.1 Returning to Investigation
The above account allows us to refine the account of deliberate and intentional inquiry. A
judgment can be represented by a series of inferences and an individual can be attentive
11Further passages where Peirce summarizes this process can be found in [CP 3:160-164] & [CP 4:53-55].
12Peirce refers to the distinction between logical (or formal) and factual (or material) guiding principles
in [CP 2:589]. Peirce offers a similar distinction in Fixation: “But it so happens that there exists a division
among facts, such that in one class are all those which are absolutely essential as guiding principles, while
in the others are all which have any other interest as objects of research. This division is between those
which are necessarily taken for granted in asking why a certain conclusion is thought to follow from certain
premisses, and those which are not implied in such a question” [CP 5:369].
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to the premises upon which the conclusion of the judgment is based. When an individual
is attentive during inquiry we can now be more specific and say that the individual is
attentive to this series of inferences. Which part or features of the series the individual is
attentive to distinguishes deliberate and intentional inquiry.
A judgment is deliberate if the inquirer is attentive to and begins to exercise control
over the rule of thought by which the conclusion is reached. The individual is in this case
aware of further instances where the rule would apply. Recall the Herbert example from
Chapter 3.3.1. The effect of deliberate behavior is a more general effect on the individual’s
behavior. Herbert deliberated in advance about what to do if an article of clothing were
to catch fire. The act had a more general effect on Herbert’s behavior because the rule of
action that was the result of Herbert’s deliberation is a rule that applied more generally
to other potential actions, e.g. to other articles of clothing, to fires located not just in
the kitchen but to other parts of the house, and beyond. Exercising control over the rule
of thought leads to the general effects on an individual that I’ve argued correspond with
deliberate behavior.
A judgment is intentional if the inquirer is attentive to and begins to exercise control
over a judgment’s guiding principles. In this case the individual is attentive to further
instances where the guiding principles would apply and the individual’s behavior is cor-
respondingly effected. Return again to the Herbert example. What is characteristic of
intentional behavior is a continued general effect on the individual’s behavior. If upon
smothering the fire Herbert were to affirm or update his rule for action, then Herbert in-
tentionally smothered the fire. In this case the experience would make Herbert revise his
guiding principles, and this revision would in turn lead to a further, general effect on his
behavior. The Peircean investigator, i.e. an individual intentionally engaged in inquiry, is
attentive to and exercises control over the guiding principles of inference.
Recall the passage from the discussion of investigation earlier in Section 1:
In genuine reasoning, we are not wedded to our method. We deliberately ap-
prove it, but we stand ever ready and disposed to reexamine it and to improve
upon it, and to criticize our criticism of it, without cessation. Thus the util-
ity of the word “reasoning” lies in its helping us to discriminate between the
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self-critical and uncritical formations of representations. [MS 831]
The Peircean investigator, we may say, is not wedded to a logical method but stands “ever
ready and disposed to reexamine it and to improve upon it, and to criticize our criticism
of it, without cessation.” The Peircean investigator contributes to the development of the
guiding principles of inference.
I have stated throughout the dissertation that the Continuity of Explanation serves as
a guide for thought. I began in Chapter 2 by showing broadly that the CE captures a
theory of meaning and a theory of inquiry. Chapter 3 substantially defended this claim
by showing that the CE captures the commitments and methods of the three types of
inference — abductive, deductive, and inductive — that Peirce takes to be characteristic
of scientific inquiry. The resulting method, what I refer to as the CE Method, is a method
for holding a belief accountable to scientific inquiry as Peirce sees it. It is a method of
reasoning that preserves the experiential effects — and in so doing refines both the meaning
of a conception and the ability to test the conception — and so can be used to determine
whether and to what extent a belief is reasonable.
With the preceding discussion in this section the CE now reaches it fullest development
as a method for guiding thought. The CE does not simply offer a method for determining
whether a belief is reasonable but offers a guide for developing more reasonable beliefs.
In being attentive to and exercising control over the guiding principles of inference, the
Peircean investigator contributes to the development of more reasonable beliefs.
The aim of the dissertation is to argue that the CE method offers a guide for develop-
ing more reasonable behavior. At this stage in the dissertation all that remains to reach
this conclusion is to rehash a familiar line of argument and appeal to the pragmatic cor-
respondence between belief and a mode of action. The meaning of a belief, according to
the Peircean pragmatist, is the mode of action it establishes. If this is the case, then in
offering a guide for developing more reasonable beliefs the CE method similarly serves as
a guide for developing more reasonable behaviors. With the conceptual point made, I turn
to discuss some of the general behaviors that follow from the CE method.
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4.3 Continuity of Explanation as a Guide for Devel-
oping More Reasonable Behavior
I discuss in this section how the Continuity of Explanation offers a method for developing
more reasonable behavior. Whether the CE serves as a guide for thought is a question that,
I take it, has been substantially answered. I turn now to the connection the CE places
between thought and behavior. This connection was introduced in Chapter 2 with the
broad commitment that the result or upshot of thought is to establish a mode of action.
When we acknowledge that the CE offers a guide for thought, and recognize in turn that
the result of thought is to establish a particular type of behavior, then we see how Peircean
pragmatism offers a direct connection between thought and behavior. The CE method can
in turn be applied towards understanding an individual’s behavior. The result is that the
CE method allows us to determine whether and to what extent an individual’s behavior is
reasonable. In this penultimate section I discuss a final consequence of the CE and show
how the CE serves as a guide for developing more reasonable behavior. I offer an initial,
simplified defense of this claim, and then offer a more elaborate defense based on the final
feature of Peirce’s theory of judgment discussed in Section 2.
The CE serves as a guide for developing more reasonable behavior when we recognize
that each type of inference discussed in Chapter 3 recommends certain behaviors for testing
a judgment. The behavior suggested by inductive inference, for example, is the behavior
associated with sampling, which requires observation and attention, repeating observa-
tions, and recording the results. I discuss more of the behavior associated with abductive
inference below. The behavior recommended by abductive inference is, in short, the more
general commitments captured by the pragmatic maxim and the CE. In each case the CE
suggests further behaviors for testing a judgment. This simplified argument shows how the
CE recommends certain behaviors as reasonable.
This initial argument above can be refined and defended when we incorporate features of
Peirce’s theory of judgment and the discussion of investigation at the start of this chapter.
In Section 2, I emphasized a final feature of Peirce’s theory of judgment where reasoning
rests on more general assumptions called guiding principles. According to Peirce these
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guiding principles of reasoning correspond with more general behavioral tendencies. The
CE method, therefore, can be said to recommend the behaviors that correspond with the
guiding principles of reasoning. The discussion of investigation at the end of Section 2
adds to this account by suggesting how these general behaviors develop. An investigator
who is attentive to the inferences upon which a judgment is based recognizes these guiding
principles, eventually factors them into deliberation, and ultimately develops the logical
guiding principles of inquiry. Peircean pragmatism, here characterized by the Continuity of
Explanation, offers a method of reasoning, a method for determining reasonable behavior,
and — now we can add — a method for developing more reasonable behavior.
4.3.1 (Logical) Guiding Principles of Reasoning
In terms of inquiry, keeping the practice going is the only way to ensure that our belief
is neither poor nor undeveloped. Peirce refers to this tendency to keep inquiry going as
the will to learn.13 Peirce offers what I take to be an example of the will to learn when
he praises the work of Wilhelm Wundt, one of the first experimental psychologists. Peirce
writes:
But the most admirable trait of all — that self-respecting quality of Wundt’s
which no foibles can obscure — is his genuine anxiety to correct the opinions
which he at the time entertains, and to cast away his most brilliant theories
the instant the dicta of experience seem to be against them. . . [CP 8:201]
The will to learn, as he puts it elsewhere, begins as a dissatisfaction with one’s present
state of opinions [CP 5:583].
A surefire means of cutting ourselves off from inquiry is to adopt a method that prevents
its continuation. Peirce discusses several assumptions that prevent the will to learn. Taking
a belief to be ultimately settled or fixed is one. As is taking a belief to be ultimately
unknowable or inexplicable.14 The will to learn is a regulative commitments for the practice
13See [CP 5:583], where he introduces the term, and the discussion that follows.
14See discussions of this point in [EP 1:27-30], [EP 1:275], and [EP 2:49-50].
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of inquiry. It is in place to keep the practice of inquiry going and for it to have a chance
at success.
The will to learn can be broken down into two further commitments. Both, as we’ll see,
can be accounted for by the Continuity of Explanation. The first is a fallibilism, which is
the tendency that our beliefs be left open to revision.15 The second is what Peirce refers
to as synechism, which is the tendency to view the world as continuous. Inquiry requires
that we not break reality into unrelated parts. To assume that two areas of inquiry are
unrelated or incommensurate is to cut off further inquiry into the matter and the possibility
of a future state of inquiry where the areas are related. The countervailing tendency to
regard reality as continuous is Peirce’s synechism.16 Peirce writes: “Whatever is wholly
incomparable with anything else is wholly inexplicable, because explanation consists in
bringing things under general laws or under natural classes” [CP 5:289]. The claim offers
direct support for Peirce’s synechism. We need to assume that things are comparable —
that, we may say, there is continuity in the world — in order to try and explain them.
Peirce is explicit about the connection between continuity and generality. Peirce writes
that synechism assumes “that the form under which alone anything can be understood is
the form of generality, which is the same thing as continuity” [CP 6:173]. The assumption
of continuity is, as the passage makes clear, the same assumption of generality that I
appealed to throughout the last chapter. Peirce offers a further version of his synechism in
the form of a maxim suggesting that the conclusions that we reach in inquiry should not
transcend the limitations of the premises upon which they are based:
The first maxim of my “Synechism” runs: “Let us not precide our conclusions
beyond what our premisses definitely warrant.” What you had a right to say
was that for certain logical problems the entire development of cognition and
along with it that of its object become pertinent, and therefore should be taken
into account.17 [CP 8:244]
15See [EP 1:xxii] and [EP 2:49-50].
16See [EP 1:313] and [EP 2:1].
17Of interest, Peirce offers this maxim of synechism as remedy for what he calls the ‘Philosopher’s
Fallacy’: “The fallacy of over-precision which consists not in taking an ell when one has a right to an inch,
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What I take to be particularly enlightening in this passage, is that Peirce seems to be
situating his synechism in the passage above within his theory of judgment. We, at the
very least, can now give an explanation of this connection in terms of the CE developed
here. The CE method serves as the example. An interesting consequence of the CE method
is that in refining the meaning of a judgment the conditions for evaluating the judgment
in turn become clear. The CE method suggests how in tracing out the consequences of
the premises, we can determine the means for evaluating the premises and so test the
result. This, as the quote above suggests, is Peirce’s synechism.18 It is the optimism that
within every judgment we have the means of refining the meaning of the judgment and
determining the conditions that would allow us to test the judgment.19 The optimism of
synechism balances the fallibilism. The CE situates both with respect to the will to learn.
The Continuity of Explanation captures the will to learn and the fallibilism and synechism
it entails. The connection should come as no surprise. These are the most general com-
mitments that regulate reasoning. The continuity of explanation includes these regulative
commitments aimed at keeping explanation going. The continual application (and the
presumed continuity that results) parallels Peirce’s synechism, while the continued dissat-
isfaction with one’s current views parallels Peirce’s fallibilism.
In addition to the regulative commitments of the will to learn above, which represents
but in stretching a warrant for a percentage of a micro-micron to more than the sum of all macro-kilometres,
may be called the Philosopher’s Fallacy” [CP 8:244].
18See a similar remark in terms of what is most characteristic of Peirce’s pragmaticism: “If, besides
being a Critical Common-sensist, he is also a pragmaticist, he will further hold that everything in the
substance of his beliefs can be represented in the schemata of his imagination; that is to say, in what may
be compared to composite photographs of continuous series of modifications of images; these composites
being accompanied by conditional resolutions as to conduct.” We may fill in the details of the example
by suggesting that the composite photograph includes the series of inferences upon which it is based.
Synechism is the assumption of the underlying semiosis in judgment.
19Compare also with the discussion in Chapter 3.2 where I discuss Peirce’s realism and his view that
reasoning has the means to correct itself.
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the decision to engage in inquiry, logical inquiry for the Peircean pragmatist supposes
further regulative commitments of its own; namely, “that [inquiry] is subject to some rules
which all minds are alike bound” [EP 1:113]. This may not seem obvious at first. It
follows, in short, from a further application of the CE to the decision to engage in inquiry.
In settling doubt in terms of belief, we assume that the belief is better on some grounds,
where these grounds are in turn subject to further inquiry. We assume, that is, that
successful inquiry is itself governed by some rules, i.e. that it is governed by some law [EP
1:1:113]. This parallels Peirce’s move to discuss an individual’s actions in terms of a more
general practice. We assume, in engaging in inquiry, that inquiry is governed by standards
and methods characteristic of a general practice. This again should come as no surprise
given that the decision to make sense of an individual’s behavior is a decision to engage in
inquiry.
The regulative commitment that distinguishes scientific inquiry, according to the Peircean
pragmatist, is that it appeals to an underlying notion of reality.20 Peirce writes of scientific
inquiry:
Its fundamental hypothesis, restated in more familiar language, is this: There
are real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about
them; whose realities affect our senses according to regular laws of perception,
so we can ascertain by reasoning how things really are, and any man, if he have
sufficient experience and reason enough about it, will be led to the one true
conclusion. [EP 1:120]
As with all regulative commitments, Peirce is again clear that the scientific hypothesis (i.e.
the underlying notion of reality) begins as an assumption that we can make. We act on
the assumption, according to Peirce, in order to keep scientific inquiry going and for it to
have a chance at being successful.
The notion of reality and the regulative commitments of Peircean inquiry extend and re-
fine the regulative commitments of logical inquiry and the will to learn already discussed.
An underlying reality serves as an explanation for the broad regulative commitment of
20See additional characterizations in [EP 1:52] and [EP 1:138-139].
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logical inquiry. According to scientific practice, reality determines whether inquiry is suc-
cessful and the method by which it is achieved.21 The notion of reality can account for
the assumption that inquirers are bound by the same law. The will to learn is also refined
under scientific practice as Peirce sees it. The will to learn — referred to here in a spe-
cific scientific context, what Peirce refers to as the scientific spirit — requires inquirers to
“not care whether the conclusions be wholesome or dangerous” [CP: 6:434] and requires a
willingness “to dump [their] whole cart-load of beliefs, the moment experience is against
them” [CP 1:55]. Peirce writes: “That which is essential [to scientific inquiry], however, is
the scientific spirit, which is determined not to rest satisfied with existing opinions, but to
press on to the real truth of nature” [CP 1:428].
The real is now taken to be independent of our opinions about it and the desire to learn
the truth must include a docility towards the results of inquiry. This is another expression
for the same desire expressed in the Wundt quote from the beginning of the section. The
will to learn begins as a dissatisfaction with one’s present opinions and proceeds as a
willingness to continue to test one’s opinions in experience.22 “Truth,” Peirce writes, “is
the fruit of free inquiry and of such docility toward facts as shall make us always willing to
acknowledge that we are wrong, and anxious to discover that we have been so” [CP 6:450].
Let me quickly summarize where we stand. For the Peircean pragmatist the will to
learn is a general regulative commitment of inquiry. A Peircean investigator behaves in its
accord. The will to learn can be broken down into a fallibilism and synechism, and can
be refined in scientific inquiry to include the underlying assumption of reality. Each is a
regulative commitment of inquiry. Each corresponds with general behavioral tendencies
that the Peircean pragmatist takes to be appropriate for reasoning.
Refinements to Peirce’s theory of judgment, and in particular the inclusion of the
three types of inference, allows us to further develop this account. Each type of inference
rests on general principles of its own. Abduction captures refinements on the will to
learn, along with further commitments of logical and scientific inquiry. Induction captures
21See [EP 1:145-146].
22Peirce continues in the Wundt passage quoted before, that such a virtue necessarily results “from any
well-considered desire to know the truth” [CP 8:201].
122
the fallibilism and the latter stages of inquiry when an investigator tests a judgment in
experience. Shortly after introducing the will to learn, Peirce situates its role in relation
to these types of inference:
The Inductive Method springs directly out of dissatisfaction with existing knowl-
edge. The great rule of predesignation, which must guide it, is as much as to
say that an induction to be valid must be prompted by a definite doubt or at
least an interrogation; and what is such an interrogation but first, a sense that
we do not know something; second, a desire to know it; and third, an effort
— implying a willingness to labor — for the sake of seeing how the truth may
really be. If that interrogation inspires you, you will be sure to examine the
instances; while if it does not, you will pass them by without attention. [CP
5:584]
The inductive method begins with abduction, and proceeds with an openness to test one’s
opinions in experience. Peirce suggests here that both abduction and induction follow from
the more general behavioral tendency that is the will to learn. I now turn to discuss the
regulative commitments of abductive and inductive inference in particular. I demonstrate
the more general behavioral tendencies that correspond with the guiding principles of these
types of inferences.
4.3.2 (Logical) Guiding Principles of Abduction
Once we recognize (as Section 2 suggests) that inferences rest on further, more general
principles, then we can begin to discuss the more general behaviors that correspond with
these principles. I turn now to discuss abductive inferences, its guiding principles, and the
corresponding behavior in their accord. Peirce goes on to discuss the general principles of
abduction:
I now proceed to consider what principles should guide us in abduction, or
the process of choosing a hypothesis. Underlying all such principles there is a
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fundamental and primary abduction, a hypothesis which we must embrace at
the outset, however destitute of evidentiary support it may be. That hypothesis
is that the facts in hand admit of rationalization, and of rationalization by us.23
[CP 7:219]
Underlying abductive inference is this general principle. It is, as I have referred to it before,
a regulative commitment. It is a commitment to continue to engage in the practice and
for it to have a chance at success.
While at first abduction just poses a question, if it is sincere — if it, as Peirce says
below, is to have any meaning at all — it must contain a further commitment to testing
the abduction. Peirce writes:
A given object presents an extraordinary combination of characters of which
we should like to have an explanation. That there is any explanation of them
is a pure assumption; To assert the truth of its conclusion ever so dubiously
would be too much. There is no warrant for doing more than putting it as an
interrogation. To do that would seem to be innocent; yet if the interrogation
means anything, it means that the hypothesis is to be tested. [HP 2:898-899]
Peirce takes the demand that every hypothesis be tested to be a point driven home by
scientific inquiry.
The circumstance that a hypothesis, although it may lead us to expect some
facts to be as they are, may in the future lead us to erroneous expectations about
other facts, — this circumstance, which anybody must have admitted as soon
as it was brought home to him, was brought home to scientific men so forcibly,
first in astronomy, and then in other sciences, that it became axiomatical that
a hypothesis adopted by abduction could only be adopted on probation, and
must be tested. [CP 7:202]
23The passage continues with a helpful example: “That we must hope they do, for the same reason that
a general who has to capture a position or see his country ruined, must go on the hypothesis that there is
some way in which he can and shall capture it.”
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Every hypothesis is adopted on probation while its consequences are put to the test.24
An abductive inference would be guided by this further commitment. Every abduction
rests on a commitment that the facts in hand admit of rationalization. Every abduction,
furthermore, includes a commitment to testing the hypothesis.
The guiding principle of abduction can continue to be refined. A final refinement (for
our purposes here) comes when we situate abduction amidst its role within the other types
of inference. Abduction furnishes the concepts employed in deduction and induction, and
it is ultimately held accountable to these other inference types. Abduction begins when
a question is posed and a hypothesis is offered as a potential response. The hypothesis is
then put on probation while its consequences are traced out and put to the test. Induction
ultimately determines whether and to what extent the hypothesis is affirmed in experience.
This is in accord with the broader principles discussed above. An abduction needs to
admit of rationalization and of further testing in order for it to be inductively appropriate.
The guiding principle of abduction, given this refinement, rests on abductions ultimate
accountability to the other inference types.
Recall the general principle that Peirce takes to govern abduction that was introduced
in Chapter 2.2:
Any hypothesis, therefore, may be admissible, in the absence of any special
reasons to the contrary, provided it be capable of experimental verification,
and only insofar as it is capable of such verification. [CP 5:197]
This regulative principle of abductive inference arises when we recognize the role abduction
plays amongst the other types of inference. It is simply a restatement of the claim above
24Peirce gives a nice summary of this point in [CP 7:220]. In the passage Peirce emphasizes that a
hypotheses should also be selected on considerations of economy. On the one hand the argument for
economy seems quite simple — Peirce recognizes that we need to recognize that some hypothesis are easier
to test, and so some will be more fruitful and economical for further inquiry than others — but I take the
underlying argument to be dependent on Peirce’s logic and to be more subtle and complicated. For this
reason I do not address it here.
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that every abductive inference would eventually be held accountable to further inductive
testing. Recall, also, the early version of the pragmatic maxim that I took as my starting
point in Chapter 2.1:
Admit no statement concerning what passes within us except as a hypothesis
necessary to explain what takes place in what we commonly call the external
world. [EP 1:30]
This is also a restatement of the guiding principle of abduction in terms of its ultimate
accountability to induction. Each is simply an early version of the pragmatic maxim. Here
we see again that the pragmatic maxim is a regulative commitment of abduction. At this
point we can be more specific and state that the pragmatic maxim is a guiding principle of
Peircean inquiry. Though it begins as a vague regulative commitment, it can be defended
as a guiding principle supported by Peirce’s theory of judgment.
The pragmatic maxim is a product and development of inquiry. It is a development
that arises from investigating the regulative commitments of the practice of inquiry. The
Continuity of Explanation can account for this development. The CE can account for
both how the pragmatic maxim arose in inquiry and how it will continue to be developed
during inquiry. The answer to both is the process of understanding the guiding principles of
inquiry, and in this case in particular, of understanding the guiding principles of abduction.
An individual who continues to intentionally engage in abductive inference, would come
to be attentive of these guiding principles. An investigator who continues to pay attention
to the guiding principles of abductive inferences and its results begins a process of sampling.
Such an investigator would recognize that these guiding principles are affirmed as one
engages in the practice. The Peircean investigator would come to recognize and behave in
accord with these guiding principles. This affirmation that follows arises through a second
type of inference — that of induction — and so we now turn to it.
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4.3.3 (Logical) Guiding Principles of Induction
I discussed above some of the guiding principles for abductive inference. In this section
I discuss some of the guiding principles for induction. The discussion is aided by the
account of induction given in Chapter 3.2.3. Recall that Peirce takes induction to rest on
assumptions about sampling. Sampling requires observation and attention, recording the
results, and repeating this process of observation and recordings. Summarizing induction,
Peirce writes:
The operation of testing a hypothesis by experiment, which consists in remark-
ing that, if it is true, observations made under certain conditions ought to have
certain results, and then causing those conditions to be fulfilled, and noting
the results, and, if they are favorable, extending a certain confidence to the
hypothesis, I call induction. [CP 6:526]
The passage above suggests that induction rests on regulative commitments to attention,
experimentation, and the like. We can now discuss these commitments in terms of guiding
principles of inductive inference.
I argued in Chapter 3.2.3 that induction rests on two assumptions. The first is the
assumption that parts make up and constitute the whole. The second is that through
continued sampling an investigator would converge, albeit indefinitely, on an accurate ap-
proximation of the way things are.25 These begin simply as assumptions — they are, I
argued, regulative commitments of inductive inference. An individual who intentionally en-
gages in inductive inference, would nonetheless come to be attentive to these assumptions.
A process of further sampling follows and these guiding principles are in turn subject to
inductive sampling. It is here that the guiding principles of induction begin to be affirmed
in experience.
Recall that according to Peirce the warrant for induction lies in confidence in the
inductive method (see, again, the discussion in Chapter 3.2.3). The warrant for induction,
25See again the discussion of induction in Chapter 3.2.3. Also passages from Peirce in [CP 5:349], [CP
2:269], & [CP 2:709].
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Peirce writes, is that “this method persistently applied to the problem must in the long
run produce a convergence (though irregular) to the truth” [CP 2:775]. The CE method
and the discussion above allows us to refine this account. An investigator who continues
to intentionally engage in inductive inference, begins to pay attention to the assumptions
upon which induction relies and the result is the same process of sampling. The method
and guiding principles of induction begin to be affirmed. Peirce writes:
. . . it cannot be said that we know an inductive conclusion to be true, however
loosely we state it; we only know that by accepting inductive conclusions, in
the long run our errors balance one another. In fact, insurance companies
proceed upon induction; — they do not know what will happen to this or that
policyholder; they only know that they are secure in the long run. [CP 5:350]
The investigator who continues to intentionally engage in induction begins to have confi-
dence that the method is secure in the long run. The result is a more general effect on an
individual’s behavior. It is a general confidence that the method would prove successful.
This general confidence in the inductive method preserves Peirce’s falliblism. Because
the convergence is irregular this confidence is not in any one result of the inductive method.
Peirce is explicit on this point:
. . . it is by no means certain that the conclusion actually drawn in any given
case would turn out true in the majority of cases where precisely such a method
was followed; but what is certain is that, in the majority of cases, the method
would lead to some conclusion that was true, and that in the individual case
in hand, if there is any error in the conclusion, that error will get corrected by
simply persisting in the employment of the same method. [CP 2:781, emphasis
in original]
The Peircean investigator would come to have a general confidence in the inductive method.
This corresponds with a hope that errors balance out in the long run, and do so all the while
recognizing that the current outcome may not be affirmed in the long run. Confidence in
the inductive method sustains Peirce’s fallibilism. The investigator in this case would have
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confidence that the method pursued indefinitely would converge (though irregularly, as the
quote makes clear) to the truth.
This general confidence in the inductive method is again the product of inquiry. It is a
development that arises from investigating the guiding principles of the practice of inquiry.
Just like in abduction, the CE can account for this development. The general confidence
in the inductive method comes from refining and developing the guiding principles of
induction. The Peircean investigator behaves in accord with the guiding principles of
induction.
I ended the last section on the guiding principles of abductive inference by turning
to the affirmation that induction provides. Here we see that the result is an increased
confidence in the guiding principles of abductive inference. An investigator — one who is
intentionally engaged in inquiry and so on the inferences upon which inquiry is based —
who continues to engage in the practice would come to be attentive to them. The result
is that these guiding principles of abduction in turn begin to see assent and affirmation
through induction. Peirce recognizes that an abduction method can be put to the test:
The validity of a presumptive adoption of a hypothesis for examination consists
in this, that the hypothesis being such that its consequences are capable of
being tested by experimentation, and being such that the observed facts would
follow from it as necessary conclusions, that hypothesis is selected according to
a method which must ultimately lead to the discovery of the truth, so far as
the truth is capable of being discovered, with an indefinite approximation to
accuracy. [CP 2:781]
By developing the guiding principles of abduction and testing them through induction, one
gains confidence in the abductive method.
The general confidence in abductive and inductive inference leads to more general effects
on an individual’s behavior. The investigator that continues to intentionally engage in the
practice would come to have increased confidence in the guiding principles of the practice.
An investigator would begin to act in accord with the guiding principles of abduction and




I have suggested that the Continuity of Explanation serves as a guide for developing more
reasonable behavior. In this chapter I have shown how certain behaviors correspond with
the three types of inferences of which Peirce takes judgment to consist — abductive, de-
ductive, and inductive inference. Each type of inference recommends certain behaviors for
testing and evaluation, and each rests on certain guiding principles that correspond with
more general behaviors.
Inductive inference recommends certain behaviors related to observation and sampling.
But there are also further guiding principles upon which induction rests. Induction, for
Peirce, rests on the commitment that in the long run continued sampling would converge
(albeit indefinitely) on some truth. An investigator who is attentive to this guiding principle
would come to have a confidence in the inductive method. The result is a recognition
that progress — progress of convergence towards some truth — comes from continued
investigation.
Abductive inference results in the development of a hypothesis. Abductive inference
rests on a primary abduction that the “the facts in hand admit of rationalization and,
of rationalization by us” [CP 7:219]. An abductive inference furthermore, if it is to be
sincere, rests on some commitment to test that hypothesis. This is a commitment to the
abductive inference having some experiential content so that observation and sampling can
operate. The guiding principle of abductive inference is none other than the pragmatic
maxim. Abductive inferences, carried out over and over again, in turn leads to inductive
support. Both types of inference support each other.
Peirce also suggests behaviors that correspond with reasoning in general. These behav-
iors, for Peirce, include a will to learn, fallibilism, and a synechism. Continued abductions
and inductions suggest that these behaviors would be affirmed as inquiry continues. The
result is the final support for the claim that Peircean pragmatism offers a guide for de-





Charles Peirce is not known for his ethical and normative thought. Most of Peirce’s writings
focus on logic and scientific inquiry. Peirce nonetheless increasingly came to recognize the
ethical and normative significance of his theory of logic and inquiry.
The secondary scholarship on Peirce’s normative and ethical thought has mostly focused
on two strands in Peirce’s writings.1 The first are Peirce’s comments on the relation
between ethics and his classification of the normative sciences. The second are Peirce’s
comments on the division between theory and practice in ‘Philosophy and the Conduct of
Life’. His remarks suggest, and the secondary literature has tended to agree, that a more
general guide for developing behavior does not follow from within his theory of logic and
inquiry.2
I take a significant part of Peirce’s normative thought to have gone under-examined. A
guide for behavior does follow from within Peirce’s theory logic and inquiry. This becomes
clear when we properly situate the relation between belief and the corresponding mode of
action that belief establishes. Peirce’s theory of judgment, which allows us to evaluate a
1See the introductions in [3], and [19].
2See throughout [8].
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belief, can then be applied to the evaluation of the corresponding mode of action. The dis-
sertation makes this connection, latent in Peirce’s writings, explicit. Peircean pragmatism
— here characterized by the Continuity of Explanation — offers a guide for developing
more reasonable behavior.
The argument begins with the pragmatic assumption that the meaning of a belief is the
mode of action it establishes. I go on to show how any change in belief corresponds with
a specific change in the mode of action. The argument for this is introduced in Chapter
2 but reaches its culmination in Chapter 3, where I offer a method for how this specific
change can be determined and evaluated. The result is that the CE can determine whether
a belief is reasonable. Chapter 4 extends this account. The method developed in Chapter
3 does not simply offer a means of determining whether a belief is reasonable; it suggests a
method for developing more reasonable beliefs and corresponding modes of action. Peircean
pragmatism does not simply describe beliefs in terms of corresponding modes of action, but
recommends certain beliefs and behaviors as well. Peircean pragmatism therefore offers a
more general guide for behavior.
Once belief and its corresponding mode of action are situated, then a theory for indi-
viduating actions follows. It has been noted by several authors (see [18, 4, 17]) that prag-
matism offers a theory of action. Recalling a quote from Robert Tallisse about whether
pragmatism is a philosophy of action, Tallisse writes:
[Pragmatism is] concerned with giving an empiricist and naturalist account of
action. It wants to try and understand all of the philosophical concepts that
we think are important for explaining action — like belief, truth, meaning
— in naturalistic terms rather than through an appeal to something either
transcendental or mental in some non-naturalistic sense, or a Cartesian sense.
It tries to naturalize all these concepts by explaining them in terms of human
activity and action. [31]
In this dissertation the further details for this philosophy of action, at least in the case
of Peircean pragmatism, have been presented. I show how belief, reasons, the practice of
inquiry, as well as deliberate and intentional behavior, can each be explained in terms of
corresponding modes of action.
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The aim of the dissertation is to lay the foundation for an alternative approach to a
Peircean normative theory and ethics. While there has been increasing interest in Peirce’s
normative thought and extending this normativity to ethics, there has been little interest
in developing a Peircean ethics from within Peirce’s theory of judgment and inquiry alone.
I think a Peircean ethics can be motivated, and indeed is already latent within, his more
general writings on these subjects. It is this approach that I have begun to develop here.
Most broadly, Peirce takes an ethical theory to be a general guide for conduct — it offers a
guide for conduct in thought, action more generally, and feeling. The question is whether a
more general guide for conduct follows from within Peirce’s theory of judgment and inquiry.
I’ve taken the first step in this dissertation towards showing that it does. Peirce’s theory
of judgment and inquiry provides a guide for action more generally in offering a guide
for developing reasonable behavior. This approach has one significant advantage. Rather
than showing how Pierce’s theory of inquiry applies to a new domain, namely ethics or
morality, this approach shows how a guide for behavior follows from within Peirce’s theory
of inquiry. No additional assumptions or metaphysics is needed.
The thesis offers further benefits. The Continuity of Explanation (CE) is the commit-
ment that every judgment entails consequences for action that are accountable to scientific
inquiry. The CE serves as a characterization of Peircean pragmatism in that it captures
three core aspects of Peirce’s philosophy: (i) Peirce’s metaphysical assumptions, (ii) the
pragmatic maxim, and (iii) Peirce’s theory of judgment. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 defend
the CE and its relation to these three aspects of Peirce’s thought. Substantial aspects
of Peirce’s philosophy can be recovered from the Continuity of Explanation. The thesis
demonstrates the recovery (at least in part) of Peirce’s synechism, fallibilisim, and his
realism. Other aspects, such as Peirce’s tychism, can be recovered as well.
Just as significant, the Continuity of Explanation is presented in a continuous story of
development. In regards to the development of a belief, Peirce writes:
A belief-habit in its development begins by being vague, special, and meagre;
it becomes more precise, general, and full, without limit. The process of this
development, so far as it takes place in the imagination, is called thought. [CP
3:160]
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I show here how the CE begins as a vague commitment to scientific inquiry. As inquiry
continues this commitment becomes more precise. What begins as a vague regulative
commitment, develops into the pragmatic maxim, is further developed through Peirce’s
theory of judgment to be both a theory of meaning and of inquiry, and this leads , in turn,
to the development of deliberate and intentional (and onto further normative aspects) of
Peirce’s theory of inquiry. The CE remains throughout, but is increasingly made more
precise, general, and full.
I end with several remarks regarding the continuation of the project. Several of Peirce’s
remarks suggests that his pragmatism (and so, analogously, the CE) serves as a guide for
sentiment in addition to behavior. Peirce goes on to suggests that the investigator would
come to acquire these sentiments and behaviors if they were to continue to engage in
the practice. I address these points in turn and begin with the connection to sentiment.
The development of sentiments can be incorporated by the framework presented in the
dissertation. All that is needed is a further claim that desires and sentiments are included
in regulative commitments. Some passages from Peirce seem to support this approach.
Below is one such passage:
It may seem strange that I should put forward three sentiments, namely, in-
terest in an indefinite community, recognition of the possibility of this interest
being made supreme, and hope in the unlimited continuance of intellectual ac-
tivity, as indispensable requirements of logic. Yet, when we consider that logic
depends on a mere struggle to escape doubt, which, as it terminates in action,
must begin in emotion, and that, furthermore, the only cause of our planting
ourselves on reason is that other methods of escaping doubt fail on account of
the social impulse, why should we wonder to find social sentiment presupposed
in reasoning? [CP 2:665]
Peirce suggests here that the guiding principles of reasoning include the development of
certain sentiments.3 An inquirer who possesses sentiments corresponding with the regu-
lative commitments will be in the best position to engage in the practice of inquiry. The
3This connection is recognized and elaborated in [14, Ch. 9].
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inquirer’s behavior will in this case be in the least amount of friction with the practice of
inquiry and its results. I do not defend this claim here, but I take the sentiments Peirce
suggests above to be variations on the guiding principles of induction described in Section
3.3. Each of these sentiments correspond with commitments for continued sampling. The
only difference is that in this case this commitments of sampling extend to the community
of inquirers.
Developing this further connnection between the CE and sentiment will go some way
towards developing a Peircean ethics. Peirce took ethics most broadly to be a guide for
conduct in each of its three forms — conduct in thought, conduct in action or behavior
more generally, and conduct in feeling. The CE has been shown to guide conduct in thought
and behavior. Developing how the CE serves as a guide for sentiment would produce the
third component that Peirce takes to distinguish an ethical theory.
The second point is that Peirce suggests that an investigator is destined to acquire
certain beliefs if inquiry continues. The Peircean investigator who continues to engage in
the practice of inquiry would come to behave in certain ways. Let me first clarify what
Peirce means by ‘destined.’ He writes:
I have given many other reasons for my firm belief that there are real possibili-
ties. I also think, however, that, in addition to actuality and possibility, a third
mode of reality must be recognized in that which, as the gipsy fortune-tellers
express it, is “sure to come true,” or, as we may say, is destined. . . [CP 4:547]
Peirce does not intend to use the term as a metaphysical or mystical notion.4 Giving an
4See a useful comparison to the use of ‘fated’:
Fate means merely that which is sure to come true, and can nohow be avoided. It is a
superstition to suppose that a certain sort of events are ever fated, and it is another to
suppose that the word fate can never be freed from its superstitious taint. We are all fated
to die. [CP 5:407n]
Peirce distinguishes ‘fated’ from ‘destined’ in [CP 4:547n]. The difference does not influence the point
here.
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example of the destined results of investigation, Peirce writes:5
On the other hand, all the followers of science are animated by a cheerful hope
that the processes of investigation, if only pushed far enough, will give one cer-
tain solution to each question to which they apply it. One man may investigate
the velocity of light by studying the transits of Venus and the aberration of the
stars; another by the oppositions of Mars and the eclipses of Jupiter’s satellites;
a third by the method of Fizeau; a fourth by that of Foucault; a fifth by the
motions of the curves of Lissajoux; a sixth, a seventh, an eighth, and a ninth,
may follow the different methods of comparing the measures of statical and
dynamical electricity. They may at first obtain different results, but, as each
perfects his method and his processes, the results are found to move steadily to-
gether toward a destined centre. So with all scientific research. Different minds
may set out with the most antagonistic views, but the progress of investigation
carries them by a force outside of themselves to one and the same conclusion.
This activity of thought by which we are carried, not where we wish, but to
a fore-ordained goal, is like the operation of destiny. No modification of the
point of view taken, no selection of other facts for study, no natural bent of
mind even, can enable a man to escape the predestinate opinion. [CP 5:407]
Peirce is discussing destined opinions or beliefs in these passages. Given the discus-
sion through the thesis, however, the Peircean pragmatist cannot separate these destined
beliefs from the destined modes of action that correspond with them. The framework
presented in the dissertation can again accommodate such a position. Given the account
of intentional behavior, the Peircean investigator can begin to determine what an investi-
gator would believe, behave (and perhaps feel) if they were to continue to engage in the
practice of inquiry. The account of intentional behavior, that is, provides the tools to
begin to defend this position. Connecting the CE method to sentiments and strengthening
the connection to destined beliefs, behaviors (and even sentiments) would move Peircean
5Peirce makes the same point with respect to logic in [CP 3:161]. Also see a similar discussion in [CP
7:334-5]
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pragmatism closer towards a developed ethical theory. The CE method as developed here,
however, makes substantial inroads by showing how Peircean pragmatism offers a guide
for developing more reasonable behavior.
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